Publications
Background study: Cross-regional comparison of ‘DOs and DON’Ts’ in the EU’s PVE Measures: Balkans, Maghreb/ Sahel & Middle East
The following report presents the research findings of a cross-societal comparison of PREVEX-related regions, with the aim of providing ideas about what has been successful and what has proven detrimental to the EU’s preventing violent extremism (PVE) efforts. As per the PREVEX consortium’s project architecture, structured comparisons serve as a central pillar for the extrapolation and generation of cross-cutting lessons and policy recommendations concerning PVE. While sporadic, intra-regional, comparative elements are already apparent within three PREVEX regional Policy Briefs – on the Balkans (D5.1), the Maghreb/Sahel (D6.1) and the Middle East (D7.1) – these documents are confined to countries within these respective regions that partly share territorial, societal, and cultural similarities. In contrast, the explicit mandate for the research to be undertaken here under Work Package 8 is to conduct cross-cutting comparisons between these radically different regions – all without losing sight of domestic-specific PVE aspects, the highlighting of which might help to generate ideas for other contexts. The conduct of such cross-regional comparisons is premised upon the methodological prerequisite of being aware, as the comparisons are being conducted, of some wide qualitative differences between the regions compared. The identification of lessons for policymaking will be considerably stronger if one can demonstrate that, despite considerable divergences, certain PVE strategies continue to perform well across the board. The consolidation of such lessons – based on validations from across different cultures, structural contexts, and radically divergent Islamic traditions – provides for an additional measure of confirmation as to their pertinence. The overt attempt of the authors of this study has been to search diligently for such ‘across-the-board’ lessons.
Nordic partnership choices in a fierier security environment: Towards more alignment
Nordic states’ partnership choices in security and defence are more aligned than they were a decade ago. When Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish government officials now identify key security challenges and partners, and reflect on the potential for Nordic cooperation, they have the same reference points and use similar wording. Since 2014, the toolbox for Nordic defence cooperation has also solidified and different formal affiliations with NATO and the EU seem to matter less than before. Furthermore, an array of multi- and minilateral cooperation structures have emerged across and beyond the EU and NATO, expanding the possibilities for Nordic cooperation under a larger Euro-Atlantic umbrella. However, two limitations remain: First, Nordic security and defence cooperation still remains subordinate to and a supplement rather than an alternative to NATO. Second, putting Nordic response mechanisms into practice remains dependent not only on the context and issue at stake, but also on the political appetite of the individual Nordic governments to choose a Nordic solution.
On digital media in Lebanon's political crisis
The technology-driven transformation of the media environment is changing politics worldwide. Yet everywhere is not the same. The digital revolution yields different results in different political contexts. This policy brief analyses digital media’s role in the political crisis unfolding in Lebanon – a weak, divided and contested state. It discusses the implications for Norwegian development aid to the country. Part 3 of 4 in the series: Digital technology and international politics
Russian reframing: Norway as an outpost for NATO offensives
Moscow increasingly views the ‘Collective West’ as an offensive actor and the High North as terrain for NATO ‘expansion’. Norway figures as an active partner in this endeavour. For Norway, this situation is precarious: to the degree that Norway is seen as an inimical ‘NATO in the North’, Norwegian policies across a range of issue-areas increasingly risk being perceived as actions in an existential Russia–West struggle. This is worrisome because a key pillar of official Norwegian policy towards Russia involves balancing NATO deterrence with reassurance. As the military/non-military distinction becomes blurred in the eyes of Russia this crucial balancing becomes very difficult – the intended ‘reassuring’ signal might not come across.
Chinese digi-tech politics: Steering growth, spurring innovation, and reinforcing control
China is a growing digital technology (digi-tech) power and a leading provider of digi-tech resources internationally. China’s digi-tech growth is helping to create opportunities in other and developing countries, but it also stirring concern regarding digital security and the safeguarding of individual freedoms. Digi-tech is at the heart of the major power rivalry playing out between China and the USA. In this brief, we study the key drivers and main implications of Chinese digi-tech politics while also considering Norwegian digi-tech interests.
