Brexit and the future of EU defence: a practice approach to differentiated defence integration
What consequences will Brexit have for EU defence integration? Answering this question, the article analyses the new visions for the future of EU defence that emerged in the debate after the Brexit vote. In doing so, the paper moves beyond institutionalism and argues that a practice approach to Brexit paves the way for a deeper understanding of EU integration as a social process and of the effects of Brexit. Through a study of the debates and concrete developments in EU defence since the Brexit referendum, the article shows how defence - an area already subject to differentiation - has enabled innovative visions for defence integration in post-Brexit Europe across three dimensions: the military, the political and the economic. Building on this analysis, the paper concludes on the possible consequences of Brexit for EU defence and the value of a practice approach to differentiated defence integration.
EPON at Stockholm Forum for Peace and Development 2019
On 14-16 May 2019, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-hosted the 2019 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development titled ‘From crisis response to peacebuilding: Achieving synergies’.
Russian Public Opinion and the Confrontation with the West
What do most Russians think about President Putin, the policies of the Kremlin and the West? Is Russia on the right track? How do Russians view the future? President Vladimir Putin has, since he was elected in 2000, scored high in public opinion polls. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 the polls reached new heights with support from nearly 90 % of the population. However, after the announcement of a comprehensive pension reform in summer 2018, the support decreased. In this working paper, Lev Gudkov provides an overview of how the Russians see the West, Ukraine and the politics of the Kremlin, and how the public opinion on these issues have changed over time. The working paper is based on the regular public opinion polls carried out by the Levada Centre since 2003.
Generation Putin: What’s important to them?
Recent polls show that Russian youths differ from their parents in values and orientations. What impact may this have on their political participation and preferences?
Russland og det ytre høyre
(Available in Norwegian only): Båndene mellom Russland og ytre høyre i Europa er mer kompliserte enn man kan få inntrykk av i vestlig media, skriver Minda Holm i denne kronikken.
Research prize to NUPI's Henriette Ullavik Erstad
Erstad is awarded the Ording Prize 2018 for her article on Iran's mobilization of Iraqi Shi'a militias.
Walls and other boundaries to irregular migration: is the US approach that different from the European one?
At this seminar 5 June, we will take a closer look at the policies implemented in areas bordering Europe and ask how this affects the neighboring countries and migration flows.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
This report assesses the extent to which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is achieving its current strategic objectives, and the impact the Mission has had on the political and security situation in Mali. Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon
This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism’s popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir’s neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a “new social movement”. Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence (“Sunnism”) and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from “Harirism” to “Sheikism” that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots’ protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate?
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.