Publications
Norwegian cybersecurity: a small-state approach to building international cyber cooperation
As a small, open and highly digitalized country, cyber security is an issue of growing policy importance in Norway. Yet, like other highly digitalized states, Norway has faced difficulties in squaring national cyber security with private business interests and the multitude of actors. Recent years has seen efforts aimed at uniting disparate institutions and organizations into a coherent framework that works.
Policy brief summarizing the EU and other stakeholders’ prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the Maghreb and the Sahel
What is the European Union (EU) doing to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) in north-western Africa, specifically in the Maghreb and Sahel region? Building upon the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (EU Council 2005), the EU Strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism has increasingly emphasized the ‘internal-external security nexus’ and the need to strengthen co-operation with key third countries in the fields of counterterrorism, anti-radicalization, prevention, and countering of violent extremism (EU Parliament 2015; EU Parliament and EU Council 2017). The fight against violent extremism has thus become one of the most prominent objectives in EU external action, especially as far as the (enlarged) neighbourhood is concerned (Durac 2017). Yet scientific inquiry into the EU’s role in this
Policy brief summarising the EU and other stakeholder’s prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the region, Middle East
The EU-Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Preventive Violent Extremism (PvE) co-operation is wide-ranging, and has been since a formalized partnership between the EU and MENA countries was outlined in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. It has nevertheless received added attention following numerous terrorist attacks within the EU during the last decade; and European foreign fighters have been linked to the attacks in Paris in 2015; in Brussels, Berlin, and Nice in 2016; and in Manchester, London, and Barcelona in 2017.
Working paper on the implementation of the EU’s policies
This working paper builds on earlier research in which we mapped and analysed the toolbox of the European Union (EU) and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It listed the institutional setup, the decision-making processes, and co-ordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of CT and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) was unpacked because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism. Overall, our research found that the PVE agenda is quite a recent phenomenon in most member states and principally aims at preventing violent Islamist extremism through community engagement. The UK has been a pioneer in developing a ‘prevent’ pillar as part of its 2003 CT strategy and has since then actively contributed to the development of an EUlevel PVE framework. This EU framework has in turn pushed other member states, such as Ireland and Spain, to develop their own national PVE strategies in recent years. While Germany has also over the past decade made significant strides in preventing involvement in extremism and has brought its national practices to the EU level, France has generally favoured a more securitized than preventive approach. The present working paper takes the research one step further by looking more closely at the implementation of adopted PVE measures and practices in the EU and the abovementioned key states, both domestically as well as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, we present a more evaluative overview geared towards identifying best practices and lessons learned in this field. The paper not only focuses on how policy is implemented and followed up, but also assesses the EU’s experiences in co-operating with member states and vice versa. In doing so, the research tries to take on board key recent developments, in particular in France and at the EU level, in response to a new series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Nice, and Vienna between the end of October and mid-November 2020. The research builds on a set of in-depth interviews with PVE officials and practitioners within the EU and national administrations.
Policy brief on the implementation of the EU’s policies
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon and terrorism has a long history in Europe, often linked to separatist movements, anarchism, and far-right and far-left extremism. The trends, means, and patterns of radicalization have evolved rapidly since the Arab uprisings flared exactly a decade ago. Counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) strategies have developed alongside these trends at the national and supranational level. In the wake of a series of Jihad-inspired terror attacks in Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and elsewhere, European Union (EU) member states ramped up their military campaigns against the Islamic State (ISIS, aka Daesh) and al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. But since the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), governments’ interest in fighting terrorism in the Middle East has decreased. Nevertheless, some European countries remain on the front foot in their securitized PVE approach. Although there is no apparent connection between the anti-jihad war waged by the French army in Mali and the radicalization in France, the government is calling for more support from European countries to fight against jihadi movements in the Sahel. But the appetite for costly expeditionary campaigns is decreasing. By and large, the phenomenon of violent extremism is perceived as homegrown. And whereas large differences remain in individual countries’ approaches to tackling the challenges posed by violent extremism, it has nevertheless become increasingly clear that today’s security challenges – whether it is terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, disinformation, or other evolving cyber-enabled threats – are shared threats that require a transnational approach. Indeed, Europe as a whole faces new security issues and specific challenges for preventive work that (lone) actors and (returning) foreign terrorist fighters raise, while the internet and social media give extremist and terrorist groups and their sympathisers new opportunities for spreading their propaganda, mobilization, and communication. It is against this changed backdrop that this policy brief asks what lessons the EU can learn from best practices identified at the national level, and in the co0ordination efforts with the supranational institutions.
