Securitisation of the EU approach to the Western Balkans: from conflict transformation to crisis management.
This chapter analyses the EU’s crisis response in the Western Balkans through the lens of EULEX. By exploring how those immediately responsible for mandate execution and those directly affected by its outcomes perceive EULEX, we discover gaps that highlight the pitfalls of direct and ingrained political interference in the mission’s work. While EULEX has been seen as an important watchdog for preventing further human rights abuses, the EU’s approach to Kosovo and the region continues to be characterised by competing priorities: the EU’s broader political objectives impact the mission’s legal work and hamper the EU in achieving a coherent and impactful rule of law policy. In turn, this decreases the local populations’ trust and approval of EULEX and ultimately undermines the EU’s overall goals of promoting good governance and a European perspective for Kosovo. This tension highlights the incompatibility of the EU’s short-term focus on crisis management and the more longterm focus on crisis transformation. We see this as particularly problematic for an actor whose self-image as a ‘normative power’, is underpinned by an assumption that its influence in the world in gained through ‘the power of ideas’.
Sudan military reinstates prime minister, but protests continue
Sudan's military has reinstated Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok on Sunday. They have announced the release of all political detainees after weeks of deadly unrest triggered by a coup. Dr Andrew Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs says one of the significant issues with a Sudanese power-sharing agreement, designed to end the deadly unrest following the coup, is that it's not actually what the civilians who are protesting want.
Small States, Different Approaches. Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council
In 2021, Estonia and Norway serve alongside Ireland as elected European members on the UN Security Council. In this report we ask: Why do smaller states like Estonia and Norway invest time, energy and resources seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council? What can they hope to achieve during their period as elected members? And how did Estonia and Norway work – individually and together – to achieve their ambitions in 2021 when they were both serving on the Council?
Funding flows for climate change research on Africa: Where do they come from and where do they go?
Africa has only contributed a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions yet faces disproportionate risks from climate change. This imbalance is one of many inequities associated with climate change and raises questions concerning the origin, distribution and thematic prioritization of funding for climate-change research on Africa. This article analyses a database comprising USD 1.51 trillion of research grants from 521 organizations around the world and covering all fields of research from 1990 to 2020. At most 3.8% of global funding for climate-change research is spent on African topics – a figure incommensurate with Africa’s share of the world population and vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, institutions based in Europe and North America received 78% of funding for climate research on Africa, while African institutions received only 14.5%. Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of the funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received around 40%. Except for Egypt and Nigeria, funding supported research on former British colonies more than other African countries. The findings highlight the need to prioritise research on a broader set of climate-change issues in Africa and to increase funding for Africa-based researchers in order to strengthen African ownership of research informing African responses to climate change.
Surveillance Technology at the Fair: Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities in International Arms Markets
State cyber capabilities are increasingly abiding by the “pay-to-play” model—both US/NATO allies and adversaries can purchase interception and intrusion technologies from private firms for intelligence and surveillance purposes. NSO Group has repeatedly made headlines in 2021 for targeting government entities in cyberspace, but there are many more companies selling similar products that are just as detrimental. These vendors are increasingly looking to foreign governments to hawk their wares, and policymakers have yet to sufficiently recognize or respond to this emerging problem. Any cyber capabilities sold to foreign governments carry a risk: these capabilities could be used against individuals and organizations in allied countries, or even in one’s home country. Because much of this industry operates in the shadows, research into the industry in aggregate is rare. This paper analyzes active providers of interception/intrusion capabilities within the international surveillance market, cataloguing firms that have attended both ISSWorld (i.e., the Wiretapper’s Ball) and international arms fairs over the last twenty years.1 This dataset mostly focuses on Western firms and includes little on Chinese firms, due to historical under-attendance of Chinese firms at ISSWorld. However, the overarching nature of this work will help policymakers better understand the market at large, as well as the primary arms fairs at which these players operate. This paper identifies companies explicitly marketing interception/intrusion technology at arms fairs, and answers a series of questions, including: what companies are marketing interception/intrusion capabilities outside their headquartered region; which arms fairs and countries host a majority of these firms; and what companies market interception/intrusion capabilities to US and NATO adversaries? The resulting dataset shows that there are multiple firms headquartered in Europe and the Middle East that the authors assess, with high confidence, are marketing cyber interception/intrusion capabilities to US/NATO adversaries. They assume that companies offering interception/intrusion capabilities pose the greatest risk, both by bolstering oppressive regimes and by the proliferation of strategic capabilities.2 Many such firms congregate at Milipol France, Security & Policing UK, and other arms fairs in the UK, Germany, Singapore, Israel, and Qatar. The authors found that 75 percent of companies likely selling interception/intrusion technologies have marketed these capabilities to governments outside their home continent. Five irresponsible proliferators—BTT, Cellebrite, Micro Systemation AB, Verint, and Vastech—have marketed their capabilities to US/NATO adversaries in the last ten years.3 This paper categorizes these companies as potentially irresponsible proliferators because of their willingness to market outside their continents to nonallied governments of the United States and NATO—specifically, Russia and China.4 By marketing to these parties, these firms signal that they are willing to accept or ignore the risk that their products will bolster the capabilities of client governments that might wish to threaten US/NATO national security or harm marginalized populations. This is especially the case when the client government is a direct US or NATO adversary. This globalizing shift is important for two reasons. First, it indicates a widening pattern of proliferation of cyber capabilities across the globe. Second, many firms in the surveillance and offensive cyber capabilities markets have long argued for the legitimacy of their business model by pointing to the perceived legitimacy of their customers; yet, their marketing strategies contradict this argument. As the recent indictment of several former US intelligence personnel working for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) confirms, capabilities originally focusing on one target set may be expanded for other intelligence uses.5 When these firms begin to sell their wares to both NATO members and adversaries, it should provoke national security concerns for all customers. This paper profiles these important trends for their practical security impacts, and to enable further research into this topic. The authors suggest that the United States and NATO create know-your-customer (KYC) policies with companies operating in this space; work with arms fairs to limit irresponsible proliferators’ attendance at these events; tighten export-control loopholes; and name and shame both irresponsible vendors and customers. The authors encourage policymakers to focus their efforts to rein in companies that sell these capabilities directly to adversaries, or those willing to ignore the risk that their capabilities may be misused. The dataset presented below is open for use by others who might similarly seek to bring some measure of light to an industry that remains so insistently in the dark.
Ali Hosseini Khamenei: Routinizing Revolution in Iran
This chapter analyzes how Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consolidated his rule and the political consequences of his survival strategy. The author argues that Iran’s long-serving leader capitalized on the institutional and ideological legacies of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as on the high potential for repression in revolutionary regimes. Khamenei has invested in nonelected and parallel revolutionary bodies, maintained strong emphasis on the Islamic Revolution’s ideology and recruited a new generation of followers to the ruling coalition. This essay outlines the tensions arising from Khamenei’s reliance on the organizational structures, aims, and elite selection mechanisms of the revolution and the wish of the Iranian population to change the political course of this important Middle Eastern country.
Mariana Llorens Zabala
Mariana is a Junior Research Fellow at NUPI and works on the Training for Peace Programme, in the Research group on peace, conflict and developmen...
How crucial a role are protesters playing in restoring democracy to Sudan?
Clashes between protesters and security forces have left at least eight people dead and 170 wounded. Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is now the acting head of state. Dr Andrew E Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs weighs in.
Can Sudan go "back to what it was" following latest coup?
Sudan's Prime Minister and most of his cabinet have been arrested by military forces in a coup. It comes after weeks of rising tensions between the country's civilian and military leaders.