Publications

A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force

In January 2015, the African Union (AU) authorised the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security arrangement of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to deal with the threat of Boko Haram (BH) in the Lake Chad region. Its mandate includes the responsibility of ensuring a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the BH insurgency, reducing violent attacks against civilians, facilitating stabilisation programmes in the Lake Chad region, facilitating humanitarian operations, and the provision of assistance to affected populations. To achieve its mandate, the MNJTF undertakes both kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Its mandate has been renewed annually since 2015, and in December 2022, the AU renewed its mandate for another 12 months. This report assesses the effectiveness of the MNJTF in delivering on its three mandate priorities to generate recommendations. It is important to note that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) renewed the mandate of the MNJTF earlier than expected, and as a result, this report offers reflections on how to enhance the effectiveness of the mission going forward. Despite long standing constraints, such as insufficient funding, gaps in operational command and control, inadequate equipment and an intelligence-sharing cell, the MNJTF has recorded appreciable successes. Its efforts and successes have counteracted BH and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists, resulting in a significant decline in attack incidents in the region. In addition, they have created a conducive environment for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their communities and the resumption of trade between the northeast of Nigeria and neighbouring markets in Cameroon and Chad. The recent acquisition of assets, growing coordination among the sectors, and shift from a defensive to an offensive posture brought about by the current Force Commander (FC) are some factors contributing to the recent successes of the MNJTF. Nevertheless, the lack of policing capability, intelligence gaps, evolving terrorist-organised crime dynamics, and resource-capacity mismatch are some of the current impediments to the efforts of the MNJTF to end the menace posed by terror groups in the Lake Chad region.The partnership between the AU and the MNJTF is considered vital not only for the mission’s credibility but also for the critical role the AU can play in appropriately resourcing the MNJTF. While the general conclusion drawn from respondents was that the AU was doing its best to improve the situation, there was still a need for it to do more in certain important areas. This situation calls for the prioritisation of current challenges and for appropriate deployment of available resources to address them. To enhance the capacity and effectiveness of the force in combating terrorism in the Lake Chad region, the report recommends prioritising developing police capacity across member states, strengthening the MNJTF intelligence capacity, aligning training with core priority areas to close capacity gaps, and institutionalising a due diligence framework for funds utilisation. The prospects of the MNJTF achieving its core responsibilities in the months and years ahead will depend to some extent on how the mandate renewal recognises and allocates sufficient resources to address areas of priority concerns.

More than just a petrol station: Norway's contribution to European Union's green strategic autonomy

The past five years have seen far-reaching changes in international politics and trade, all of which forced European policymakers to reconsider the role and place of the ‘Old World’ in global affairs. The continuous rise of China and its ambition to play a larger role, matching its economic weight, requires new approaches to international trade. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed Europe’s import dependencies and the fragility of long and complex global value chains on which it relies. These vulnerabilities are visible in many strategically important sectors, from semiconductors (chips) through medicine to the production of items on which European Union’s visions of future decarbonization rest: photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, nuclear fuel etc. This Policy Brief has also been published as a Policy Brief within the GreenDeal-NET project

The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War

The subsea cable cut at Svalbard January 2022: What happened, what were the consequences, and how were they managed?

Svalbard is, like most other societies, largely dependent on an internet connection. The fiber connection on Svalbard consists of two separate subsea cables that connect Longyearbyen to the mainland. In some areas the cables were buried about two meters below the seabed, especially in areas where fishing is done, to “protect against destruction of the fishing fleet’s bottom trawling or anchoring of ships. (New version uploaded 18 January 2023)

The localisation of aid - debate and challenges

The localisation agenda resurfaced with the Covid 19-pandemic among development and humanitarian actors. Aid localisation refers to providing aid through local, grassroots institutions without the use of intermediaries, which involves a shift in power over policy and financial issue to local actors.

External Voting among Central European Migrants Living in Western Europe

Non-resident citizens’ participation in national elections is known as external voting. This report presents the first comparative dataset of external voting, both in parliamentary and presidential elections. We gathered voting results among migrants from nine Central and Eastern European countries, with the main analysis focusing on six where most data were available: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania. The analysed countries of residence where diasporas cast their votes were Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden (EU members) as well as two countries belonging to the European Economic Area (Norway and Iceland) and Switzerland. How different are external voting results from those seen in countries of origin? What are the ideological differences between voting migrants and the ‘mean’ voter back home, and to what extent does that matter? These are some of the questions the data gathered may help shed light on.

Loss of Tonga’s telecommunication – what happened, how was it managed and what were the consequences?

In January 2022 the subsea volcano Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai in Tonga had a major eruption which also cut the country’s communication lines nationally, between Tonga’s inhabited islands and the outside world. The damage led to a complete halt in international communication (a “digital darkness”) which meant that, in the period immediately after the outbreak, not much was known about the extent of the damage in Tonga. Due to very limited access to contact with both the authorities and the population of Tonga, it was only during overflights carried out by the Australian and New Zealand air forces that one could begin to map the extent of the damage and the need for assistance.

Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of Far-Right Protest in Georgia

What role do political opportunities play in far-right mobilisation? The case of Georgia indicates that modernisation in itself may be insufficient to trigger a far-right backlash. A systematised database of 154 far-right protest events in Georgia in the period 2003–2020 shows that the movement remained dormant for over two decades after post-Soviet independence and a decade after the 2003 Rose Revolution. After 2012, however, less severe repression of protest, divides within the political elite, and the sympathetic attitudes of mainstream political and societal actors enabled far-right mobilisation and violence. Thus, however deep-rooted anti-modernisation, a backlash may not erupt until mobilisation opportunities become available.

Iran – revolusjon igjen?

Ei ung kvinnes død etter å ha blitt arrestert av moralpolitiet utløyste dei sterkaste protestane i Iran sidan revolusjonen i 1979. Den islamske republikken er tilbake der han starta.

Makt og avmakt i FNs sikkerhetsråd: Valgte medlemslands veier til innflytelse

The UN Security Council consists of five permanent and ten elected member states. The latter is elected on a rolling basis, for two years at a time. In 2021-22, Norway has been one of these elected member states. The research literature often refers to how the Security Council's room for action is limited by superpower interests and the power struggle between the five veto countries: the United States, China, Russia, Great Britain and France. Russia's attack on Ukraine illustrated these challenges. In this policy brief, we take a closer look at how elected member states work to exercise influence while sitting on the Security Council.