Digital Vulnerabilities and the Sustainable Development Goals in Developing Countries
How does digitalization lead to new kinds of global connections and disconnections in the developing countries? And which role does digitalization play for the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals? This entry focuses on cybersecurity capacity building (CCB) and the sustainability of development processes in developing countries.
Vietnam: Six Ways to Keep Up the Renewable Energy Investment Success
Vietnam is one of the most attractive destinations for renewable energy investment in ASEAN. In 2018, the country attracted USD 5.2 billion. In 2019, the share of renewable energy in the energy mix was 9%, thus already exceeding the 7% target set for 2020. If Vietnam is to continue its success and compete globally for investment in renewable energy, it will need to further develop its investment climate. The competition is heating up in this area, and an increasing number of countries have similar conditions and frameworks for renewable energy investment. Therefore, every improvement may help boost a market’s relative attractiveness. We propose six actions that can further enhance the attractiveness of Vietnam’s renewable energy sector for investment from both domestic and international investors: prioritise renewable energy in the governance system; streamline the regulatory framework; facilitate market entry for investors; improve transparency and communication about the investment regime; improve grid expansion planning; join IRENA to further build the capacity for renewable energy governance.
Thailand: Improving the Business Climate for Renewable Energy Investment
Thailand is among ASEAN’s renewable energy leaders. It attracted more than USD 10.7 billion of investment in renewable energy from 2006 to 2018. The country’s total installed capacity of renewable energy represented over 60% of the total capacity of ASEAN in 2019. Renewables accounted for 15% of its energy mix in 2018, and a target of 30% in 2036 was set. Despite this, during 2018–2019, Thailand experienced relative stagnation in terms of attracted investment. We propose five actions that can improve the attractiveness of Thailand’s investment climate for renewable energy in both the short and long term: set up a dedicated ministry for governing renewables; expand and improve the regulatory framework; capitalise on its peer-to-peer energy trading experience; simplify market entry for foreign investors; build capacity for renewable energy governance.
In the shadow of the virus Varieties of power in the COVID-19 crisis in Venezuela
While all states face massive challenges when responding to COVID-19, some are in a more precarious position than others. In Venezuela, the pandemic arrived at the worst possible time for its citizens. Facing one of the deepest economic crises outside of wartime in recent years, its consequences have spilled over to all aspect of social life.1 However, the timing seems to have suited the leaders of the Venezuelan regime well. Rather than constituting a threat to the stability of a regime that has lost both democratic legitimacy and the capacity to provide services and security, the government of Nicolas Maduro (2013-present) has seemingly managed to consolidate itself after several years of instability. The starting point of the discussion is an apparent paradox: how can a regime with neither legitimacy nor capacity, two commonly invoked criteria for effective crisis management, strengthen itself during a crisis such as that spurred by COVID-19? The brief presents an overview of how the Venezuelan regime has responded to COVID-19, and how the government of Nicolás Maduro has applied different strategies to consolidate a favorable political status quo. It takes as its starting point three concepts, namely “state capacity,” “legitimacy,” and “power,” all of which are frequently upheld as fundamental for understanding the varying ways in which states have responded to the pandemic. It highlights how relative power relations have shifted in recent years, and how the pandemic has contributed to skewing the balance of power further in favor of the Maduro government.