Publications
French foreign policy and the limits of Europeanisation : The changing French position on EU enlargement
This article focuses on the changing French position on EU enlargement. The aim of the analysis is to study the interplay between the foreign policy of the EU and the foreign policy of France, but also between the official French foreign policy and the French public opinion. Most of the literature on EU enlargement underestimates the importance of public opinion. This article is therefore an attempt to present a more comprehensive understanding of the changing French position on enlargement by combining a top down with a bottom up approach. By doing this the analysis do not consider whether enlargement is good or bad, but rather how a member state’s position on this issue may change both through a process of Europeanisation and as a result of changes in domestic public opinion.
Strategic Adaption or Identity Change? : An analysis of Britain's Approach to the ESDP 1998-2004
In this working paper, Kristin Marie Haugevik seeks to analyse the nature of the changes in Britain’s approach to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) after 1998. Ever since the beginning of the European integration process in 1951, Britain’s approach to European security and defence cooperation has been characterized by anti-federalism and transatlanticism. Hence, it was unexpected when Tony Blair, together with Jacques Chirac, took the initiative to frame a common security and defence policy for the EU in Saint Malo in 1998. This paper discusses to what extent Britain’s new approach to the ESDP after 1998 can be explained as the result of a strategic adaptation, and to what extent it can be seen as a result of more profound changes in the British identity and security interests. These two accounts are tested by analysing Britain’s approach to some of the most important ESDP documents since 1998: the Saint Malo declaration, the Laeken declaration, the Nice Treaty, the European Security Strategy, and the Constitution Treaty
As safe as the Bank? : Household financial behaviour and economic reasoning in post-soviet Russia
This study examines the financial behaviour of Russian households from the collapse of communism to the financial melt down in August 1998. By transforming savings into investment, financial intermediaries are important to economic growth. In post-Soviet Russia, financial intermediaries were increasingly unable to attract new household savings, as people turned to foreign currency. What determined the allocation of household savings? The study considers the three main alternatives households could turn to: The state savings bank; commercial financial companies; and foreign currency, mainly dollars. But how do we go about to explain the behaviour of millions of individuals over time? Economists usually assume that people maximise returns on their assets. Financial behaviour would then reflect economic variables such as interest rate, exchange rate and inflation. Such a view fits uneasily with observed behaviour in post-Soviet Russia. However, why would people not allocate their savings in the most profitable way? This study holds that to understand why people do what they do, we should listen carefully - although not uncritically - to what they say and how they say it. On this view, we can explain the behaviour of individuals only if we can understand them. And - since social phenomena are constituted by the behaviour of individuals - such understanding is crucial to the causal explanation of macro level phenomena. The historical narrative thus becomes an important vehicle for explanation of the contemporary world. Through analysis of discourses on financial institutions, as they appeared in newspapers of the day and as I have been able to gather from interviews conducted in 2004, this study identifies certain dramatic events that altered the way Russians perceived different financial institutions and their view on trust, risk and profitability, and finds that such changes in perception go a long way to explain the changes in observed behaviour in this period.
Shi'i Separatism in Iraq : Internet Reverie or Real Constitutional Challenge?
This paper deals with non-conformist ideas among Iraqi Shi‘is about the territorial integrity of the modern state of Iraq. Two findings are presented. First, new Internet communications technology has enabled radical Shi‘is outside the main clerical, intellectual and political establishments to propagate visions of an independent Shi‘i state for the areas south of Baghdad, a scheme that runs counter to a robust and long-standing anti-separatist tradition among wider sections of the Shi‘i community. Secondly, by choosing the Internet as their primary modus operandi, the Shi‘i separatists also expose their relative weakness vis-à-vis other and less radical trends in Iraqi Shi‘i society.
