Researcher
Niels Nagelhus Schia
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Niels Nagelhus Schia is a research professor, head of NUPI's Research group on security and defense, and co-chair of NUPI's Center on digitalization and cyber security studies.
He is a former fellow of the NSSR (New School for Social Research) and holds a PhD degree in social anthropology from the University of Oslo.
With a focus on the role of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance in international relations Schia tracks new developments in policy and research, and provide academic studies, expert analysis and strategic policy recommendations. His research focus combines anthropology and international relations theory with theories of cyber security. His current projects are concerned with norms and state behavior in cyber space, development assistance and capacity building, societal vulnerabilities, sovereignty and cyberspace, global governance and cyberspace. In the research project GAIA (funded by the Research Council of Norway's IKTPLUSS initiative) Schia explores links between digital value chains, national autonomy and international politics. This is a four-year cooperation between SimulaMet, NUPI and several other institutions and universities. Read his most recent article The Cyber Frontier and Digital Pitfalls in the Global South published in Third World Quarterly (2018).
Schia has worked on numerous topics within international organizations, global governance, peacebuilding and statebuilding over the previous years. He has acted as an adviser to governments and international organizations on issues pertaining to capacity building, institution building and global governance. He has participated in international discussions and working groups in the United Nations and regularly participates at international conferences. He has long experience with developing and finalizing research projects financed by governments and research councils. A cross cutting concern in these research projects has been the exploration of global connections to more localized and national contexts. This is also a concern in his book Franchised States and the Bureaucracy of Peace (Palgrave Macmillian, 2018) and in his chapter Horseshoe and Catwalk: Power, Complexity and Consensus-Making in the United Nations Security Council in the book Palaces of Hope: The Anthropology of Global Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
Schia has published in scientific journals such as Third World Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, International Peacekeeping, Journal of International Relations and Development, and Political and Legal Anthropology.
His current research focuses on cyber security, cyber capacity building in developing countries and emerging economies, internet governance and collaboration between states and non-state actors.
He is a former Fulbright Scholar and from January 2017 he is a co-editor of the leading Scandinavian-language International Relations-journal Internasjonal Politikk.
Expertise
Education
2015 PhD, Social Antropology, University of Oslo
2004 Cand.polit., Social anthropology, University of Oslo
Work Experience
2022- Head of NUPI's Research group on security and defence
2017- Co-editor of the leading Scandinavian-language International Relations-journal Internasjonal Politikk
2015- Head, NUPI's Cyber Security Centre. 2010 Advisor, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York HQ
2009 Visiting scholar at The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eiriksson mobility programme (The Research Council of Norway) and Fulbright Scholar
2003- Research Assistant / Research Fellow / Senior Research Fellow/Research Professor, NUPI
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2012-2016 Board member Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway
2013-2016 Head of Scientific Committee for Fulbright annual research award
Aktivitet
Filter
Clear all filtersDagsnytt 18 - Norge inn i Sikkerhetsrådet
Norge sikret seg en plass i FNs Sikkerhetsråd i perioden 2021-2022. NUPI forsker Niels Nagelhus Schia, Utenriksminister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide og Janne Haaland Matlary møttes i Dagsnytt 18 for å snakke om valget, hvorfor denne plassen er interessant for Norge, hvilke dilemmaer Norge vil møte vis-a-vis stormaktene, samt hvordan og på hvilke områder vi kan ha innflytelse i Sikkerhetsrådet i de to årene vi skal sitte der.
Norge holder pusten foran FN-avgjørelse
Norge ruster seg til den aller siste innspurten i kampen om et sete i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Å tape blir et antiklimaks, fastslår forsker.
Politisk Kvarter - Norge vil inn i FNs Sikkerhetsråd, men hvorfor?
(Interview in Norwegian): NUPI-forsker Niels Nagelhus Schia og Utenriksminister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide om det norske kandidaturet til FNs Sikkerhetsråd, hvorfor er dette interessant for Norge? Hvilke dilemmaer vil Norge møte i forhold til stormaktene? Hvilke land konkurrerer Norge med?
Kjemper om en plass i FNs Sikkerhetsråd
Wednesday 17 June 2020 we will know if Norway gets one of the two available seats that we are fighting for in the UN Security Council. What does this involve and why should Norway sit around the horseshoe table? Senior researcher Niels Nagelhus Schia was interviewed about this on NRK News.
The role of the UN Security Council in cybersecurity: international peace and security in the digital age
At the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, the UN Security Council is faced with difficult questions about its efficacy, relevance and legitimacy. The leading powers and the permanent members (P5) of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – are drawn into a heavy contest over the world order. Power lines are (to be) drawn in an increasingly digital, interconnected and multi-stakeholder society. So far, despite the language from heads of states, global media houses and from leaders of international organizations including NATO and the UN, none of the P5 countries have brought cyber to the UNSC. Other countries – for instance, Lithuania and the Netherlands – have considered introducing cybersecurity issues in the Council, but no action has followed. One of the most recent members-elect, Estonia, has pledged to take the issue up. To stay relevant and act up on its responsibility for international peace and security, the Security Council will have to establish itself vis-à-vis cyber issues. The goal of this chapter is to examine why and how. To what extent do questions pertaining to digital threats and cybersecurity fall within the mandate of the Council and what could it address given the politically tense times among the P5.
Theory Seminar: Cyber Conflict in the study of International Relations
Max Smeets will take a closer look at the academic literature on analysing cyber conflict.
Cybersikkerhet
(In Norwegian only) Den teknologiske utviklingen og framveksten av digitale nettverk har ført til noen av de mest dramatiske endringene vi har sett på flere generasjoner. Dette gjelder både endringer i sosial samhandling, men også endringer i den mer generelle samfunnsmessige utviklingen. Disse framskrittene har også hatt viktige implikasjoner for sikkerhetspolitikk, internasjonal politikk og forhold mellom stormakter. I fokusspalten i dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk har vi invitert samfunnsvitere til å belyse hvordan cybersikkerhet bidrar til å endre forhold mellom stater og internasjonale organisasjoner samt internasjonal politikk.
Neumann, NUPI og utenriksdebatten
(In Norwegian only) Iver B. Neumann begynte på NUPI i 1988. Etter tre tiår som NUPI-forsker (riktignok med en periode som Montague Burton-Professor i International Relations på LSE i London) meldte han i 2018 overgang til OsloMet. Med NUPI som plattform har Neumann satt et solid fotavtrykk i norsk offentlighet, og han er i dag en av Norges mest profilerte og internasjonalt anerkjente forskere på utenriks- og internasjonal politikk. Han er hyppig sitert, og er blant de 20 norske forskerne som publiserer mest ifølge CRISTIN-registeret.1 Han er særlig opptatt av norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, identitet, diplomati og Russland.
Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.