Trump, Global Order, and the Liberal West

This text has been translated from Norwegian with help from ChatGPT.

‘We are witnessing three partially overlapping trends that challenge the status quo in global politics,’ says Senior Researcher Minda Holm, author of the report "A Postliberal Global Order? Challenge(r)s to the Liberal West", which examines the rise in ideological and geopolitical conflict in international politics and its implications for the liberal West. 

She elaborates: 

‘First, we see a broad and increasing convergence around criticism of liberal values in both domestic and international politics. A number of actors want more ideological diversity in global politics, and to thus overturn the liberal ideological dominance of the post-Cold War era. But they do not necessarily agree on what to put in its place.’

The call for ideological diversity unites non-Western powers such as Russia and China with far-right actors in Europe and the United States.

‘At the same time, but only partially overlapping, there is an increased pressure for stronger non-Western representation in international organizations – essentially, a push for geopolitical diversity. These developments are compounded by a third trend: the international legal system is under pressure from both certain Western and non-Western powers. This situation has been exacerbated dramatically by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza,’ Holm adds. 

These three trends challenge what is often referred to as the "international order" established after World War II. In essence, an international order refers to the institutions, rules, relations, and values that govern global relations at a given time and context. Holm notes that what we precisely mean by this term is often politically and ideologically charged, as discussed in her report. 

Creating an Artificial Divide 

After discussing what is under pressure in today's global order and the role the liberal West has played in undermining some of the values and institutions that it wants and claims to represent, Holm delves into the alternative transatlantic value and interest community that has emerged between Europe's populist radical right and Donald Trump's administration.

‘The political and academic discourse surrounding a “post-1945 Liberal International Order” post-1945, or a “Rules-Based Order”, fails to capture how international politics have evolved since the post-WWII period. These terms create an artificial divide between the West and the rest of the world, and foster a misleading understanding of what is being challenged and by whom in today's international political system,’ Holm states. 

In her report, she examines the evolution of dominant liberal ideals and practices from 1945 to the present, particularly in relation to the formal boundaries between the international community and sovereign states. For example, the 1945 UN Charter was based on a liberal ideal emphasizing diversity and tolerance for different governance systems in regulating relations between states. Non-Western states also played a crucial role in shaping this post-war architecture. 

‘A lot changed in international politics after the end of the Cold War. The formal boundary between the international community and the sovereign state became increasingly blurred. State-building and the promotion of broad liberal-democratic ideals by both states and organizations became more central to the global order. The idea was that a “good state” was a liberal-democratic, capitalist state. Additionally, human rights norms and humanitarian principles took on a more prominent role in international organizations like the UN.’ 

Now, more actors oppose this development. 

‘The ideological dominance of liberal democracy has ended,’ says Holm. 

Increasingly Difficult to Conduct Human Rights Advocacy 

Critics seek greater control over their own governance systems. Both far-right Western parties and several key non-Western states aim to reverse much of the post-Cold war developments.

‘It will become increasingly challenging to do human rights advocacy. Vulnerable minorities—such as LGBTQ+ individuals and refugees—are constructed as external enemies. Principles from the 1945 UN Charter—such as sovereignty, sovereign equality, and non-interference—are becoming increasingly central to states and actors that desire greater control over their own domestic politics. After all, these principles ultimately—at least formally—protected the sovereign power of states. The UN Charter and system are therefore central in the rhetoric of states like Russia and China, even though Russia, in particular, actively contributes to undermining the principles upon which they are based. Often, more illiberal and authoritarian actors express a desire for diversity and tolerance for different governance systems in global politics—a diversity and tolerance they do not extend to the diverse lifestyles of their own citizens.’ 

Reform, Not Exit 

At the same time, these actors do not necessarily oppose multilateralism—that is, cooperation between states—or all developments since 1989. 

‘Despite everything that is changing, much also remains the same. While an increasing number of actors challenge liberal democracy, few challenge global capitalism. The desire among both the populist radical right and actors like Russia, China, and the emerging economies in the BRICS+ organization is primarily reform, not withdrawal, from key international organizations such as the UN, EU, WTO, IMF, and the World Bank,’ Holm explains. 

The political consequences, however, remain significant, as reform would entail both a weakening of Western and American dominance and changes in policy, weakening for example existing human rights norms.

Internal Tensions Among Challengers 

Holm also highlights significant tensions both within and between the European and American populist radical right, and states like China and Russia in how they view international politics. However, they share some important commonalities. With Donald Trump's election, which Holm believes in many ways takes criticism of the status quo in global politics even further, significant changes in the coming years are inevitable. 

‘In recent years, a significant alternative far-right transatlantic value community has emerged. In academic literature, one speaks of a 'fourth wave' of far-right politics in the 2000s, particularly in the West, where far-right parties and policies have become more mainstreamed. Since Donald Trump first came to power, the ideological and strategic ties between European and American milieus have become much stronger. The closest ties are between Viktor Orbán's Hungary and different circles surrounding the new Trump administration.’ 

The West Has Undermined Itself 

Far-right parties challenge both aspects of liberal democracy and key components of liberal international politics. This development thus also challenges the idea of the West as a unified and cohesive community of values. 

‘In Western political discourse, there has long been a tendency to present the West as inherently liberal-democratic and as defenders of both international law and multilateralism. Throughout the 2000s, this self-image has increasingly been challenged from within. On the one hand, Western states themselves have undermined some of the values and institutions they sought to promote, such as through the war on terror and most recently in Gaza. On the other hand, far-right parties have gained significantly more power also within the West.’ 

With Trump, internal tensions in the West will become more pronounced, as he questions both fundamental multilateral practices and the traditional transatlantic community, as well as a range of liberal values. 

‘It is no longer possible to speak of the West as a unified liberal “Us”. Western states must take this seriously and address it—rather than continuing to reflexively speak as if the West and its organizations represent everything from international law to liberal democracy, and as if threats to the status quo in international politics only come from non-Western and fully illiberal actors. The United States is the biggest elephant in the room, as Trump reminded us earlier in January with his remarks about Greenland and the Panama canal. For Norway, the pressing question then becomes: How should we handle the increasing tension between our security and defence alliances and our longstanding interest in a world where everything from international law to multilateralism and support for democracy and human rights advocacy matters? Is the solution for example to look more toward the EU and distance ourselves somewhat more from an ideologically unstable United States? Or do we need to rethink our role in the world?’