Changing or frozen narratives? The Arctic in Russian media and expert commentary, 2021–2022
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has brought Russia–West relations to its lowest point since the Cold War. Relations in the Arctic region are not excepted, evidenced not least by the other seven member states’ pausing their participation in Russia’s Arctic Council chairmanship (which concluded in May 2023). To the extent that “Arctic exceptionalism” – the notion that the Arctic has been characterised by a cooperative mode between Russia and the West which has remained relatively untouched by increasing tensions elsewhere – was ever an appropriate description, Western analysts have now declared it firmly dead. How does this situation look from within Russia? This research paper investigates how the Russian state media and the foreign policy expert community have portrayed the Arctic in 2021 and 2022. How much change has been seen since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine? By surveying “the story about the Arctic” as presented by mainstream narrators and experts, we gain insights into, among other things, how changes in Arctic cooperation, sanctions, the role of China in the Arctic, and the question of climate change are conveyed to Russian audiences. The paper proceeds as follows. We start by briefly explaining the methods and data used. We then present a portrayal of the Arctic in Russia’s government’s newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta, followed by the role of the Arctic in analyses published by the Russian International Affairs Council and the journal Russia in Global Affairs. Lastly, we conclude by discussing a general continuity in the way the Arctic is framed in the material, and foreground three core themes: climate change, security, and cooperation.
Knowledge Gaps in the Nexus of Climate, Peace and Security
There is a growing body of research on the relationship between climate change and peace and security. Research shows that the effects of climate change can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, such as food and water security, and in combination with other factors can also increase the risk of violent conflict. It is increasingly recognized that actions taken to prevent and manage conflict can be coordinated and integrated with actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Such cross-disciplinary cooperation can generate outcomes that are beneficial for both a sustainable peace and environment. The COP27 Presidency initiative titled “Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace” (CRSP), has taken a leading role in this movement by spearheading a discursive pivot from a climate security nexus towards a climate and peacebuilding nexus, with multifaceted and holistic approaches. The literature on how to integrate climate adaption and mitigation actions in efforts to build sustainable peace is still underdeveloped. However, there are related fields, such as the relationship between peace, conflict and natural resource management that may offer comparable lessons. This policy paper takes stock of the existing knowledge and identifies knowledge gaps for policy practice in the crucial, complex and emergent field of climate, peace and security. It classifies significant gaps in our actionable knowledge by sorting them into operational knowledge gaps, climate finance knowledge gaps, and gaps in the knowledge infrastructure.
Africa in a time of global crisis: Some trends
Africa is facing major challenges. Poverty is increasing again after many years of decline, and many countries are experiencing an economic crisis as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including rising inflation. Several countries are indirectly affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has led to high energy prices and reduced access to grain and fertiliser. Several countries and regions are also marked by terrorism and violent conflicts, and climate change is creating increased risks of floods, droughts and heatwaves. Parallel to this, the role of the great powers in Africa is changing rapidly. After a period of strong European and American dominance, other great powers, such as China and Russia, have stepped up their activities in Africa. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, trade and development aid, while Russia has gained an important role in a number of countries, particularly through military aid and arms supply. Other countries, such as India, Turkey and Qatar, have also invested heavily in Africa. These developments are taking place simultaneously as Africa’s global significance is set to increase. First, the region has important natural resources, such as oil and gas, as well as rare minerals and earth metals that are in high demand in the context of the green transition. Second, Africa is severely affected by climate change, which can lead to social unrest, violent conflicts and extensive migration. In a time of increasing geopolitical rivalries and instability, this means that developments in Africa will have considerable global ramifications. Although other countries have increased their interest in and become more important partners for African countries, the EU and Europe are still Africa’s largest trading partners and providers of development aid. The influence of the EU and Europe in Africa is not challenged in this respect, but rather in areas such as governance, infrastructure and energy, and specifically from the Russian side within what we can call a niche of security markets. Russia has been able to operate here by offering arms sales, military training and services from the Wagner Group (a private military company) to regimes that Europe and the United States are not willing to provide that type of support for. The struggle for political and economic influence in Africa is stronger and more intense than since the Cold War, and there is reason to believe this will continue. This also gives African countries more choice and autonomy vis-à-vis external actors. African states are not just objects to be acted upon by the international community, whether through development aid, investment or in international forums; they are also active agents who, with increased self-awareness, will seek to navigate the new landscape of global power rivalries and fragmentation. This is a development that must be taken seriously. Neither Norway nor Europe can afford to take Africa and African support for our positions in international politics for granted. This report provides a brief overview of the key trends in Africa, which form the basis for Norway’s development of a new strategy for Africa.
