Publications
Parade, Plebiscite, Pandemic: Legitimation Efforts in Putin’s Fourth Term
Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement.
Policy brief comparing the EU and other stakeholders’ prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the Balkans and the broader MENA region
This policy brief offers a cross-regional comparison of PREVEX findings regarding the efficacity of the EU’s PVE efforts. Based upon an amalgamation of PREVEX partners’ policy briefs over the Balkans (D5.1), the Maghreb/Sahel (D6.1) and the Middle East (D7.1), two reports on respectively EU’s policies and instruments for PVE (D4.1) and the implementation of these (D4.2), further corroborated by an extensive validation background study (D8), we have the following recommendations to the EU: EU – ‘DOs’ -Increase cooperation with High Muslim Councils -Enhance their standing -Empower them to act against IVE EU – ‘DON’Ts’ – A, B, C -Avoid the all-out securitization of everything ‘Islamic’. -Block imported Islamic ‘Madhhab’ (Wahabism) from entering European spheres -Consult ‘elders’ and rethink funding youth projects that lack proven PVEimpact
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance and human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments” – areas in which various factors create a conducive situation where segments of its population become prone to violent extremism. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and experiencing these grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? In our newly released PREVEX working paper analyzing the drivers, occurrence, and non-occurrence of violent extremism in the MENA region, we study four cases of the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.1 Specifically, we analyze why segments among disenfranchised Islamist Egyptian youth, the majority of Jordanian jihadists, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and the Syrian village Swedan in the Deir Ez-Zor province have displayed a far greater resilience to carrying out violent extremism than others. We assess the role and importance of local community and religious leaders, the role of tribal affiliation, ideological exposure, good governance and political inclusion, poverty and marginalization, and state repression. We address both a scholarly puzzle and a policy problem. If the aforementioned grievances create enabling environments conducive to violent extremism, why is it that the majority in these situations actually abstain from violence and reject extremist ideologies? What does that tell us about the role and dynamics of enabling environments? The policy problem relates to how one evaluates, weighs, and approaches populations in enabling environments and who are thus perceived to be prone to violent extremism. Put bluntly, should a population residing in an enabling environment be treated as future extremists or terrorists, to wit, a problem in need of securitization? Necessarily, these findings have consequences for how we perceive the feasibility of past and current EU funding programs intended to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East.
Working Paper on ´enabling environments´, drivers and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance, human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments”. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and who experience such grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any violent extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? Based on in-depth fieldwork in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, we study and analyze four cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East to further our understanding of enabling environments, community resilience, and the decisive moments pushing people to, or away from, violence.
European defence beyond institutional boundaries: Improved European defence through flexibility, differentiation and coordination
As a response to the changing geopolitical situation, initiatives aimed to strengthen European defence have been taken in NATO, in the EU, but also bi- and multilaterally between EU member states and associated non-members, such as Norway. This policy brief argues that all these processes must be taken into account when we want to measure the full security and defence capacity of Europe. Rather than a sign of fragmentation, they are preparing the ground for a new European defence architecture, characterised by a high degree of flexibility, which in the end may be better adapted to the current security context. To maximalise the effect of this differentiated defence architecture, however, a certain coordination between the different initiatives is needed. There is now a window of opportunity for such coordination, as two key processes are now running in parallel: the development of a new “strategic concept” for NATO and the development of a “Strategic Compass” in the EU. If this succeeds, we can hope for the development of a more flexible and capable European defence.
Nordic Airpower Cooperation and Finland’s F-35 decision: Towards a New Era?
The Nordic states air forces have cooperated closely, especially after Russia reinvigorated its military posture in the region from 2007-2008. With regional security policy and military strategy becoming more closely integrated after 2014, this tactical activity has become a key part of an emerging strategic-level pattern of cooperation. Closer political and military integration has enabled regional security cooperation to proliferate across unit types and activities. With the introduction of new generation fighter aircraft in the short term, and future air combat systems in the longer term, cooperation is set to change, but given its dual imperative is bound to continue and expand as new avenues emerge. Especially, the continuation of CBT in the short and long term has both a tactical and strategic rationale. Finland’s decision to procure the F-35 Lightning II will enable even closer airpower cooperation in the Nordics and in a broader European and trans-Atlantic framework, both in peace, crisis, and armed conflict. System similarity with Norway extends to the JSM, which opens the possibility for joint development of this weapon system and its operational use. As such, the procurement sets the stage for closer collaboration at both the tactical, operational and military-industrial levels.
AUKUS and its implications for Asia, US-European relations and non-proliferation
The political, strategic and technological aspects of the AUKUS deal may be more important than the provision of nuclear-powered submarines. The deal is a clear sign of the US tilt towards Asia and will have important implications for both USFrench, US-EU and US-NATO relations. AUKUS does not imply any nuclear weapons proliferation risk. However, it paths the way for a proliferation of nuclear-powered submarines, which will open for legitimate and illegitimate claims for producing Highly Enriched Uranium. It remains to be seen whether the strategic benefits of AUKUS in the Indo-pacific will outweigh its political costs for transatlantic relations and the image of the United States as a trusted security partner.
Trade, Trust, and De Facto State Conflicts: Abkhazia’s International Economic Engagement
Does trade really foster trust? In the case of conflict-torn regions, developing trade links is often believed to contribute to transforming conflict or even facilitate peacebuilding. However, when it comes to de facto states—states with no or limited international recognition—the relationship between the two may not be quite as straightforward. A closer look at Abkhazia, a de facto state in the contested neighborhood between Russia and the EU, shows that trade can thrive even in a post-conflict situation where mutual distrust is high. However, as long as trade occurs informally and in the shadows, it does not help in building trust at the state level.
The Role of External Powers in EU–Asia Security Relations
This chapter maps out the changing roles played by the United States, Russia and India as security actors in East Asia, and their influence on EU foreign and security policies in the region. Detailing the waxing and waning of the US’ ‘unipolar moment’, Russia’s military resurgence, and the increasingly assertive balancing acts of India, the chapter reviews the main policy developments implemented by these three actors since 1990 and how their policies converge or diverge with the EU’s approaches across a range of traditional and non-traditional security issues. The chapter concludes that the challenge for the EU is to advance its interests, and augment the effects, of its policies and instruments in Asia considering the potential for collaboration and contestation with the United States, Russia and India, three very different actors that diverge considerably in both strategic intentions and capabilities.
Nordic cooperation amid pandemic travel restrictions
Since 2020, the Nordic countries have been confronted with the Covid-19 pandemic, which has been a multi-level stress test for the region. The strong basis of open borders and free movement in Nordic cooperation has been questioned by national pandemic measures, including wide travel restrictions. The Nordic dimension to pandemic responses has largely been missing, the trust between the countries has arguably been put to test and cross-border commuters have been subjected to differential treatment. Especially cross-border regions have suffered the consequences of travel restrictions, causing disruptions to work and private life. The report draws attention to the preparedness of the Nordic Region to jointly confront global crises. It explores the different strategies and travel restrictions adopted by four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. It also studies how Nordic cooperation functioned in a time of crisis. At the local level, it examines the economic, labour market and social implications for three cross-border regions, that is, Tornedalen, Svinesund and Öresund. The report finds that while there is room for improvement in handling a crisis like the pandemic, there are diverging views on the desirability to have all-Nordic approaches to situations affecting national security. The consequences are, however, serious for free movement and the aim to become the most integrated region in the world.