Publications
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the G5 Sahel Force by Strengthening Strategic Coherence and International Support
At the UN Security Council and in other forums in Africa and Europe diplomats are considering how to increase international support to the G5 Sahel Force. The support is aimed at filling critical gaps that have hindered the mobility and operational tempo of the G5 Sahel Force. The overall goal is to enhance its operational capacity and effectiveness in an effort to restore stability in the Sahel. Despite the presence of the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Group of Five Sahel (G5 Sahel) Force, as well as French-led and European Union missions, the security situation in the Sahel has significantly deteriorated over the last few years. Drawing on lessons identified from the support provided by the UN to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and a wide number of experiences with voluntary funded trust funds in other mission support set¬tings, we discuss a few political, financial, doctrinal, human rights and operational considerations. We find that a UN support office funded from assessed contributions, complimented with voluntary contribu¬tions, appear to be the only solution for reliable and predictable support to those core needs of the G5 Sahel Force that cannot be met by the G5 Sahel countries themselves, or via bilateral support to those countries.
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors, its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.
Reviewing Jihadist Governance in the Sahel
The ways in which jihadist insurgents in the Sahel govern is rarely considered in the academic literature. They have often been portrayed as ‘Islamic terrorists’, who achieve their objectives by using brutal force against the civilian population and who finance their activities through criminal networks and activities. However, scattered empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgent groups, often use a variety of strategies to rule territory and populations. The scale, character and form of how such groups govern differs not only between countries but also at the sub-national level within the same group. Nevertheless, until recently jihadist insurgent governance in Africa and particularly the Sahel region has largely been overlooked. This synthesis reviews the existing literature on jihadist governance in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on the understudied region of the Sahel. The review is organised as follows: first, we clarify key concepts and provide definitions. Second, we provide a brief overview of Islam and politics in the Sahel, contextualising the rise of Salafist-jihadism as well as historical cases of jihadist governance. Third, we provide a brief overview of the literature and synthesise the existing research on jihadist insurgent governance in the Sahel. Fourth, we examine some key cases of jihadist governance in northern Mali, Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Finally, we conclude by summarising our findings, discussing the implications for the study of civil war and insurgency and consider avenues for future research.
The impact of climate change on Africa’s peace and security
The gradual rise in global temperatures, irregular rainfall and floods have indirect, complex and coherent implications for peace and security. On March 9 2021, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council met at state level to discuss these challenges. The Peace and Security Council presented various recommendations concerning climate and security. This op-ed is based on the communique published after the meeting and presents opportunities for how the African Union, together with regional economic communities/regional mechanisms, member states and others, can work together to strengthen efforts surrounding climate and security challenges.
The Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security in Somalia: Implications for AMISOM
The February 2021 mandate renewal for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an opportunity to review what we know about climate change and security in Somalia, and to consider what governments and multilateral organisations can do to improve the way they manage climate related security risks. Research finds no direct causal relationship between climate and conflict but has identified multiple pathways through which climate-related change interacts with political, social, and environmental stresses to compound existing vulnerabilities and tensions. These factors combined can undermine development gains, impact the dynamics of ongoing violence and disrupt fragile peace processes. Additional pressures, such as COVID-19, compound the risk and makes a country like Somalia even more vulnerable to shocks and setbacks, as the recent political crisis shows.
How states manage international censure: Norway's response to criticism of its Child Welfare Services
When states are criticised, they normally recognise, reject or counter the critique. Yet they could listen to and contain criticism without directly rejecting or recognising it. Using criticism of Norway’s Child Welfare Services as an example, Kristin Haugevik and Cecilie Basberg Neumann show that diplomatic containment can prevent conflict accelerating and then damaging bilateral relations
Myter om ytre høyre
They are called populists, anti-liberal and pro-Russian - but is it that simple?
Much Ado About Very Little? Migration-Linked Development Assistance — the Cases of Poland and Norway
In response to the migration management crisis that peaked in Europe in 2015-2016, the EU institutions and some European states promised to address the “root causes of migration”, with development assistance seen as an important tool in that respect. By comparing the development cooperation policies of Poland and Norway, this paper shows how the development-migration nexus has been implemented in practice by new and traditional donors alike. Despite important differences at the rhetorical level, neither state has substantially changed their development cooperation to link it directly to migration interests. This demonstrates the limited usefulness of the “root causes of migration” approach.
Restructuring state power in Sudan
Developing post-conflict economic policies in Sudan remains a significant challenge for the Sudanese transitional government and the international community. This article argues that understanding the conflict, its costs and the progress made during the current peace agreement are essential for advancing policy reforms in Sudan. The Sudanese transitional government has attempted to implement reforms, but little progress has been made because the civilian elements operate outside of the existing state power. The previous regimes policies sustained conflict(s) through both passive and active enablement of the Sudanese security forces, which means that the restructuring of state power is essential to place Sudan on the right course towards sustained democracy. This article posits that addressing structural reforms in Sudan means establishing control over the economy, defense, and security sectors.
The Pandemic as a Litmus Test for (Dis)Engagement of External Powers in Central Asia
This study provides an empirical overview of pandemic-related external assistance to the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan by partner countries and international organisations between March and September 2020. This state-of-the-art review of Central Asia official development assistance extends to pledged funds beyond this period. The systemic comparison of donors suggests that there is no single actor that stands out as a champion of economic recovery; these are mostly small, token contributions. By contrast, targeted medical assistance has been far more significant, albeit focused on short-term crisis management of the pandemic. There has been only a handful of assistance projects that reflect a long-term stake in Central Asia's economic recovery and the pandemic showed little evidence of the Great Game competition for regional geopolitical influence. Thus, the relations between big powers and Central Asia need to be reconsidered and given a new meaning that would better reflect the interests and interaction between the two parties. The pandemic showed that these relations were mainly pragmatic during the global health crisis with no external partner showing interest in projecting and expanding strategic influence on the region. The region needs to build its internal resilience against new crises and avoid excessive reliance on external assistance in the long term.