Publications
Valg i India: en representasjonskrise?
(Article in Norwegian only): Parlamentsvalget i India for 2019 nærmer seg, og de politiske kandidatene forbereder seg på å møte velgerne sine igjen. Et enkelt og viktig spørsmål følger: hvor mange mennesker representerer egentlig en indisk folkevalgt? Svaret er at i dagens India representerer et medlem av parlamentet (Lok Sabha) i gjennomsnitt 1.5 millioner stemmeberettigede, eller nærmere 2,5 millioner innbyggere. Dette er mer enn den totale befolkningen i over 50 av verdens stater, og nesten fire ganger så mange som en folkevalgt i India representerte under det første valget i 1952. Størrelsen på velgermassen som hvert enkelt parlamentsmedlem skal representere kan være med på å undergrave det representative demokratiet i India.
Study shows Indian politicians are spending less and less time in legislative assemblies
In many democracies, elected politicians spend a substantial amount of time in the legislature to propose, debate, and vote on policies. In developing countries, politicians face an extra duty – they are also expected to spend a large part of their time with constituents listening to their concerns, solving conflicts, and helping them navigate the local bureaucracy. As India votes, it is timely to ask – how much time do Indian politicians spend in legislative assemblies and why has this changed over time?
Women and minorities in the Lok Sabha: Intersectionality in the Indian elections
It is well known that women are under-represented in India’s legislative assemblies. The historically marginalised Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), on the other hand, have reserved seats proportional to their share of the population that guarantee them a political presence. What does this mean for SC and ST women? Perhaps counter-intuitively, the answer is that there are more women candidates and winners in reserved seats than in general category seats.
Should I stay or should I go? Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia
The Somali jihadi organization al-Shabaab, yet again featured in the news internationally when they attacked a business and hotel complex in Nairobi 15 January this year. This is not the first time the group carries out largescale attacks outside the Somali boarders. Other examples are the Garissa University College attack in 2015, the mass shooting at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013 and the Kampala attacks in 2010. However, the majority of the atrocities committed by al-Shabaab take place in South Central Somalia. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 ranked Somalia as number 6 on its list of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017.1 Al-Shabaab was behind the deadliest terrorist attack in 2017 worldwide, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck, killing 587 people in Mogadishu. Although al-Shabaab has had several military setbacks the last few years, the group still poses a significant threat to security and stability in the region. As the name al-Shabaab (‘the youth’) indicates, young people predominate in the group. This means that thousands of individuals spend parts of their youth in al- Shabaab. The question then arises: how to best assist the ones who want to leave the group?
The limits of technocracy and local encounters: The European Union and peacebuilding
This article is the conclusion to a special issue that examines the European Union (EU), peacebuilding, and “the local.” It argues that technocracy—particularly EU technocracy—shapes the extent to which local actors can hope to achieve ownership of externally funded and directed peace support projects and programs. Although some actors within the EU have worked hard to push localization agendas, a number of technocracy linked factors come together to limit the extent to which the EU can truly connect with the local level in its peace support activities. While the EU and other international actors have invested heavily into capacity building in conflict-affected contexts, the EU’s own capacity has not necessarily been built to address the scalar problem of accessing the local in ways that are meaningful.
The European Union’s Crisis Response in the Extended Neighbourhood: The EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Case of Afghanistan
The European Union’s Crisis Response in the Extended Neighbourhood: The EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Case of Iraq
Working Paper: Comparing the EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali
This part of the overall report (Deliverable 7.1) on the EU’s crisis response in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali compares the findings of three comprehensive cases-studies. The analytical focus is on the output dimension of EU policy-making that is the output of decision-making of the policy-making machinery in Brussels. Thus, the analysis is confined to the choices and decisions made regarding the EU’s problem definitions, policy goals, strategies and instruments – both on a strategic and operational level; thus policy implementation or impact will be analysed as next steps in following project reports (D 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4).
Comparing the EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali
Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Mali
This paper offers a critical review of the EUTM and EUCAP in Mali, arguing that this is another example of international interventions that may be well-intended, but that end up producing very mixed results on the ground. One reason for this is the gaps between intentions and implementation and between implementation and local reception/perceptions. Whereas the first gap points to mismatches between EU policy intentions and what effect the implementation of these policies actually have (see for example Hill 1993), the latter gap reveals the inability of an international actor to both understand how key concepts such as ‘security sector reform’ and ‘border management’ are understood on the ground as well as translating its own policies and Brussels’ developed mandate into policies that makes sense for people on the ground (Cissé, Bøås, Kvamme and Dakouo 2017).