Forskningsprosjekt
Hybrid paths to resistance in the Muslim world: Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali
Bruken av vold ser ut til å være uavhengig av hvorvidt grupper har et statsorientert eller et transnasjonalt fokus. Det finnes dermed fire ulike veier til motstand for islamistgrupper: statsorientert og ikke-voldelig; statsorientert og voldelig; transnasjonalt orientert og ikke-voldelig; transnasjonalt orientert og voldelig.
Spesifikt vil forskningen i dette prosjektet se på hvordan motstand varierer avhengig av lokale, interne og internasjonale kontekster. Dette er viktig da den eksisterende litteraturen på islamistiske bevegelser ikke gir gode svar. Den fokuserer enten for mye på strukturelle forklaringsvariabler, som salafisme og islamsk teologi; eller på innenrikspolitiske variabler som til hvilken grad ulike grupper inkluderes eller ekskluderes av staten.
Prosjektet utforsker tre mulige forklaringer: 1) Rivalisering mellom konkurrerende islamistgrupper, som driver frem mer radikal retorikk. 2) samhandlingen mellom ulike islamistgrupper og statens maktapparat. 3) Import av transnasjonale slagord som finner gjenklang i lokale stridsspørsmål. HYRES benytter en systematisk, komparativ analyse og utvikler et generelt konseptuelt rammeverk, som bygger på den nyeste utviklingen i contentious politics litteraturen. Vi vil identifisere og granske variasjon mellom våre case og bidra til den generelle litteraturen om sosiale bevegelser i ikke-demokratiske og semi-demokratiske land.
Tine Gade er vitenskapelig koordinator for prosjektet, og Morten Bøås er prosjektleder.
Prosjektet er finansiert av Norges forskningsråd gjennom programmet FRIPRO.
Prosjektleder
Deltakere
Aktuelt
Hvordan forholder islamist-grupper seg til den moderne staten?
Forskerne bak HYRES-prosjektet ser nærmere på islamistgrupper i Mali, Irak, Libya og Libanon. Nå er de første resultatene klare.
Nye publikasjoner
Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon
This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism’s popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir’s neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a “new social movement”. Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence (“Sunnism”) and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from “Harirism” to “Sheikism” that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots’ protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate?
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
Mali's Religious Leaders and the 2018 Presidential Elections
Mali is by constitution a secular state, but here as elsewhere in the Sahel the role of religious leaders is increasing both in the social and the political sphere. This HYRES research brief explains how, why, and in what ways religious leaders tried to gain influence in the 2018 presidential campaign. While the research brief shows that there has been a fusion of politics and religion that can increase the political influence of Malian religious leaders, such engagement can also be a double-edged sword as Malians tend to see ‘politics as dirty’ and not a field that pious men of faith should get too deeply involved in.
Lebanese Sunni Islamism: A Post-Election Review
This research note analyses the internal and external factors that led to Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya‘s loss of its only parliamentary seat in 2018. Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya is the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Through this case, the author assesses the status of Lebanon’s Sunni community and the electoral fortunes of regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations more generally. The main external factors leading to Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya’s electoral decline included the abandonment by the Future Movement, the law on proportional representation, potential regional involvement in the Lebanese elections and the rise of pro-Hezbollah Sunni MPs like those belonging to al-Ahbash. The internal challenges faced by Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, include its strategic dilemma on how to position itself in the sectarianized 'New Middle East' after the Arab uprisings, as well as its organizational structure and its inability to properly convince its supporters of the last-minute alliance with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). This note also analyses the fate of Lebanon’s Salafis and their absence from the elections, a result of the security pressures they face following their political support of the Islamist armed opposition in neighboring Syria. Furthermore, the research note explores the trajectory of the Al Masharee’ Association known as Al-Ahbash which, by returning to parliament in 2018, presented a fatal blow to the electoral hopes of Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists.