Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of Far-Right Protest in Georgia
What role do political opportunities play in far-right mobilisation? The case of Georgia indicates that modernisation in itself may be insufficient to trigger a far-right backlash. A systematised database of 154 far-right protest events in Georgia in the period 2003–2020 shows that the movement remained dormant for over two decades after post-Soviet independence and a decade after the 2003 Rose Revolution. After 2012, however, less severe repression of protest, divides within the political elite, and the sympathetic attitudes of mainstream political and societal actors enabled far-right mobilisation and violence. Thus, however deep-rooted anti-modernisation, a backlash may not erupt until mobilisation opportunities become available.
Noen har hevdet at mitt moralske kompass er gått i stykker
Jeg forsøker å skjønne hvorfor Kreml handler som det gjør. Er det virkelig det samme som å støtte disse handlingene?
Tale ved utdeling av Fritt Ords Pris 2023
Torsdag 11. mai 2023 fikk NUPI-forsker Julie Wilhelmsen Fritt Ords Pris 2023 for å ha bidratt med nyanserende faglig kunnskap i et opphetet offentlig ordskifte, før og etter Russlands fullskala-invasjon av Ukraina. Hun har gjennom dette vist betydningen av ytringsmot og utøvd akademisk ytringsfrihet i praksis, sa styreleder Grete Brochmann.
PODCAST: AI and geopolitics
Major Powers in a Shifting Global Order
How to measure power in international affairs is an eternal matter of debate, especially among political scientists. Many generic approaches have been suggested, among them control over resources; control over actors; and control over events and outcomes,2 and numerous efforts have been made to develop concrete formulas. In China, academic institutions 3 and independent scholars have competed as to how best to measure “comprehensive national power”. All approaches and formulas have something to offer, and all have inherent limitations.
Myths in the Russian Collective Memory: The “Golden Era” of Pre-Revolutionary Russia and the “Disaster of 1917”
This paper examines shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past in the “collective memory” of the 1917 October Revolution. Employing a qualitative approach to examine collective memory “from below,” two age cohorts were interviewed in three Russian cities from a variety of social groups in 2014–2015. What was revealed was the existence of a strong positive myth about the pre-revolutionary era of 1900–1914, as well as positive references to the current Putin era. Both eras were “positive” in that Russia was/is a “normal European power,” “on the rise economically” and “respected by the other powers.” In terms of the definitive national trauma, an overwhelming majority viewed the 1917 October Revolution as a break or rupture in Russian history that caused appalling destruction. This view of 1917 as catastrophic leads to certain key “lessons”: that revolutionary change is inherently destructive and wasteful and that external forces had (and have) a vested interest in weakening Russia from without whenever she is at her most vulnerable. Overall, at the heart of myths over 1917 we find a central occupation with the threat of disintegration and a yearning for stability and normality, highlighting how collective memory interacts with political values and social identity.
Discourses of Russian-speaking youth in Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan: Soviet Legacies and Responses to Nation-building
Research into post-independence identity shifts among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities has outlined a number of possible pathways, such as diasporization, integrated national minority status and ethnic separatism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with young people in Almaty and Karaganda, I examine how Russian-speaking minorities identify with the state and imagine their place in a ‘soft’ or ‘hybrid’ post-Soviet authoritarian system. What is found is that Russian-speaking minorities largely accept their status beneath the Kazakh ‘elder brother’ and do not wish to identify as a ‘national minority’. Furthermore, they affirm passive loyalty to the political status quo while remaining disinterested in political representation. Russian-speaking minorities are also ambivalent towards Kazakh language promotion and anxious about the increasing presence of Kazakh-speakers in urban spaces. This article argues that two factors are central to these stances among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities: the persistence of Soviet legacies and the effects of state discourse and policy since 1991.
Mainstream Russian Nationalism and the “State- Civilization” Identity: Perspectives “from below”
Based on more than 100 interviews in European Russia, this article sheds light on the bottom-up dynamics of Russian nationalism. After offering a characterization of the post-2012 “state-civilization” discourse from above, I examine how ordinary people imagine Russia as a “state-civilization.” Interview narratives of inclusion into the nation are found to overlap with state discourse on three main lines: (1) ethno-nationalism is rejected, and Russia is imagined to be a unique, harmonious multi-ethnic space in which the Russians (russkie) lead without repressing the others; (2) Russia’s multinationalism is remembered in myths of peaceful interactions between Russians (russkie) and indigenous ethnic groups (korennyye narodi) across the imperial and Soviet past; (3) Russian culture and language are perceived as the glue that holds together a unified category of nationhood. Interview narratives on exclusion deviate from state discourse in two key areas: attitudes to the North Caucasus reveal the geopolitical-security, post-imperial aspect of the “state-civilization” identity, while stances toward non-Slavic migrants in city spaces reveal a degree of “cultural nationalism” that, while sharing characteristics with those of Western Europe, is also based on Soviet-framed notions of normality. Overall, the article contributes to debates on how Soviet legacies and Russia’s post-imperial consciousness play out in the context of the “pro-Putin consensus.”