Regions

Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context

Swedish security policy has experienced dramatic developments in recent decades. With the end of the Cold War, Swedish security policy could not identify any military threat to the country’s security, and so the armed forces were dramatically reduced. What remained of Swedish defence shifted the focus to international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. At this point it was said that Swedish security started in Afghanistan; the doctrine of Swedish security policy was accordingly referred to as the ‘Afghanistan doctrine’. But in 2008 the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission (För­svars­beredningen) presented a report which, for the first time in many years, recognized what might become a new security context. The Defence Commission argued that the litmus test of Russia’s choice of future path would be how it came to behave toward former members of the Soviet Union over the coming years (Försvarsberedningen 2007: 36). Accordingly, many Swedish politicians and commentators saw the Russian–Georgian war later that same year as proof of a more assertive Russia (see Brommesson 2015). After 2008, tension levels in Sweden’s neighbourhood have risen – including what the Swedish Armed Forces have deemed to be violation of Swedish territorial waters by a foreign power, confrontational behaviour in the airspace over the Baltic Sea and reports of heightened levels of espionage in Sweden. Against this background, the Swedish security policy has gradually refocused and has once again defined the defence of Swedish territory as its first priority. Military spending has increased, various types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the defence area have gained momentum and there is now lively discussion on what Sweden’s future secur ity policy should look like. In this debate one central issue concerns the character of Sweden’s future security policy cooperation. In particular, two forms of cooperation have featured in discussions in the past decade: Sweden’s extensive cooperation with NATO, which now includes almost all aspects of NATO membership except the core of such membership: the mutual defence assurances under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and Sweden’s equally extensive bilateral cooperation with Finland. This Policy Brief discusses these two forms of security policy cooperation as points of departure for alternative paths for Swedish security policy. In particular this policy brief focuses on the idea of the bilateral relationship between the two post-neutral Nordic states, Sweden and Finland, as a potential solution to cut the Gordian knot of the Swedish security dilemma.

Lebanon poised at the brink

Gravely affected by the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has remained relatively stable against all odds – despite the influx of some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and an internal political crisis involving supporters of opposing Syrian factions. Lebanon’s resilience can be explained by the high opportunity cost of state breakdown for domestic, regional and international political actors. Moreover, international economic assistance, diaspora remittances and informal networks established by refugees help to prevent outright economic breakdown. However, stability remains extremely precarious. Primary tipping points include (1) an IS strategy to spread the conflict to Lebanon, with consequent disintegration of the army along sectarian lines, (2) democratic decline and people’s dissatisfaction, (3) Hizbullah’s domestic ambitions and Israeli fears over the group’s growing military powers and (4) the potential that frustration between refugees and host communities may erupt into recurrent violence. The slow economic and sanitary decline in the country (5), however, is considered the biggest challenge.

Leaving the European Union, the Union way : A legal analysis of Article 50 TEU

The outcome of the UK referendum on membership of the EU prompted a considerable interest in the modalities of a state’s withdrawal from the Union. This policy analysis examines the specific provisions governing this process, viz. Article 50 TEU, and its function in the European integration process.

Nordisk renessanse

Forrige uke hadde president Barack Obama innkalt til et nordisk toppmøte i Det hvite hus. Det er flere grunner til at det nå er stor interesse for Norden i USA, skriver Ulf Sverdrup i DN-kronikk. Med en ny sikkerhetspolitisk situasjon har de nordiske lands strategiske plassering fått økt betydning, med tanke på Russland, Baltikum og Østersjøen, såvel som i nord. Fordi det er sterke tendenser til fragmentering i Europa, fremstår også Norden som et stabilt område som burde kunne bidra positivt og mer aktivt til europeisk samhold og lederskap. Topper rangeringer Mange ser også med interesse på hvordan de nordiske landene har lykkes med å høste gevinster av globalisering, samtidig som de har hatt målrettede tiltak mot de gruppene som taper eller marginaliseres av globaliseringen. De nordiske landene topper internasjonale rangeringer innenfor global konkurransekraft, åpenhet, innovasjon og FNs Human Development Index med mer. Det er ikke tilfeldig at Bernie Sanders har nordiske land som sine forbilder. Fordeler med samarbeid President Obama skal også selv være fascinert av Norden. I det bredt anlagte intervjuet i The Atlantic (anbefales), fremgår det at han titt og ofte sukker til sine kolleger: «If only everyone could be like the Scandinavians, this would all be easy». Presidenten har latt seg fascinere av at de nordiske landene har en nøktern og pragmatisk problemløsende stil, og at de har et stort engasjement for internasjonale fellesgoder knyttet til for eksempel klima, fattigdom, nedrustning, likestilling og fred. Et tettere nordisk samarbeid ville trolig gjort at de nordiske landene i større grad kunne ha sikret sine interesser, og at de i større grad ha satt et større preg på utviklingen i Europa og globalt. Betydelig samlet kraft Hver for seg, er de nordiske landene små og ganske ubetydelige i en internasjonal målestokk, men samlet er de en betydelig kraft.

Britisk EØS spor er ikke dødt

Det er for tidlig å avskrive EØS-løsning for Storbritannia. Det kan i så fall bli krevende for Norge, skriver direktør Ulf Sverdrup i DN-kronikk.

Norden og Kina - «Forbrytelse og straff» Forholdet mellom Norge og Kina

The South China Sea after "Philippines v. China": Summer of Our Discontent?

The July 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of the Philippines versus China on outstanding legal disputes in the South China Sea was a watershed in the ongoing dispute over the waterway’s status. Although the verdicts weighed heavily against China’s claim to historical waters in the SCS, the court’s decision will hardly be the last word on the subject, given Beijing’s rejection of the ruling and the growing importance of the waterway to both China as well as Southeast Asia and US policy in East Asia. In the wake of the decision, a cooling-off period would be ideal, but there are several variables which may or may not permit a reduction in tensions to take hold.