COVID-19 and the Resilience of Africa’s Peace and Security Networks
Many commentators predicted that the impact of COVID-19 on Africa, with its high levels of under-development and weak public health systems, will be particularly catastrophic. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic sectors have exposed and compounded preexisting social, political, and environmental vulnerabilities, especially in conflict-affected countries and regions, and have severely stress-tested their social cohesion and resilience. Global and local peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Africa have also been significantly disrupted. More than 1 year into the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, however, the emerging pattern is one of resilience rather than insecurity and chaos. This article assesses the disruption caused by COVID-19 to Africa’s peace and security networks and considers how a complexity informed Adaptive Peacebuilding approach can assist in strengthening community resilience and stimulating self-organized adaptive capacity. The spread of the virus is still increasing steadily, and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. The question is what can African civil society, governments and multilateral organizations do to further strengthen and support the pattern of resilience that has emerged over the first 1 year of the COVID-19 crises in Africa?
Small States at the Top of Global Diplomacy: Different Tactics of Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council
Op-Ed discussing what elected members of the UNSC can hope to achieve in a setting marked by great power tensions and ineffective working procedures.
COVID-19 and the Resilience of Africa’s Peace and Security Networks
Many commentators predicted that the impact of COVID-19 on Africa, with its high levels of under-development and weak public health systems, will be particularly catastrophic. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic sectors have exposed and compounded preexisting social, political, and environmental vulnerabilities, especially in conflict-affected countries and regions, and have severely stress-tested their social cohesion and resilience. Global and local peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Africa have also been significantly disrupted. More than 1 year into the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, however, the emerging pattern is one of resilience rather than insecurity and chaos. This article assesses the disruption caused by COVID-19 to Africa’s peace and security networks and considers how a complexity informed Adaptive Peacebuilding approach can assist in strengthening community resilience and stimulating self-organized adaptive capacity. The spread of the virus is still increasing steadily, and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. The question is what can African civil society, governments and multilateral organizations do to further strengthen and support the pattern of resilience that has emerged over the first 1 year of the COVID-19 crises in Africa? The author would like to recognize the invaluable research assistance of Neyma Mahomed Ali and the contribution of ACCORD’s COVID-19 Conflict and Resilience Monitor. The engagement with colleagues and contributors stimulated much of the analysis contained in this article.
The Persistence of the Civic-Ethnic binary: Competing Visions of the Nation and Civilisation in Western Central and Eastern Europe
The normative binary of ‘good-progressive’ and ‘bad-retrograde’ nationalism, traceable to the civic and ethnic dichotomy, is alive and well in studies of nationalism and populism today. This article underlines the insufficiency of this approach, firstly by examining three stances on the civic nation in the West, each of which rejects ethnic nationalism and reflect different fundamental concerns. Moving east, in Central Europe the binary is inverted and turned against ‘liberal cosmopolitans’; in Russia, the Kremlin’s ‘state-civilization’ project can be viewed as a distinct trend in nation-building for non-Western contemporary great powers.
Securitisation of the EU approach to the Western Balkans: from conflict transformation to crisis management.
This chapter analyses the EU’s crisis response in the Western Balkans through the lens of EULEX. By exploring how those immediately responsible for mandate execution and those directly affected by its outcomes perceive EULEX, we discover gaps that highlight the pitfalls of direct and ingrained political interference in the mission’s work. While EULEX has been seen as an important watchdog for preventing further human rights abuses, the EU’s approach to Kosovo and the region continues to be characterised by competing priorities: the EU’s broader political objectives impact the mission’s legal work and hamper the EU in achieving a coherent and impactful rule of law policy. In turn, this decreases the local populations’ trust and approval of EULEX and ultimately undermines the EU’s overall goals of promoting good governance and a European perspective for Kosovo. This tension highlights the incompatibility of the EU’s short-term focus on crisis management and the more longterm focus on crisis transformation. We see this as particularly problematic for an actor whose self-image as a ‘normative power’, is underpinned by an assumption that its influence in the world in gained through ‘the power of ideas’.