Covid-19 and the Russian Regional Response: Blame Diffusion and Attitudes to Pandemic Governance
As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.
Cheering and Jeering on the Escalator to Hell: One Year of UK Media Coverage on the War in Ukraine
While there is a common awareness of wartime media censorship in both Ukraine and Russia, there has been less research on Western media coverage and expert analysis of the war in Ukraine. This essay considers the extent to which a skewed and partisan version of the war’s evolution has been presented in UK media. Five stages are identi- fied in the emergence and evolution of a British meta-narrative on the war in Ukraine, replete with ‘cheering’ and ‘jeering’, that works against a realistic understanding of the war’s nature and reasonable consideration of possible future scenarios. It is argued this coverage has sidestepped critical questions of the war’s stage-by-stage escalation and has essentially avoided serious debate of the risks, costs and benefits of such a course.
Escaping the Long Shadow of Homo Sovieticus: Reassessing Stalin’s Popularity and Communist Legacies in Post-Soviet Russia
It is often asserted that the values and attitudes of Homo Sovieticus, marked in the rising “popularity” of Stalin, live on in contemporary Russia, acting as a negative factor in social and political development. This article critiques the argument that attitudes to Stalin reflect unreformed Soviet values and explain Russia’s authoritarian regression and failed modernization. Our critique of this legacy argument has three parts. First, after examining the problematic elements of the Levada Center approach, we offer alternative explanations for understanding quantitative data on Stalin and the repressions. Second, we examine interview data showing that, for those with a pro-Stalin position, “defending Stalin” is only a small part of a broader worldview that is not obviously part of a “Soviet legacy.” Third, we consider survey data from the trudnaia-pamiat’ project and find common reluctance to discuss much of the Stalinist past, which we argue represents an agonistic stance. Thus, we interpret attitudes to Stalin within a broader context of complex social and cultural transformation where the anomie of the 1990s has been replaced with dynamics toward a more positive identity construct. On the one hand, the antagonistic mode of memory is visible in statist and patriotic discourses, which do not seriously revolve around Stalin but do resist strong criticism of him. On the other hand, we find many more in Russia avoid the Stalin question and adopt an agonistic mode, avoiding conflict through a “de- politicized” version of history.
Leonard Seabrooke
Leonard Seabrooke is Professor of International Political Economy and Economic Sociology in the Department of Organization at the Copenhagen Busin...
Arctic Pressures (ArcPres)
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 precipitated a challenging new chapter for Arctic political and security dynamics. Going forward, security and governance developments in the region will continu...
How Do Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives Fit in Africa’s Evolving Security Landscape?
Over the last two decades, places like the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Northern Mozambique have experienced a rise (and in some cases, a resurgence) of groups that use violence to challenge the state. Often termed “rebel groups,” some, like the M23 in eastern DRC, fit the rebel model. But many others take the form of violent extremist insurgencies that mix insurgent tactics with criminal activities, such as banditry and the illicit trading of goods, drugs, money, and natural resources. What both have in common is the use of violence to pursue political and economic objectives related to long-standing center-periphery grievances, and economic and political marginalization.
Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations
Despite criticism of the United Nations (UN) as peacekeepers “hiding behind sandbags,” by the former president of Chad, the Chadian military has become a critical enabler of African-led and UN peace operations. This paper posits that the effectiveness of the Chadian forces stems from refined and modified nomad and warlord structures and attributes used during Chad’s various conflicts to build and improve its national army. This has allowed the Chadian regime to exercise and project power, thus, producing one of Africa’s most effective forces for current conflicts and challenges. Thus, Chad’s military leadership reflects a trend of states that use military prowess to project force, while maintaining international partnerships with permanent members of the unsc (the US and France), UN peacekeeping missions and African ad hoc security initiatives. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this trend for the evolving nature of African Peace and Security Architecture.
Considering ecological security from the perspective of Arctic ecosystemic politics
This brief essay is part of a book forum on Matt McDonald's book (2021) presenting the idea of ecological security. In the essay, I reflect on progress and prospects for Arctic cooperation and governance in order to consider the promise and limitations of McDonald’s ecological security framework. The Arctic is an instructive example for such an exploration. The longstanding post-Cold War cooperation in the Arctic is strongly rooted in an appreciation of the interconnected nature of the Arctic ecosystem, even as the governance mechanisms remain far from what would qualify as an ecological security approach in McDonald’s sense. Nonetheless, I suggest that especially two aspects are instructive from the Arctic example. The first relates to how ecological security would potentially interface with an already quite full landscape of governance practices rooted in ecosystems, and associated power political genealogies and effects. The second point is a reflection on unfolding events, seeking to explore how continued inputs from other forms of security governance could impact on emerging or partial attempts to govern with an ecological security perspective. Here, the status of Arctic cooperative governance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an illustrative example to consider. Both points can be read as impediments limiting the applicability of the ecological security framework. However, as McDonald argued, impediments are not the same as absolute limits (2021, 192) and potential obstacles are explored here in the spirit of advancing possibilities for ecological security.
The Russia Conference 2023: Russia and the West – a new reality
Join us on 14 November for the annual Russia Conference!
Panel debate, "War in Europe: Nordic Cooperation in a Changing Security Environment"
Paneldebate, annual conference held in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry, the Nordic House, the Institute for Public Administration and Politics at the University of Iceland and the Icelandic Political Scientist Association.