Event
When Russia goes to war
Since 1999 Russia has been at war in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and now in Syria. These wars enjoy strong support in the Russian population. How does war become an acceptable undertaking in the Russian polity?
Popular explanations that see Russian war-making as determined and grounded in President Putin alone are too simplistic. Close study of statements and texts of Duma representatives, experts and journalists before and during the war in Chechnya demonstrates how war is made a legitimate undertaking by the efforts of many.
Russian war-fare against Chechnya was particularly violent and caused enormous suffering for the civilian population, much like what we are seing in Syria today. De-humanization of the enemy is a precondition for any violent undertaking. But enemies that are portrayed as particularly different and dangerous, such as ‘terrorists’, can legitimately be subjected to gross violence. The ‘anti-terrorist campaign’ against Chechnya in 1999 and the consequences of this war can provide useful insights in a world trying to grapple with a growing terrorist threat.
The seminar is a book-launch of Wilhelmsen’s book ‘Russia’s Securitization of Chechnya: How war became acceptable’.
10.30 – 10.50 Presentation of the book by Julie Wilhelmsen, NUPI
10.50 – 12.00 Comments on the book by Helene Skjeggestad, Aftenposten followed by a conversation between Skjeggestad and Wilhelmsen
The event is streamed live on Youtube:
Related publications
Russia's Securitization of Chechnya:How war became acceptable
This book provides an in-depth analysis of how mobilization and legitimation for war are made possible, with a focus on Russia's conflict with Chechnya. Through which processes do leaders and their publics come to define and accept certain conflicts as difficult to engage in, and others as logical, even necessary? Drawing on a detailed study of changes in Russia’s approach to Chechnya, this book argues that ‘re-phrasing’ Chechnya as a terrorist threat in 1999 was essential to making the use of violence acceptable to the Russian public. The book refutes popular explanations that see Russian war-making as determined and grounded in a sole, authoritarian leader. Close study of the statements and texts of Duma representatives, experts and journalists before and during the war demonstrates how the Second Chechen War was made a ‘legitimate’ undertaking through the efforts of many. A post-structuralist reinterpretation of securitization theory guides and structures the book, with discourse theory and method employed as a means to uncover the social processes that make war acceptable. More generally, the book provides a framework for understanding the broad social processes that underpin legitimized war-making. This book will be of much interest to students of Russian politics, critical terrorism studies, security studies and international relations.