Norwegian Gas in Europe in the 2020’s
This article examines the factors that will influence the position of the Norwegian gas on the market in the 2020’s. Starting with an examination of the historical role of Norway as a gas supplier to the EU, this article maps the role of various factors in shaping framework conditions on the European gas market that can influence the position of the Norwegian gas as an energy source. The main conclusion is that Norway will remain an important supplier of gas until 2030 but may face some serious problems to remain relevant after this date due to possible depletion of gas deposits and increased EU focus on the negative impact of fossil fuels on climate change, the development of a more sustainable energy mix in Europe as well as the emergence of new gas suppliers to Europe, first and foremost LNG that could take higher share of the shrinking gas market in Europe. Development of the cost-effective large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology could alleviate some energy transition related pains and make gas more acceptable as a source of energy, also if the development of hydrogen economy were to materialise. The Norwegian gas could be turned into an important input in green hydrogen, a new promising energy source combining the best of the two energy worlds—the fossil one and the green one.
The European Maritime Security and Defence Policy Architecture: Implications for Norway
Maritime security is high on the international and European security agenda, hence a number of new initiatives and actions have developed within the EU, NATO and through bilateral/minilateral agreements. To increase the common capabilities of Europe and secure more targeted responses, there is a need for better coordination between different organizations and forums. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU’s parallel Strategic Compass offer an opportunity to do this. Bilateral and minilateral defence groupings can strengthen European maritime security by accelerating capability development and fostering improved levels of interoperability. Norway should further develop its political dialogue and practical cooperation with the EU, and secure participation in major defence initiatives like the EDF and PESCO, various programmes, and cooperative arrangements with the European Defence Agency (EDA). Norway should pursue further leadership roles within NATO to bolster both its national interests and transatlantic security within the maritime security domain. Norway should actively promote enhanced EUNATO cooperation on maritime security issues, including closer alignment of strategic thinking, policies and investments of the two organisations. Mini-lateral’ structures can allow Norway to join forces with like-minded nations to act rapidly on maritime issues of common importance.
Ismoil Sadullozoda
Ismoil Sadullozoda was a visiting research fellow at NUPI in 2022.
Sudan´s Power Struggle
Sudans statsminister Abdalla Hamdok har gått av. Dr Andrew Yaw Tchie fra NUPI diskuterer komponentene som har hindret landet i bevege seg framover.
Development Assistance and Root Causes of Migration: A Risky Road to Unsustainable Solutions
In the aftermath of the 2015 migration-management crisis, both the European Union and several European states declared that they would be using development aid more strategically to address root causes of migration. The final report from the MiDeShare project, a joint two-year research project managed and implemented by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), addresses two key issues that such a declaration brings to the fore: First, can development assistance really tackle root causes of migration, and second, have the EU and European countries such as Norway and Poland changed the direction of their aid since 2015? By reviewing the research already published by our joint project, we will sum up both what we know and in what areas new research-based knowledge is needed.
European defence beyond institutional boundaries: Improved European defence through flexibility, differentiation and coordination
As a response to the changing geopolitical situation, initiatives aimed to strengthen European defence have been taken in NATO, in the EU, but also bi- and multilaterally between EU member states and associated non-members, such as Norway. This policy brief argues that all these processes must be taken into account when we want to measure the full security and defence capacity of Europe. Rather than a sign of fragmentation, they are preparing the ground for a new European defence architecture, characterised by a high degree of flexibility, which in the end may be better adapted to the current security context. To maximalise the effect of this differentiated defence architecture, however, a certain coordination between the different initiatives is needed. There is now a window of opportunity for such coordination, as two key processes are now running in parallel: the development of a new “strategic concept” for NATO and the development of a “Strategic Compass” in the EU. If this succeeds, we can hope for the development of a more flexible and capable European defence.
AUKUS and its implications for Asia, US-European relations and non-proliferation
The political, strategic and technological aspects of the AUKUS deal may be more important than the provision of nuclear-powered submarines. The deal is a clear sign of the US tilt towards Asia and will have important implications for both USFrench, US-EU and US-NATO relations. AUKUS does not imply any nuclear weapons proliferation risk. However, it paths the way for a proliferation of nuclear-powered submarines, which will open for legitimate and illegitimate claims for producing Highly Enriched Uranium. It remains to be seen whether the strategic benefits of AUKUS in the Indo-pacific will outweigh its political costs for transatlantic relations and the image of the United States as a trusted security partner.
Nordic Airpower Cooperation and Finland’s F-35 decision: Towards a New Era?
The Nordic states air forces have cooperated closely, especially after Russia reinvigorated its military posture in the region from 2007-2008. With regional security policy and military strategy becoming more closely integrated after 2014, this tactical activity has become a key part of an emerging strategic-level pattern of cooperation. Closer political and military integration has enabled regional security cooperation to proliferate across unit types and activities. With the introduction of new generation fighter aircraft in the short term, and future air combat systems in the longer term, cooperation is set to change, but given its dual imperative is bound to continue and expand as new avenues emerge. Especially, the continuation of CBT in the short and long term has both a tactical and strategic rationale. Finland’s decision to procure the F-35 Lightning II will enable even closer airpower cooperation in the Nordics and in a broader European and trans-Atlantic framework, both in peace, crisis, and armed conflict. System similarity with Norway extends to the JSM, which opens the possibility for joint development of this weapon system and its operational use. As such, the procurement sets the stage for closer collaboration at both the tactical, operational and military-industrial levels.