The Norwegian import regime for agriculture
Norway maintains one of the highest levels of protection for agriculture in the OECD, but the tariff structure is not so transparent due to the extensive use of specific tariffs, i.e. tariffs expressed in NOK/kg or the like. In this paper, we use world market prices and Norwegian import prices to calculate ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. This shows that 28% of the tariff lines in agriculture are above 100%, and 10% are above 300%. The average of MFN applied tariffs is in the range 73-103%, depending on the calculation method. Protection is somewhat lower (54-74%) for goods exported by developing countries. While the Least Developed Countries have zero tariffs, other developing countries obtain 10-15% tariff reductions under the GSP system of tariff preferences. Tariff rate quotas provide some increase in market access. Protection of grains and feedstuff raises the forage costs in agriculture, and especially feedstuffs are important in the exports of developing countries.
GSP in the "spaghetti bowl" of trade preferences
The paper examines the relative position of GSP (tariff preferences for developing countries) compared to ordinary tariffs and free trade agreements in Norway, the EU and the USA. On average, ordinary GSP gives a tariff rebate of less than 50% in all countries. “Extended” GSP, given to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and others, implies zero tariffs in Norway and the EU, but only partial liberalisation in the USA. EU provides extended GSP for 119 countries, while the USA does so for 76 and Norway for 52. Considering the shares of trade rather than the number of countries, extended GSP covers 5% or less of total trade in all cases, and ordinary GSP is much more important. Compared to tariffs in free trade agreements, ordinary GSP is inferior in the USA and the EU, but not too far behind in Norway. This is due to recent cuts in MFN tariffs as well as improvements in the GSP system of Norway. For manufacturing, Norway has low tariffs and a generous GSP system. This is however not the case for agriculture.
Norway's trade with developing countries
This paper presents some characteristics of Norway’s trade with developing countries. Norwegian trade with low and low middle-income countries has increased in recent years. Imports have increased more than exports. This is partly because a large part of Norwegian exports is petroleum sold to other OECD countries. Norwegian trade with the least developed countries, on the other hand, is stagnant and constitutes only a minor share of Norwegian foreign trade. This pattern is similar to other OECD countries: Developing countries increase their share in world trade while least developed countries are marginalized. By adjusting for size and geographical position of Norwegian trade partners it is found that Norwegian trade with developing countries is as expected as compared to other OECD countries.
Trade and development - a selective review
This paper reviews parts of the recent literature on trade and growth. The relationships between trade and growth have been extensively studied in recent research. Many studies indicate that trade stimulates income and growth. The literature is controversial and many studies are criticised for weaknesses in methodology. Despite the methodological controversies, most evidence gives support for the view that trade stimulates growth. It is argued that major deficiency in the literature is that it does not discriminate between the impact of market access in other countries and the impact of liberal domestic trade policies.
Corruption in China and Russia compared : Different legacies of central planning
During the first decade after markets became the major mechanisms of economic coordination in China and the area of the former Soviet Union (FSUA), corruption was perceived to increase in both. At the same time China experienced rapid growth while most countries in FSUA experienced steep declines. In the paper I argue that this difference is difficult to explain within an n-country, cross-section econometric framework. Instead a case-oriented approach with more institutional specification is chosen. In particular, the role of the former normative and institutional framework of central planning is explored. The paper describes some of the explanations of corruption as it occurred under central planning, including its limitations and how they may be linked to (negative or positive) growth mechanisms. In addition the posttransition data on corruption and growth are linked to major political characteristics at the point of transition.
'A house of straw, sticks or bricks'? Some notes on corruption empirics
Corruption has become a fashionable subject the last decade or so. The decades before it was neglected, and the phenomenon itself has been around as long as large-scale organisations. One reason for large shifts in emphasis is the lack of precise knowledge about corruption, particularly at elite level. That admits different views. When both social scientists’ and politicians’ perceptions are interrelated large shifts may be expected. By comparing the major corruption indexes such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indexes to an earlier attempt to expand precise knowledge for policymaking, I argue that they are unable to supply the knowledge needed. The difficulty in gaining information about elite corruption is illustrated by means of simple game theory.