Publications
Not Enough Maritime Capability. The Challenge of Reinforcing Europe
Russia’s resurgence has meant that the United States again must seriously consider a possible conflict in Europe in its military plans. Central to the defense of NATO allies is a requirement for U.S. reinforcement of Europe, and U.S. reinforcement in turn depends on U.S. maritime shipping, which faces a number of critical challenges.This paper examines the current capability and availability of U.S. shipping to meet U.S. strategic sealift needs. It describes efforts by the United States to modernize and sustain the capacity required for strategic goals, including the reinforcement of Europe, and examines how the United States could leverage allied commercial and sealift capacity to address potential gaps. Finally, the paper identifies recommendations for addressing these challenges.U.S. logistical capabilities that are required to rein-force Europe, including sealift capabilities, have atrophied since 1989. Competing naval requirements make addressing future sealift shortages unlikely to be a top funding priority, while complicated laws hamper quick solutions to filling maritime shortfalls. Until U.S. shipbuilding can fill the gaps, workarounds such as using allied maritime assets to ship U.S. reinforcements must be considered. The requirement to reinforce Europe is too urgent not to consider all alternatives to addressing future shortfalls.
På tide å tenke nytt om Iran
(Available in Norwegian only): Det overordnede målet for USAs såkalte "maximum pressure"-strategi har vært å fremforhandle en bedre atomavtale med Iran, samt å svekke både Teherans innflytelse i Midtøsten og ayatollah Khameneis grep om makten. Men har strategien vært vellykket i å oppnå dette?
Avskrekke hvem? Betydningen av strategisk kultur for cybersikkerhet
There is an ongoing debate in academia about if and how deterrence theory may be used in cyberspace. Deterrence was originally a theory developed for avoiding conventional and nuclear war. In the current discussion on cyber security, there has been pointed out a range of technical problems of transferring a theory about the physical world to cyberspace. We recognize these challenges of deterrence in cyberspace, but in this article we want to shed light on a different aspect of deterrence. That is the interplay between social and technical factors of deterrence in cyberspace. In this article we will discuss how deterrence as a strategy in cyberspace is influenced by the specific strategic culture of a country. We will use China as a case study to showcase our argument. Contrasts between Chinese and “Western” strategic culture results in concrete differences in how Chinese and Western countries act in cyberspace. By utilizing four components of deterrence theory (denial, punishment, entanglement and norms), we will show how an in-depth knowledge of a state’s security policy and strategic culture may be used to tailor a more effective deterrence and enforce the capacity of hindering unwanted activity.
Governing complexity in the Arctic region
This book argues that confining our understandings of Arctic governance to Arctic states and a focus on the Arctic Council as the primary site of circumpolar governance provides an incomplete picture. Instead, the authors embrace the complexity of governance in the Arctic by systematically analyzing and comparing the position, interventions, and influence of different actor groups seeking to shape Arctic political and economic outcomes in multiple sites of Arctic politics, both formal and informal. This book assesses the potential that sub-national governments, corporations, civil society organizations, Indigenous peoples, and non-Arctic states possess to develop norms and standards to ensure a stable, rule-based Arctic region.
Make or buy : offshoring of services functions in manufacturing
About 40% of employment in manufacturing is in services functions. This paper examines how employment in services function in manufacturing is affected by offshoring. It finds that the impact is small on average but depends strongly on the complexity of the value chain, the policy environment and ICT maturity. Manufacturing employment is more services intensive the longer the value chain. In-house IT functions complement and support offshored IT functions, while offshored R&D functions tend to replace in-house R&D.
The GeGaLo index: Geopolitical gains and losses after energy transition
This article presents the GeGaLo index of geopolitical gains and losses that 156 countries may experience after a full-scale transition to renewable energy. The following indicators are considered for inclusion in the index: fossil fuel production, fossil fuel reserves, renewable energy resources, governance, and conflict. Some of these represent potential gains; some represent losses; and some the capacity of countries to handle changes in geopolitical strength. Five alternative versions of the index are developed to work out the optimal design. First, the energy resource indicators are combined with equal weights to create two simple versions of the index. Next, governance and conflict indicators are included to create three more complex versions of the index. The index provides useful pointers for strategic energy and foreign policy choices: geopolitical power will be more evenly distributed after an energy transition; Iceland will gain most; Russia may be one of the main holders of stranded geopolitical assets; China and the USA will lose more geopolitically than foreseen by other analyses. The index also indicates a lack of emphasis in parts of the literature on space for renewable energy infrastructure and on domestically sourced coal for the current strength of countries such as China and the United States.
Free trade agreements in a small, open country: The case of Norway
Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU) / the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting one the world’s most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway’s trade – a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products, and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non-tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade-promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non-tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.
Et ambisiøst fagmilitært råd
An assessment of the Military Advice the Chief of Defence of Norway recently submitted to the Minster of Defence.
Stater og transnasjonale motstandsnettverk: Irans mobilisering av irakiske sjiamilitser etter 1979
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been building a transnational network of Shi’a militias since 1979, commonly referred to as its asymmetric warfare capability and ‘strategic depth’. While it is a known fact that Iran has mobilised Shi’a militias in other countries to strengthen its regional position, how they have done it has not received much scholarly attention. The objective of this paper is to explain this phenomenon by examining how Iran has mobilised Iraqi Shi’a militias since 1979. The selected cases are the mobilisation processes of three most prominent Shi’a militias in Iraq today: Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hizbullah. Although variation exists between them, they are all cases of Iran’s network of armed resistance groups, which have allowed it to engage in covert or indirect conflict intervention in the Middle East. To logically connect the empirical data with the study’s research question, I have used a case study research design, with process tracing and the semi-structured interview as methods for data collection. Furthermore, the empirical analysis has been guided by a theoretical framework that has attempted to build a bridge between the existing literatures on state-militia dynamics and contentious politics.
Improving nuclear strategic stability through a responsibility-based approach
This brief paper brings together several critical elements and key tenets of nuclear weapons policies and postures. There is an urgent need to find mechanisms that would help turn the world’s nuclear weapons capable states from their current increasingly perilous track and provide an incentive for countries to resume discussions on shared security interests. A vital contribution would be for states to agree a globally-shared definition of Nuclear Strategic Stability that accounts for the complexities of the world today. An equally immediate agreement and adoption of the proposed Code of Nuclear Responsibility would foster a responsibility-based approach.