Research Project
Balancing between integration and autonomy. Understanding the drivers and mechanisms of EU's foreign, security and defense policy
Events
In an international context that is constantly shifting, we need a better understanding of how various global and regional challenges affect Europe.
Our starting point is an assumption that global shifts and regional challenges add a completely new dimension to the European decision trap: States, or decision-makers, no longer face only a choice pf how to improve their influence within Europe and the EU system, but are also increasingly faced with an "exit" option.
The aim of EUFLEX is therefore to study how the EU, its member states as well as closely associated states, balance between the concerns for preserving national autonomy on the one hand and loyalty to the European integration project. Balancing between autonomy and integration has been a key question throughout the history of European integration, but it has become more urgent following the British government decision to withdraw from the EU. While the existing literature has focused primarily on why integration takes place in spite of this dilemma, EUFLEX will be more interested in investigating what kind of integration it produces. In the current situation, it is likely that we will see a process of more flexible integration. However, we know little about what it means in practice, and how will it be addressed by different actors and levels of government (the EU, the member states and associated member states).
EUFLEX is organized into three overarching thematic areas focusing on how different levels relate to the dilemma of integration and autonomy in the area of foreign policy and diplomatic integration, regional integration and security community building and defence integration.
For more information on NUPI's research on Europe and the EU, please visit NUPI Centre for European Studies.
Project Manager
Participants
Articles
Rethinking differentiated integration
Several NUPI researchers contributed to the debate about differentiated integration in the area of security and defence at the annual conference of the European International Studies Association (EISA) in Sofia, Bulgaria last week.
Norway’s cooperation with the EU – 4 ways ahead
Can Norway benefit from closer collaboration with the EU on foreign and security policy?
New publications
United clubs of Europe: Informal differentiation and the social ordering of intra-EU diplomacy
This article makes the case for integrating informal, social and minilateral dynamics in analyses of ‘differentiated integration’ in the European Union (EU) context. In EU studies, differentiated integration has mainly served as an analytical lens for studying variation in states’ degree of formalized commitment to the European integration project or in organizational decision-making procedures across policy areas. While this focus has generated important analytical and empirical insights, three dimensions tend to be lost when limiting the study of differentiated integration to negotiated outcomes manifest in legal documents and decision-making procedures. First, informal processes of integration precede and concur with formal ones. Second, European integration is an inherently social process, and member states integrate with the EU identity-building project in different ways and to different degrees. Third, member states enjoy heterogeneous social ties with one another, routinely forming informal bi- and minilateral coalitions in everyday decision-shaping processes. More knowledge about these informal and social dynamics can give us a better understanding of how differentiated integration manifests itself in practice and where the European integration process is heading. The theoretical argument is buttressed by data from the 2020 European Council of Foreign Relations’ ‘Coalition Explorer’ survey, showing how partner preferences within the EU continue to reflect stable social sub-orders.
Differentiated Defence Integration Under French Leadership
Studies dealing with EU security and defence policy tend to focus exclusively on what is formally included in the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Other initiatives taken outside this framework are frequently seen potentially undermining the development of EU defence – even when the intention is to strengthen defence capacity. This has been the case with the various initiatives taken within or closely linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the recent French approach involving the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). An alternative perspective is to see these as integrated parts of a more flexible and differentiated European security framework where all these initiatives combined contribute to strengthening European defence capacity. Building on the argument presented in the introduction to this Special Issue, this article argues that France, as a leader in promoting ‘l’Europe de la défense’, has been instrumental in promoting this differentiated approach to European defence integration, especially under the Macron presidency.
Differentiated Integration and Europe’s Global Role: A Conceptual Framework
In a time of global challenges, rising geopolitical tensions and a weakening of the traditional trans-Atlantic security community, we can expect pressures for Europe to play a more important role in the world. Various initiatives have been taken to strengthen the role of the European Union (EU), but there are also tendencies towards a more complex European governance structure in the making, characterized by a combination of both EU and non-EU (but still European) initiatives. This introductory article presents a framework for studying a European role that includes initiatives taken within and outside the EU framework, but closely interlinked, indicating that the concept of differentiated integration (DI) may help to clarify Europe’s role in a changing and volatile global context.
