Publications
Female Participation in Peacebuilding Efforts in Africa: A Review of Recent Academic Contributions
The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the unanimous adoption of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 and the resolutions that followed, which now constitute the WPS normative framework, a substantial body of literature has emerged. This review explores (1) recent academic and policy contributions to the WPS agenda on the African continent from 2017 onwards, with a special emphasis on participation; and (2) relevant new contributions regarding emerging challenges to female participation in peacebuilding efforts.
Fiche technique sur le climat, la paix et la sécurité au Sahel
La région du Sahel est fortement exposée au changement climatique. Toutefois, en raison de facteurs relevant des contextes national et local, ce dernier ura des impacts différenciés dans la région. Les températures deviendront progressivement plus élevées dans la région et certaines zones connaîtront es niveaux de précipitations accrus, mais irréguliers. Dans l’immédiat, ces tendances pourraient se traduire par des saisons irrégulières, des périodes de écheresse et des inondations. L’interaction avec des facteurs d’ordre social, économique et politique pourrait exacerber les vulnérabilités existantes et accroître les risques de conflits violents: • Les changements dans les régimes pluviométriques et les tendances saisonnières peuvent parfois attiser et exacerber des conflits violents dont l’enjeu st l’accès à des ressources limitées ou inégalement réparties. Les femmes et les filles sont particulièrement vulnérables. Partout au Sahel, le changement climatique peut accentuer le risque d’affrontements entre éleveurs et agriculteurs autour de l’accès à l’eau et aux pâturages. • Les catastrophes d’apparition soudaine et le changement climatique à long terme peuvent forcer des populations à se déplacer de manière temporaire ou permanente et parfois à rejoindre des personnes déplacées par des conflits armés. La migration est une importante stratégie d’adaptation qui peut toutefois entraîner des conflits entre communautés d’accueil et communautés de migrants. • Les catastrophes et le changement climatique entraînent une érosion de la résilience, aggravant ainsi la vulnérabilité des communautés aux prédations de groupes armés et aux manipulations opérées par les élites. Certains groupes armés recrutent dans des communautés dont les moyens de subsistance sont affectés par des facteurs comme le changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les milices locales peuvent aggraver les conflits entre agriculteurs et éleveurs.
Russian Grand Strategy and Energy Resources: The Asian Dimension
This chapter addresses a set of strategically important questions about the relationship between Russian strategy and the country’s energy resources. It is divided into three sections. The first presents a brief discussion of the concept of a ‘grand strategy’ and its application in the Russian context. The second examines the role of energy resources in a grand strategy in general, and in the current Russian context in particular. The final section considers the importance of Asia in the realisation of Russian energy and grand strategy. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions: • What is a grand strategy? • Does Russia have a grand strategy? • What is the connection between grand strategy and energy? • What is the role of energy resources in Russia’s grand strategy? • What is the role of Asia in Russia’s grand and energy strategy designs?
Strengthening the resilience and adaptive capacity of societies at risk from hybrid threats
How would the civilian population of a specific country respond to significant disruptions caused by hybrid threats? This paper explores different response scenarios and considers what can be done to strengthen the resilience and adaptive capacities of a civilian population, and its social institutions, when such threats are likely. One of the main challenges in increasing civilian resilience is the uncertainty and unpredictability of both the threat and how people will respond to it. The paper recommends utilizing an adaptive approach that is designed to cope with the complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- Ge...
This report assesses the extent to which the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) along with the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary- General on Cyprus (OSASG) – also called the mission of the Good Offices – is achieving its mandate enshrined in Resolution 164 of March 1964. In 2024, the UN Missions in Cyprus will celebrate the 60th anniversary of their presence in the country, and it seems timely to analyse their impact and effectiveness over the years. The EPON report looks for the first time at what the peacekeeping research community has called “legacy operations”, those born during the Cold War and still in place today. UNFICYP is the eighth peacekeeping mission created since 1948. The report looks also at the interaction between peacekeeping and peacemaking in the context of a frozen conflict, often referred to by researchers and scholars as the “Cyprus problem”. Cyprus is a unique case in international relations and peace operations. Its capital city is the only remaining divided capital in Europe and in the world. Cyprus is the only country in the world to have “Guarantors” with a right to intervene and station troops on a permanent basis. The report acknowledges the role of prevention of UNFICYP to the extent that the people in Cyprus tend to forget that no cease-fire agreement exists between the parties. Peacekeeping has been successful at creating a comfortable status quo that peacemaking has yet been unable to break down. In this context, the lack of will from the parties to engage in a meaningful political process has limited the UN’s effectiveness.
Premien for utenlandske eierskap i Norge: Opprinnelseslandskarakteristika og Kina-effffekten.
Many studies from a number of different countries show that there is a premium for foreign ownership; Foreign-controlled enterprises (UKFs) are larger and more productive than domestic-controlled enterprises. In the article, I use register data to show that this also applies to Norway. UKF has particularly high values of a number of enterprise characteristics that are often associated with productivity, such as number of employees, turnover per employee, value creation per employee, salary and trade in goods and services per employee. Using regression analyzes, I estimate, for example, that UKF has more than 80 per cent more employees than domestically controlled companies and almost 40 per cent higher turnover per employee (after taking into account that UKF may be overrepresented in some industries and / or year). Among the enterprise characteristics that are studied, only research and development activity for which there is no UKF prize. Furthermore, I find that the characteristics of the country of origin of UKF affect the size of the prize. In general, the premium is higher the larger and more developed the country of origin is and the further away from Norway it is. For the number of employees, turnover per employee and retail trade per employee, there is also a separate China effect; The estimates show that Chinese UKF, compared to other UKFs, has almost 60 per cent more employees, more than twice as much turnover per employee and even greater exports and imports per employee.
Utenlandske direkteinvesteringer og eierskap i Norge
Foreign investment is an important component of the economy of many countries. This is the case for Norway too, where foreign-controlled enterprises employ 21 percent of the workers in the (private) business sectors. We know that foreign investment flows are changing, with increased activity from countries that have traditionally invested little abroad. This is true for China, especially, but also for India, Russia, and some other non-traditional investor countries. In this article, we study how Norway’s position as a destination for investment is changing. We discuss the developments in relation to established theories within economics and political science.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Mali
Mali is characterised by short-term climate variability, and is vulnerable to long-term climate change due to high exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, but also high population growth, diminished resilience and multiple violent conflicts. Mali is forecast to become hotter with more erratic rainfall, impacting seasonal regularity and increasing the risk of droughts and floods. Moreover, conflict, political instability and weak government institutions undermine effective adaptation to climate change.
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the G5 Sahel Force by Strengthening Strategic Coherence and International Support
At the UN Security Council and in other forums in Africa and Europe diplomats are considering how to increase international support to the G5 Sahel Force. The support is aimed at filling critical gaps that have hindered the mobility and operational tempo of the G5 Sahel Force. The overall goal is to enhance its operational capacity and effectiveness in an effort to restore stability in the Sahel. Despite the presence of the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Group of Five Sahel (G5 Sahel) Force, as well as French-led and European Union missions, the security situation in the Sahel has significantly deteriorated over the last few years. Drawing on lessons identified from the support provided by the UN to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and a wide number of experiences with voluntary funded trust funds in other mission support set¬tings, we discuss a few political, financial, doctrinal, human rights and operational considerations. We find that a UN support office funded from assessed contributions, complimented with voluntary contribu¬tions, appear to be the only solution for reliable and predictable support to those core needs of the G5 Sahel Force that cannot be met by the G5 Sahel countries themselves, or via bilateral support to those countries.
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors, its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.