Publications
Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight
Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019, this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
This report assesses the extent to which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is achieving its current strategic objectives, and the impact the Mission has had on the political and security situation in Mali. Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon
This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism’s popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir’s neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a “new social movement”. Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence (“Sunnism”) and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from “Harirism” to “Sheikism” that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots’ protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate?
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
Valg i India: Få bastioner og mange svingninger
(Article available in Norwegian only): I forbindelse med valget i India hører man ofte at enkelte partier har såkalte bastioner – områder hvor de sanker inn spesielt mange stemmer. Hvor mye belegg er det for slike påstander?
Valg i India: Legitimitet og ansvarlighet i kompetitive valg
(This article is available in Norwegian only): Det er sterk konkurranse i Indiske nasjonalvalg. Indiske politikere vinner med mindre marginer enn kandidater i andre land med sammenlignbare valgsystemer, for eksempel Canada og Storbritannia. I et valgsystem som det indiske, med flertallsvalg i enkeltpersonskretser, trenger en kandidat minst 50 prosent pluss én av stemmene for å vinne dersom det bare er to kandidater som konkurrerer. Hvis det er tre kandidater, vil en kandidat trenge minst en tredjedel av stemmene pluss én stemme for å vinne. I India er det vanligvis mange kandidater som konkurrerer om hvert sete i nasjonalforsamlingen, noe som gjør det mulig for indiske politikere å bli valgt med en lav andel av stemmene. Dette kan ha konsekvenser for politikernes legitimitet og ansvarlighet som folkevalgte.
Hvem dominerer Indias nasjonale valg?
(Article available in Norwegian only): Antallet uavhengige kandidater har økt kraftig i India siden uavhengigheten i 1947, men hvor stor sannsynlighet har de for å vinne?
Valg i India: Utdanning, urbanisering og valgdeltakelse
(Article available in Norwegian only): India er kjent for å ha en ganske høy valgdeltakelse, men hvem stiller opp for å stemme i India, og hvorfor?
Valg i India: Lokale valg topper statistikken
(Article available in Norwegian only): Historisk sett har valg i India hatt en høy deltakelse på rundt 60 prosent, men i motsetning til de fleste andre demokratiske land stemmer flere indere i lokale valg enn i nasjonale valg. Hvorfor er det slik?