European defence beyond institutional boundaries: Improved European defence through flexibility, differentiation and coordination
As a response to the changing geopolitical situation, initiatives aimed to strengthen European defence have been taken in NATO, in the EU, but also bi- and multilaterally between EU member states and associated non-members, such as Norway. This policy brief argues that all these processes must be taken into account when we want to measure the full security and defence capacity of Europe. Rather than a sign of fragmentation, they are preparing the ground for a new European defence architecture, characterised by a high degree of flexibility, which in the end may be better adapted to the current security context. To maximalise the effect of this differentiated defence architecture, however, a certain coordination between the different initiatives is needed. There is now a window of opportunity for such coordination, as two key processes are now running in parallel: the development of a new “strategic concept” for NATO and the development of a “Strategic Compass” in the EU. If this succeeds, we can hope for the development of a more flexible and capable European defence.
The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.
The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises
The Palgrave Handbook of EU crises comprehensively explores the European Union’s institutional and policy responses to crises across policy domains and institutions – including the Euro crisis, Brexit, the Ukraine crisis and other foreign policy crises, the migration crisis, the legitimacy crisis and the global health crisis resulting from Covid-19. It contributes to our understanding of how crises affect institutional change and continuity, decision-making behavior and processes, and public policy making. If offers a systematic discussion of how the existing repertoire of theories understand crises and how well they capture times of crises and events of disintegration. More generally, the handbook looks at how public organizations cope with crises, and thus probes how sustainable and resilient public organizations are in times of crisis and unrest.
Norway and the changing Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union
For decades, Norway has cooperated with the European Union in matters of foreign policy, security and defence. It has thus participated in EU civilian and military operations, aligned itself with EU political declarations and restrictive measures against states and/or individuals, and collaborated with the European Defence Agency. Unlike other frameworks of cooperation between the EU and Norway, such as the EEA and Schengen agreements, the cooperation in foreign policy, security and defence does not rely on a single setup, with elaborate institutional arrangements and dynamic obligations. Rather, Norway joins forces with the Union in an ad hoc fashion and often based on informal arrangements. This allows for flexibility, but also entails that Norway has few formal channels for exerting influence on EU CFSP decisions to which it subsequently subscribes. Against this backdrop, and as the EU has become more active in this policy area, Norway has shown a renewed interest in deepening its relationship with the Union in CFSP matters. This report examines the ways in which Norway can enhance its cooperation and develop its institutional arrangements with the EU in this fast-evolving field. The discussion is based on an assessment of what the EU is able to offer in view of its constitutional framework, as informed by its on-going discussions with the UK on a future security partnership post-Brexit. Given the increasing interactions between the CFSP and other fields of the EU’s activities, the analysis also discusses whether Norway may draw a cooperation dividend from its participation in the single market through the EEA, to build a deeper and more participatory cooperation with the EU in CFSP matters. The report envisages four possible ways of enhancing the Norway-EU cooperation in the area CFSP: an extension of the present cooperation by ad hoc participation in new CFSP initiatives, a more active use of other existing EU-Norway frameworks of cooperation including the EEA, the setting up of a distinct EU-Norway CFSP agreement and the participation in a multilateralised EU-UK CFSP partnership.
European Defence and Third Countries after Brexit
The UK’s departure from the European Union has given energy to the process towards ‘ever closer Union’ in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Many policies and initiatives have been brought to the table in the aftermath of the referendum that created shock waves in Europe. This policy brief takes stock of the developments in European defence integration since the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Contrary to the dominant political and public debate about those developments, and the political optimism inside the EU, the brief identifies some key obstacles towards expanded European defence integration. With the UK’s exit from the EU, the ‘third country’ role in the CSDP will inevitably be altered, as one of the largest military powers in Europe will stand outside of the EU. For current third countries – like Norway and Iceland – this should lead to caution regarding immediate participation and a pragmatic approach to the developments. Energy and resources should not be invested before post-Brexit institutions and practices have been established.