Climate, Peace and Security Research Paper: Insights on Climate, Peace and Security
Climate change is transforming and redefining the global security and development landscape. United Nations member states are increasingly acknowledging that the impacts of climate change have implications for international peace and security. The growing recognition of this link has been reflected by the UN Security Council adopting over 70 related resolutions and presidential statements since 2017. Since 2021 the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) have analysed the links between climate, peace and security in countries and regions on the agenda of the UN Security Council. With support from Norway during its elected membership of the UN Security Council in 2021–22, NUPI and SIPRI jointly published 11 Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets covering Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, the Sahel region, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. These fact sheets build on an analysis of four pathways from climate change to conflict that were identified in the context of East Africa; and supplement research on South and South East Asia, West Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. The relationships between climate change and conflict have been studied in numerous other empirical studies and literature reviews with complementary findings. This paper outlines how climate change can affect peace and security (section I) and how climate change interacts with social, economic and political vulnerabilities in the countries covered by the Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets (section II). The paper then synthesizes (section III) four key findings from the fact sheet series: (a) livelihood security is important, if not crucial, to the ways in which climate change influences conflict risk; (b) the impacts of climate change in one location can increase security risks in other locations; (c) the impacts of climate change interact with local vulnerabilities in ways that can create new security risks and exacerbate existing risks, such as conflict; and (d) conflict is not an inevitable consequence of climate change, but can be a response to its effects. This paper concludes with recommendations for how the UN Security Council shapes policies to address the complex challenges arising from climate change (section IV).
The Ukraine War, the New Geopolitics of Energy, and Norway
This study aims to address the question of how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has changed patterns of regional and global energy interactions and how this influences perceptions of Norway as a major regional energy actor. To examine these important questions, we will proceed in the following manner. In the first part of this study, we will present our operational understanding of the key concepts shaping our thinking about the relationship between the geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of international cooperation and rivalry. Here we also will discuss the role of various national instruments of power in the pursuit of geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives. In the second part we narrow the scope of this examination to shed light on the relationship between geopolitics and energy in global and regional contexts, paying special attention to trends shaping the international energy game. This includes the changing role of Russia; how green energy transition reshapes international energy cooperation and how old and new energy-related policy instruments are evolving in this rapidly changing energy landscape. In addition, we also examine the nature of the old and new threats to energy flows, particularly those related to critical energy infrastructure. In the third part of this study, we examine the direct and indirect impacts the Russian war against Ukraine has had on energy markets and what implications these recent developments have for the position of Norway as a major energy actor. Norway’s importance for energy consumers, especially in Europe, has increased because of the war. Although the global energy trends discussed in the previous section also influence Norway and Europe, the focus in the latter section is on the regional dimension as Norway’s energy supplies reach first and foremost Europe. Finally, we examine possible scenarios that may influence energy markets and geopolitical conditions, with special attention paid to global factors with the potential to cause serious shifts. Part of the focus is on possible technological breakthroughs that may change the parameters of the international energy interactions and undermine the position of traditional energy producers and exporters.
From partners to allies: Finland and Norway in a new era
Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership in 2022 altered Nordic security and defence dynamics. It also reset Finland’s relations with its neighbouring states – including longstanding NATO member Norway. In this policy brief, we discuss the evolving relationship between Finland and Norway. Despite their history as peaceful neighbours, divergent security arrangements generated political distance between Finland and Norway during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, their security policies gradually became more aligned, as evident also in heightened Nordic security cooperation, Finnish and Swedish participation in NATO exercises, and, more recently, the signing of a series of defence agreements with each other as well as with Sweden and the United States. Following Finland’s NATO accession, both states have anticipated a deepening of the Finnish-Norwegian alliance. We identify some areas where Finland and Norway may benefit from collaborating and exchanging perspectives in the coming years. This includes in the management of shared institutional frameworks, security concerns in the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions, the future relationship with the United States, and a more antagonistic Russia.
Do regime differences shape developmental engagement? How China and Japan compete in post-coup Myanmar
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has left the country significantly isolated on the world stage. Politically, foreign governments have avoided recognizing the junta rulers, although quasi-official engagement is still underway. Economically, foreign investments into Myanmar have dropped by 42% from 2021 to 2022, off levels that had already massively decreased since the 2017 Rohingya expulsion. However, despite the international outcry over the new regime’s open warfare against civilians and the escalating violence in Myanmar’s multi-front civil war, both China and Japan have remained engaged in development cooperation, pursuing ambitious projects for economic corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) that were contracted under the deposed civilian government; in the case of China, even some new projects have been launched.
Climate change in the Arctic: Security implications and consequences for military operations – a MCDC project (CLIMARCSEC)
Climate-change occurs at some of the highest rates in the Arctic regions resulting in both emerging risks and new opportunities....
Dizzying Developments in International Relations
Arctic Governance and Cooperation Through Conflict