Kacper Szulecki

Expelled from the Fairytale: The Impact of the Dissident Legacy on Post-1989 Central European Politics

To understand the political dimension of dissident legacies, we need first to understand the components that “made” the dissidents and follow their reconfiguration after 1989, leading to initial empowerment followed by gradual demise of the liberal post-dissident elite. Dissidence in the form that first appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s in central and eastern Europe constituted a particular mode of political practice, combining open, non-violent dissent with universalist moral claims. The phenomenon of dissidentism was transnational, as political empowerment of oppositionists was achieved through a particular network of relationships between domestic audiences, repressive regimes, and Western media, social movements, trade unions, political parties, and policymakers. The specificities of the dissidents’ empowerment can partly explain key features of post-dissident politics and the visible backlash against former prominent dissidents, which has contributed to the rise of illiberalism and to democratic backsliding. This article traces the post-1989 trajectories of a few who belonged among central Europe’s most prominent representatives in this symbolic category, to try to explain the causes and character of the swift backlash against them—or as Václav Havel put it, their “expulsion from the fairytale.” Three pillars of dissident political power turned into the roots of their demise. First, critics question the dissidents’ uniqueness and rewrite their master narrative. Further, we see a clash of representations that results from the dissidents’ transnational empowerment, and third, the broader anti-elite and anti-intellectual tendencies that always accompanied dissidence as its shadow became amplified by more recent populist rhetoric.

The urgent need for social science and humanities knowledge for climate action in Europe

Climate Obstruction in Poland: A Governmental–Industrial Complex

Poland is known for its climate scepticism and denial throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Despite its recent rapid deployment of renewable energy sources, Poland remains Europe’s most coal-dependent economy. Since 2004, consecutive governments have been ‘pulling the brake’ on the European Union’s more ambitious climate policy initiatives and decarbonization targets. There are recent signs of changing societal attitudes, but the country is alone among EU nations in lacking a net zero emissions target or a coal power phase-out date. This situation has been created and perpetuated by a coalition of governmental institutions, agencies, state-owned energy companies, and utilities that constitute a governmental–industrial complex (GIC). While the GIC has moderated its discourse and policies, it continues to promote ‘silver bullet’ technologies such as ‘clean’ coal and new nuclear power plants. Poland’s commitment to a just, gradual energy transition is a climate imposter tactic, part of an overarching strategy of delay.

Contesting just transitions: Climate delay and the contradictions of labour environmentalism

The notion of ‘just transition’ (JT) is an attempt to align climate and energy objectives with the material concerns of industrial workers, frontline communities, and marginalised groups. Despite the potential for fusing social and environmental justice, there is growing concern that the concept is being mobilised in practice as a form of ‘climate delayism’: a problem more ambiguous than open forms of denialism as it draws in multiple and conflictual agents, practices, and discourses. Using an historical materialist framework, attentive to both energy-capital and capital-labour relations, we show how JT is vulnerable to forces and relations of climate delay across both fossil capital and climate capital hegemonic projects. We review this through an engagement with the climate obstructionism literature and the theory of labour environmentalism: the political engagement of trade unionists and workers with environmental issues. As tensions within the labour movement surface amidst the unsettling of the carbon capital hegemony, we assess the degree to which (organised) labour—as an internally differentiated, contradictory movement—is participating in climate breakdown through a ‘praxis of delay’. Trade unions and industrial workers are often implicated in resisting or undermining transitions, but this is related significantly to their structural power relations vis a vis the fossil hegemony. Notably, JT negotiations are themselves structurally embedded within the carbon capital economy. The general preferences of trade unions for social over environmental justice might be prevalent but are neither universal nor inevitable; JT is open and contested political terrain, and labour-environmental struggles remain imperative for building just energy futures.

Prospects for Europe’s green transition after the 2024 European Parliament elections

On 18 July 2024, Ursula Von der Leyen has been reelected for another term as head of the European Commission, with a stronger mandate than in 2019 – the majority in the European Parliament she managed to ramp up was 401 votes. On 17 September, the planned composition of the new Commission was announced, subject to the approval of the European Parliament. What can we expect from the new EU ‘government’ and what are the most important challenges the VdL2 Commission will face in the area of climate, energy and sustainability governance?

Polish-Norwegian Perceptions and Interactions

This working paper, which is one of deliverables of the NORPOLFACTOR project, maps mutual perceptions of Poland in Norway and Norway in Poland, the basic ideas informing their approaches to security-related challenges caused by their location in Russia’s neighbourhood as well as what could be termed as areas of cooperation and points of contention in their cooperation on addressing various security related challenges in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The Political Economy of Global Climate Action: Where Does the West Go Next After COP28?

This report offers a critical, candid examination of the landscape of global climate action. Current efforts are lacking even amid consecutive UN climate conferences that build upon the successes of the 2015 Paris Agreement. It argues that the incremental progress achieved thus far is insufficient to address the escalating climate crisis. Challenges of domestic political economy and lacking global governance are substantively at fault. We identify several related barriers to effective climate action, including mismatched time horizons, shared public and private responsibility, the complexity of global challenges, and problems of global collective action and burden distribution. The report explores the distributional costs of climate policies, emphasizing the impacts of populism on climate action (and vice versa), and the need for a fair transition. Global governance challenges are attributable to the limits of existing multilateral institutions and the persistently difficult geopolitical and macroeconomic outlook. We conclude by offering a set of specific policy recommendations, spanning corporate taxation, public investment, long-term commitment mechanisms, the climate action-energy security interface, corporate responsibility, and the imperative of a just, equitable, and participatory transition. The proposed strategies can contribute to achieving time-consistent, decisive and systemic action that tackles the urgent climate crisis, building on political incentives and disincentives. This systematic lens – focused on political economy and global governance constraints - needs to be applied to all climate action policies to get ahead of the curve in the global and domestic political environment in which we find ourselves.

Climate and Russia - Does the world need nuclear power?

The rising global temperature must be restricted to well below a two-degree increase. It’s crucial to make electricity production carbon neutral as quickly as possible. Is nuclear power the new game changer for achieving this ambitious goal? In this documentary from DW, NUPI Research Professor Kacper Szulecki is interviewed about nuclear energy.

The EU's CBAM and Its ‘Significant Others’: Three Perspectives on the Political Fallout from Europe's Unilateral Climate Policy Initiative

As part of the European Green Deal, the European Commission has launched a tool to protect the fulfilment of Europe's climate policy targets – the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). It is thought that the CBAM will spark stiff resistance from Europe's external trade partners, potentially undermining the initiative. How this plays out will depend in part on who the opponents and potential allies are – and how the European Union (EU) engages with them. But which non-EU countries have a stake in the CBAM? The criteria for selecting third countries that are relevant for the CBAM are often implicit, which can lead to contradictory policy analyses and confused climate diplomacy. This research note compares three different perspectives that result in different lists of non-EU countries that are important for the success of the CBAM. Awareness of these three perspectives amongst EU actors can help the CBAM succeed.