Research project
Norway as an in-between for Russia: Ambivalent space, hybrid measures
It will investigate in depth Russia’s changing official view of recent NATO engagement in the High North and of Norway’s status within this endeavor and ascertain what means of force Russia sees fit in its approach to NATO. By coupling the study of Russia’s approach with a study of NATO's changing approach to Russia in the same period, we will uncover the interactive game that shapes the challenges for Norway as a small state ‘in-between’ a resurgent Russia and inside a reinvigorated NATO, paying particular attention to how notions of hybrid warfare play out in this game. Methodologically, the study scrutinizes official statements by combining quantitative textual tools with (qualitative) discourse analysis, maximizing efficacy and rigor.
The project will produce three policy briefs with complimentary ‘brownbag’ seminars, two co-financed academic peer-reviewed articles, as well as conference participation and communication to the general public. It is co-financed with the NFR sponsored WARU project (300923).
Other co-financed deliverables for this project:
The Russia Conference 2023: Russia and the West – a new reality | NUPI
Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic | Arctic Review on Law and Politics
Full article: Reimagining NATO after Crimea: Defender of the rule-based order and truth?
Project Manager
Participants
New publications
Topos of threat and metapolitics in Russia’s securitisation of NATO post-Crimea
This article makes a twofold contribution on the relationship between self/other securitisation, ambiguous threat constructions, and anxiety at the intersection of Securitisation Theory (ST) and Ontological Security Studies (OSS). First, we develop the concept topos of threat (TT) as a potent linguistic anchor in securitisation processes. TTs depict an entire self/other threat situation that warrants escape, serving identity needs while staying flexible and ambiguous. However, their frequent rhetorical deployment can blur the threat construction and increase anxiety: this challenges the classical scholarly assumption that antagonism necessarily alleviates anxiety. Second, we theorise metapolitics as an anxiety mediation strategy. Metapolitics is a mode of interpretation – a relentless analysis of surface clues to expose a deceptive, powerful adversary – which in the final event fails to alleviate anxiety. The dual practice of nurturing topoi of threat and metapolitics drives conflict because it sets in motion a vicious securitisation spiral that entrenches rigid patterns of self/other representation and fosters a bias of anticipating hostility. We employ abductive theorising: working with established theory alongside empirical discovery through a discourse analysis of Russia’s official rhetoric on NATO and the use of the TT ‘colour revolution’ since the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014.
Trump II: A new trajectory in Russia relations for NATO Nordic states
• The incoming Trump administration will replace the policy of “stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” with “making a deal with Russia”. This might entail de-escalation with Russia as well as economic and security burden-sharing with Europe. Norway and its now NATO neighbours Sweden and Finland have a window of opportunity to develop new policy for the second Trump term. • An adjusted approach to relations with Russia in the North can be devised that draws on Norwegian traditions in its relations with Russia. This approach will differ from the UK, Poland and the Baltic States but can represent a fruitful model of NATO membership for the Nordic states. • Despite a significant decline in military tension in the North since 2022, the risk of a future security competition with Russia and Nordic NATO members should not be downplayed. Presuming Russia is a status quo power in the North, NATO should have a clear and predictable posture in the North that combines deterrence and reassurance. • Russia should not be treated as a monolithic entity; there are moderates that would welcome diplomacy with Nordic NATO neighbours. Backchannel contacts between Russia and the Nordic NATO states can develop the outlines of an adjusted security posture for the North that could be received favourably by the new Trump Administration as it attempts to open negotiations to end the war in Ukraine
Differentiating Hybrid Threats against the High North and Baltic Sea regions
Russia’s grey-zone threats and actions are a major concern for bordering countries who are on the receiving end of such actions, both physical and cyber. This policy brief examines how such hybrid threats affect countries in the High North and Baltic Sea regions and evaluates the challenges related to response and countermeasures. NATO's policy is that the member nations are responsible for building resilience and responding to hybrid threats or attacks. To avoid invalid interpretations or paralysis in assessment and response to such complex and diverse threats, they should be differentiated and dealt with separately rather than boxed into a wide cognitive basket. This Policy Brief is part of the project ‘Norway as an in-between for Russia: Ambivalent space, hybrid measures’ financed by the Norwegian MoD.
Russian reframing: Norway as an outpost for NATO offensives
Moscow increasingly views the ‘Collective West’ as an offensive actor and the High North as terrain for NATO ‘expansion’. Norway figures as an active partner in this endeavour. For Norway, this situation is precarious: to the degree that Norway is seen as an inimical ‘NATO in the North’, Norwegian policies across a range of issue-areas increasingly risk being perceived as actions in an existential Russia–West struggle. This is worrisome because a key pillar of official Norwegian policy towards Russia involves balancing NATO deterrence with reassurance. As the military/non-military distinction becomes blurred in the eyes of Russia this crucial balancing becomes very difficult – the intended ‘reassuring’ signal might not come across.