Researcher
Sverre Lodgaard
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Sverre Lodgaard’s expert fields are geopolitics, the Middle East, Iranian foreign policy, nuclear arms control and disarmament, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea.
Lodgaard was the director of NUPI from 1997 to 2007.
Expertise
Education
1971 Magister degree in political science, University of Oslo. Thesis: Interaction Trends and Integration Loads in the East-West System
Work Experience
2007- Senior Research Fellow, NUPI
1997-2007 Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
1992-1996 Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Office at Geneva
1987-1992 Director, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
1980-1986 Research Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Aktivitet
Filter
Clear all filters
NUPIpodden #14: Den usynlige opprustningen i Sør-Korea
Det er i ferd med å skje noe i nabolandet til et av verdens mest kjente diktaturer. Mens Kim Jong-un og Nord-Korea ofte tar oppmerksomheten med te...
Major Powers in a Shifting Global Order
How to measure power in international affairs is an eternal matter of debate, especially among political scientists. Many generic approaches have been suggested, among them control over resources; control over actors; and control over events and outcomes,2 and numerous efforts have been made to develop concrete formulas. In China, academic institutions 3 and independent scholars have competed as to how best to measure “comprehensive national power”. All approaches and formulas have something to offer, and all have inherent limitations.
The Geopolitics of the Middle East
US retrenchment from the Middle East—long in waiting—has caused Arab states to seek new partnerships in order to reduce their vulnerabilities in a turbulent world. The geopolitical fault line between East and West has moved westward, from Iran to Saudi Arabia, and the new agreement between Iran and these countries has a huge potential to turn the region in a cooperative direction. Given all the uncertainties, however, the significance of it can only be tested over time. This Policy Brief discusses the new geopolitical landscape and its implications for war and peace in the region.
A transparency regime for European missiles
Join us when Nikolai Sokov will talk about how such a regime would have made it more difficult for Russia to concentrate long-range conventional weapons vis-à-vis Ukraine before the invasion.
China-US nuclear rivalry and the discovery of China’s missile silos
Last summer, researchers discovered that China is building several nuclear missile silo fields. Featuring one of the researchers behind the silo discovery, this seminar explores how Beijing’s unprecedented nuclear buildup will affect China-US rivalry and strategic stability.
The ban on nuclear weapons: Next Stop Vienna
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is more relevant than ever. What could be expected of the First Meeting of States Parties to the treaty?
Research group for Peace, Conflict and Development
Research group for Peace, Conflict and Development
AUKUS and its implications for Asia, US-European relations and non-proliferation
What does the AUKUS security partnership between Australia, the US and UK mean for security in Asia, for the US-China rivalry, and for US-Europe relations?
The Nuclear Umbrella Revisited
The NPT is in miserable shape, betrayed on the disarmament dimension, stuck in the Middle East and mostly irrelevant to the Asian nuclear armed states, but it has proven resilient and lingers on. It will soon be accompanied by the TPNW, which is about to enter into force. Hopefully, the wrangling between the respective treaty supporters will calm down and enable a new consensus on the normative basis for non-proliferation and disarmament consisting of a combination of both treaties. That will not happen overnight, however. There is a long way from mutual recriminations to passive co-existence to bridge-building to exploitation of synergies – if it ever happens. The dilemma facing the umbrella states is a hard one. On the one hand, it is in their interest not to be defended with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they deem it important to remain members of NATO. These propositions may or may not be compatible. Some believe they are, emphasising that the Alliance is a conglomerate of nuclear and non-nuclear states; of states that are hosting nuclear weapons and others which do not; and that France left the military part of NATO but remained part of the political cooperation without rocking the rest. Others claim they are not and note that in the face of big power pressure, small states tend to balk at running the risks involved – especially if they cannot agree to act together. Business as usual is the problem, not the solution. In view of current trends in international security affairs there can be little disagreement about that. If so, much is achieved, because it encourages reflection and re-examination of established positions. If not, the strength of argument will remain posited against the power of inertia.