Sjømatnæringen og Europa. EØS og alternativene
The book examines the importance of the EEA for the seafood sector and the consequences if the EEA is replaced by EU membership or another type of trade agreement: NOREXIT. This is analysed in areas of particular importance for the seafood industry, such as tariffs, veterinary and border control; migrant workers in the fish processing industry; catch quotas after Brexit; and cross-border investment. In addition, the book includes background chapters on the EEA agreement, the Norway-EU negotiation history and the legal aspect of the EEA. The book is the result of an inter-disciplinary project with emphasis on economics and political science. The contributions are written by key experts from Norwegian universities and research institutions. The book has no political agenda of replacing the EEA with one alternative or another; it is a peer-reviewed academic contribution to greater knowledge about the EEA and the alternatives.
Fra «fiskebrevet» til EØS: Betydningen av toll for norsk sjømateksport til EU
An “archeology of tariffs” reveals how current tariffs for Norwegian seafood are based on trade agreements negotiated with the EU over 50 years. Furthermore, the economic impact of tariffs and tariff rate quotas under the EEA, EU membership and abolition of the EEA is quantified. The trade agreements reduced tariffs from 2.3 to one billion NOK in 2018. 2/3 of the tariff savings were due to the EEA, and less than 1/10 due to the “fisheries letter” of 1973. Abolition of the EEA may lead to an export loss of up to more than three billion NOK for harvest-based fisheries, whereas EU membership will lead to increased exports, particularly for aquaculture.
Book launch: EEA and the alternatives – what about NOREXIT?
What are the alternatives to the EEA Agreement? What happens if Norway joins the EU, or if the EEA is terminated? A new book edited by Arne Melchior and Frode Nilssen looks into this.
The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.
Liberal fred
Over the last years, the EU has become a more important actor in international security relations. Whereas its core objective used to be to prevent a return to Europe's bloody past, EU is now increasingly a defender of liberal values and the international order. In Norway, this security dimension of the Union has not been very present in the EU-debate. But is should be now.
Hvorfor sier regjeringen nei til forsvarsfondet?
The Norwegian government has decided not to join the European Defence Fund (EDF) at this stage - despite having lobbied for an invitation to be included for years.
Intergovernmental checkmate on cyber? Processes on cyberspace in the United Nations
Cyberspace is an increasingly controversial field on the international agenda. Despite the fact that processes on the thematic have been going on in the UN since 1998, a more significant international agreement is needed on what basic principles should apply in cyberspace. Small states have the opportunity of pushing cybersecurity as a thematic priority in the United Nations Security Council – a path Norway could pursue in its forthcoming 2021–2022 Security Council term. The attribution of the assumed Russian cyber operations toward the Norwegian parliament earlier this year actualizes the addressing of the issue in the Council. The policy brief discusses the GGE negotiations on cyberspace in 2015 and 2017 - and gives policy recommendations on the way forward.
“Irregular” Migration and Divergent Understandings of Security in the Sahel
On 23 September 2020, the EU launched its new Pact on Migration and Asylum. In a refreshingly blunt press-release accompanying the Pact one could read: “The current system no longer works. And for the past five years, the EU has not been able to fix it”. The stated aim of the Pact is a fairer sharing of responsibility and solidarity between member states while providing certainty for individual asylum applicants. This is intended to rebuild trust between EU members as well as improve the capacity to better manage migration. However, whether the Pact will be implemented and have an effect on EU external migration policy in the Sahel remains to be seen. Following the 2012 crisis in Mali and further spread of instability to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, the central areas of the Sahel region have gained prominence as “producers” of transnational security threats, such as violent extremism, “irregular” migration and human trafficking. With Niger also being a major transit hub for northbound “irregular” migrants, this trend was further exacerbated by the so-called European refugee and migration crisis in 2015. This has led to unprecedented international attention in recent years, and consequently, a growing number of bilateral and multilateral donor assistance programmes and external military interventions. Since 2015, the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming from this area to Europe has been reduced. At first glance, this could mistakenly be understood as a success-story in migration management, or alternatively, that fewer people want to travel the dangerous route across the Mediterranean. However, the situation on the ground is going from bad to worse, despite increased levels of international resources invested to foster stabilisation and development in the region. Why? This IAI Commentary is based on the authors’ forthcoming journal article: “The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2020).
Security Council Resolution 1325 at 20: What Next for the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda?
This policy brief takes stock of the achievements of the WPS agenda since the passing of its founding Security Resolution 1325, twenty years ago. It outlines the challenges it currently faces like the implementation gap; the global push-back against women’s rights and multilateral cooperation; the increase of a strongly gendered nationalist populism; the political climate amongst UN member states and within the Security Council; and the Covid-19 pandemic. It discusses whether this challenging situation points towards prioritising the maintenance of the gains achieved in the field of WPS since the passing of Security Council Resolution 1325, instead of pushing for progressive changes. It puts forward the argument that the current situation makes it more relevant and necessary than ever to apply a more comprehensive understanding of what gender entails and how it is integral to politics, conflicts and peace efforts. It is argued that this approach must form the basis for analyses of conflict situations, as well as for understanding the challenges that the WPS agenda currently faces. Hence, the promotion and utilisation of such an approach should be a priority for the WPS agenda in the years to come.
Myanmar: How to Become an Attractive Destination for Renewable Energy Investment?
Myanmar is endowed with abundant renewable energy resources, and its solar potential is the greatest in the Greater Mekong Subregion – yet, this potential remains largely untapped. The country’s 50% electrification rate remains the lowest in ASEAN, and the government plans to electrify the entire country by 2030. The share of renewable energy in the energy mix is expected to rise from less than 1% in 2020 to 12% in 2025. In addition to expanding electricity access, renewable energy could also stimulate much-needed employment and economic growth in Myanmar. We propose five actions that can improve the investment climate in Myanmar for renewable energy investment: strengthen renewable energy governance; join IRENA and intensify capacity building; adopt a feed-in tariff or auction mechanism; build a regulatory framework for renewable energy; simplify the business environment for investors.