Publications
Journalism under instrumentalized political parallelism
Media systems where political parallelism co-exists with political clientelism have contradictory influences on journalistic practices. Journalists are encouraged to actively defend a cause and influence public opinion while expected to remain subservient to their political masters. The media studies literature has analyzed the impact of political parallelism and clientelism separately, without reflecting on the tensions that emerge when they operate together. The article examines journalism under instrumentalized political parallelism and argues that it plays out in a field defined by both horizontal and vertical conflicts. We add an elite-grassroots analytical perspective to the inter-elite tensions associated with a polarized public sphere. Political parallelism in non-democratic contexts seemingly leaves little room for journalistic agency, as the politically powerful tend to instrumentalize media outlets. However, by looking closely at the case of Lebanon, we argue that journalists are still able to act independently of and contrary to the elite's intentions. The empirical analysis shows how journalists navigate vis-à-vis the politicians by playing the relations game, exploiting internal contradictions in the system and connecting with popular grievances. The article contributes new knowledge about journalists’ resilience to instrumentalization in a context of media/politics connections that is commonly found outside the West.
Resilience in the age of crises
This research paper examines the concept 'resilience' as a response to the constantly changing environments and turbulence of the world. While resilience is used by several international organisations and nation states, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what the concept really means – it denotes both resisting change and being willing to adapt at the same time. This paper offers some clarity and argues that a temporal dimension is needed when applying the concept of resilience.
Politique africaine et méditerranéenne de la France : vers une réinvention de l’exceptionnalisme ?
Engagement in Africa is still at the heart of French foreign policy. Over the past twenty years, this African policy has undergone significant changes, which seem to confirm the hypothesis of a reinvention of French exceptionalism, more than its end. It is no secret that French foreign policy practices in Africa have had a negative image associated with Françafrique - a loaded concept that refers to the patronage and corrupt activities of French and African political, economic and military actors. These practices, without having completely disappeared, seem in the process of being replaced. How to characterize them? Are they still an instrument for strengthening French exceptionalism, and if so, how? Besides, is exceptionalism still an interesting concept to help understand French foreign policy in general, and African policy in particular?
The EU's comprehensive response to out of area crises: Plugging the capability-expectations gap
Since adopting a “comprehensive approach” to crisis management in 2013, the EU has spent considerable time and energy on streamlining its approach. Recently, we have also seen a terminological shift from “comprehensive” to “integrated”, indicating an expansion of the approach beyond the development–security nexus to encompass the commitment to the synergistic use of all tools available at all stages of the conflict cycle. It also recognises the need to overcome the EU’s own legal, institutional and budgetary internal/external dichotomies that have troubled a truly joined-up approach in the past. But has this change improved the Union’s capacity to act? Drawing on institutional theory, this article analyses whether the EU has the administrative capacities needed in order to be an effective actor in this area.
Frankrikes Europa-politikk gir muligheter for Norge
If one wants an EU that is able to protect the values on which European cooperation is based, then the EU must be strengthened. This is the main message of the new French European policy. And Norway should support that, even if it is not an EU member.
Norway – optimising EU non-membership to maximise mutual European added value
Several countries outside the European Union have cooperation agreements with the EU that integrate them more or less into European projects of their choice. One of the ‘third’ countries most integrated into EU activities and EU regulations is Norway. What motivates the Norwegians - whose country would easily qualify for EU membership in all respects - to opt for very far-reaching cooperation, while choosing not to have a full say in all the rules and regulations that such cooperation involves? Pernille Rieker is Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, specialised in European integration and European foreign and security policy. In this article she explains how the search for European added value brings Norway very close to EU membership, and why the country chooses to go no further.
Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
A new report by the Center for Climate and Security (CCS), an Institute of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), together with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), assesses the security risks posed by a warming climate in the Artcic. The analysis looks at two future warming scenarios (curbed and uncurbed) to project security threats alongside potential environmental changes deemed likely in the High North by 2030. The analysis identifies a number of key climate security risks across both warming scenarios, but notes that the risks are more severe and more likely in an “uncurbed” warming scenario. In a “curbed” scenario in which the world takes rapid action to curb climate change, including by transforming energy use, decarbonizing the global economy, and building international institutions to manage climate risks, the Arctic is likely to see fewer opportunities for severe security risks. The report recommends integrating this climate risk analysis into Arctic planning strategies into the coming years, and avoiding the uncurbed warming scenario. Specifically, the analysis highlights five key findings: 1) A warmer and increasingly navigable Arctic will lead to more commercial, civilian, and military activity, rendering the region more prone to accidents and misunderstandings between major players. 2) Increased commercial activity significantly expands the likelihood of states like Russia and China using civilian and commercial actors as vehicles for strategic positioning, dual-use data collection, and for gray zone operations which may escalate to direct confrontation. 3) The institutions that have helped depoliticize and produce stability in the Arctic for several decades may not have sufficient mandates and authorities, or be resilient enough to withstand new demands resulting from climate change. 4) To manage a more complex operating environment in the Arctic, with ever more state and non-state actors, governments will need an integrated toolbox that includes legal, economic, diplomatic, and military instruments. Robust mechanisms for cooperation and communication with civilian and commercial actors will be particularly useful. 5) States are likely to place higher demands on their military forces in the Arctic, particularly as regards to monitoring, assertions of sovereignty, search and rescue, and other Coast Guard duties given higher levels of overall activity in the region. New climatic realities may also reduce the constraints for force projection in the region. At the same time, over-reliance on military approaches in the region could risk escalating conflicts. To build resilience to the above threats, the report recommends that allied Arctic nations begin to advance the elaboration of a “Military Code of Conduct for Arctic Forces,” or other form of renewed dialogue among regional security actors, to address joint security risks.
Bra med bombefly
The debate over the deplyoment of US bombers B1 at Ørlandet is unfortunately too often imprecise.
UN peace operations in a multipolar order: Building peace through the rule of law and bottom-up approaches
UN peace operations need a new peacebuilding agenda that acknowledges both the transboundary nature of conflict drivers and the multipolar nature of the global order. This means casting aside the current stabilization approach, but also abandoning the pursuit of liberal peacebuilding of the unipolar era. Such a conflict transformation agenda would require UN peace operations to prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up approaches, thus creating the potential to be embraced by a much broader range of member states. In this article, we bring liberal peacebuilding critiques into a discussion with debates on the nature of the global order. Liberal peacebuilding critiques are rooted in the bottom-up problematization of international interventions and show what kind of peacebuilding is desirable. Conversely, the debates on the multipolar nature of the global order expose the top-down constraints as to what kind of peacebuilding is feasible.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: South Sudan
Flooding and droughts significantly disrupt livelihood patterns and food-security and may result in temporary displacement or longer-term migration. Such shocks exacerbate vulnerabilities and weaken the resilience and adaptive capacity of agriculture-dependent communities; they can heighten competition over natural resources, sometimes leading to cattle raiding and communal conflict. Unpredictable annual variation and extreme weather events, like flooding and droughts, affect pastoralist mobility patterns and routes, and farmers’ agricultural production. These changes may exacerbate tensions between herders and farmers, often in connection with land, grazing, water and communal conflicts. Female-headed households are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as most depend on agriculture to sustain their families, and rely on natural resources like firewood and water. Climate-related livestock losses compound ongoing rivalries, increasing the risk of cattle raiding, which can trigger retaliations, communal conflicts, displacement and the growth of new or existing armed groups.