Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency - Two of a Kind?
This article demonstrates that there are more similarities between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency than often recognized. In today's ‘war among the people’, the counter-insurgent cannot succeed with offensive military capabilities alone and must seek to apply also non-kinetic and defensive methods; whereas the peacekeeper often is forced to apply ‘robust’ and kinetic means to implement a mandate. As a result, the two concepts seem to be converging and share some commonalities. The article compares the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ‘capstone doctrine’ and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual to argue that the two doctrines share similarities in six areas: (1) a focus on civilian solutions; (2) a need for protection of civilians; (3) international coherence; (4) host-nation ownership; (5) use of intelligence in support of operations; (6) limitations on the use of force. The article suggests areas where the two doctrines could mesh with each other.
The Caspian Sea Region towards 2025
The Caspian Sea and the lands around it are emerging again as a focus region in global affairs. With security of energy supply high on the international agenda, and with fears of resource shortages re-surfacing, the countries of the Caspian region are stepping onto the global stage, claiming for themselves new roles as providers of resources to the world. However, the new-found strength and self-confidence of the rulers of these countries are built on uncertain ground. How will a temporary – or longer-term – global recession affect these recently independent countries? How will climate change influence them – and will global climate policy alter the value of their massive hydrocarbon reserves? In some of these countries, there have been domestic armed conflicts or conflicts with neighbouring states – could hostilities erupt again? And what about the major powers in the neighbourhood? Who will gain influence, and who will lose – or will geopolitical games simply serve to destabilize matters? In three scenarios for the Caspian Sea region in 2025 this book tries to suggest possible futures for the countries around the Caspian Sea. The futures are shaped in a complex interplay with global events, with other powers and with a range of forces within the region itself. The main forces shaping the region will be the market for natural resources and their impact on regional economies, political and cultural forces of change within the region and each of the countries, as well as the dominance and influence of great powers.
Caspian Energy Politics
Caspian Energy Politics analyses the role of oil and gas in the development of the three main petroleum exporters in the Caspian region - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - and how energy resources influence interactions with semi-authoritarian Russia and China. Due to volatile commodity prices and competition for the resources in and around the Caspian Sea, the governments of these petroleum-exporters face a series of difficult decisions. These governments have sought to balance short-term incentives to spend oil revenues as a means to maintain power against the need for a long-term strategy for managing these assets, choices which have further implications for how these countries align themselves internationally. By illuminating important linkages between domestic and international dynamics in these states, the book provides a fresh perspective on energy politics and the impact of petroleum on the development of the Caspian petroleum producers. Expert contributors from Central Asia and the South Caucasus and international scholars provide context-specific insights into the incentives affecting decision-makers that can provide a foundation for strategies to help the countries in the region overcome the negative effects of reliance on oil and gas. As such, the book will be a valuable tool for business actors seeking to understand the role of Chinese and Russian companies in the region, as well as local and international policymakers and non-governmental organisations.
Who is to Blame? Agency, Causality, Responsibility and the Role of Experts in Russian Framings of Global Climate Change
Megaton nuclear underground tests and catastrophic events on Novaya Zemlya : A satellite study
During the first NUPI study of the Novaya Zemlya underground nuclear test site in 1991–92, much information was generated. This relates both to facilities and testing activities. One of the most important discoveries made was the enormous catastrophic rockslide caused by an underground test. In recent years, new information has become available also from Russian sources. Declassified US satellite imagery made it possible for NUPI to study in more detail the effects of the powerful underground nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. This report contains the most pivotal discoveries and findings during the three years of studying this arctic test site.
Words and Deeds : Russian Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflicts
[Abstract] The goal of this report is to examine Russia’s policy towards secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In order to better understand Russia’s policy choices in that sphere, the report addresses three key issues: the internal Russian debate on separatism as a security challenge in the post-Soviet space; Moscow’s policies with regard to international institutions, regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international terrorism. The report is divided into five sections. The first chapter briefly outlines the scope of the study. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework used to address the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts. The third chapter contains a detailed case study of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflict between Moldova and Transdniester. The fourth analyses Russia’s policy towards the conflicts between Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia, while the fifth chapter presents authors’ conclusions. The theoretical framework chosen by the authors of this study derives from two major schools in IR theory – the liberal-institutional one, and the constructivist one. On the one hand they raise the traditional neo-liberal question of the validity of institutions in international relations; on the other hand they ask how the ability of institutional frameworks to address various problems is affected by the identities of the actors who interact in the institutional arena. The report addresses the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space designed and implemented by President Vladimir Putin’s administration. It departs from the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, where agreements on the withdrawal of Russian forces from both Moldova and Georgia were reached. According to the Istanbul Pact, Russia was to withdraw its forces from these two countries in line with the CFE Treaty. At the same time, however, Russia has been playing an active part in the international community’s attempt at finding a viable solution to secessionist conflicts in the same areas. The report analyses how the Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conflicts and separatism in statements and doctrines and how this has influenced Russia’s policy towards the conflicts themselves and towards the institutions that are actively involved in the work on conflict resolution. In the authors view, Russia has since the early 1990s pursued an inconsistent and incoherent policy towards the separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. After having recognized the importance of separatism as a security challenge and threat within Russia and within the post-Soviet space, Russia has however chosen not to translate this approach into a viable and coherent policy towards these conflicts. Instead of pursuing a policy of unambiguous support for the territorial integrity of the states haunted by secessionist conflicts, Russia seems to have adopted a policy of playing the separatist card for its own purposes and has sought to maximize its geopolitical gains and retain some control in the areas that it deems important for the realization of its partly outdated geopolitical strategy. This policy may yield some short-term geopolitical gains, but in the longer term it may undermine Russia’s credibility as a predictable and serious international partner, as a ‘normal’ great power seeking its own new place on the recently redrawn global power map.