Publications
Editorial: The New Right’s internationalism
The editorial team welcomes you to the final issue of 2021. For this issue, convened by Minda Holm, one of New Perspectives’ Associate Editors, we have brought together a group of invited essays on the Internationalism of the New Right. As an object of analysis for political science and International Relations, the New Right refers to intellectual movements that have emerged since the 1980s, including Reaganite economic conservatives, theorists and philosophers like Alexandr Dugin and Alain de Benoist, and political movements that have swept to power across the globe, but with particular successes in Central and Eastern Europe. Globally these movement include actors as diverse as Bolsonaro in Brasil, Modi in India, and Putin in Russia, and in Central and Eastern Europe are exemplified by Fidesz in Hungary and Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc in Poland. So far, academic conversations have happened mostly in parallel, rather than with each other, drawing seemingly different conclusions as to both who we are speaking of, and what their global ideas entail – both for world politics, and IR as a field (see Abrahamsen et al., 2020; Azmanova and Dakwar, 2019; De Orellana and Michelsen, 2019; Drolet and Williams, 2018). In this special issue, we bring together some leading voices to reflect on the transnational and international relations between these movements.
Psykisk helse, terrorisme, ekstremisme og radikalisering
The possible connection between mental health, radicalisation, extremism, and involvement of terror has received a lot of attention as of late. But what do we really know about this connection? What are we unaware of, and how can challenges related to this be handled? This policy brief goes through these questions and gives the knowledge status in this domain a clean-up.
Ad Hoc Crisis Response and International Organisations (ADHOCISM)
International organisations (IOs) are created with the aim of solving collective action problems when a crisis arises. Yet, member states have repeatedly established ad hoc crisis responses in situations where IOs might be expected to play a central role. ADHOCISM asks what is the impact of ad hoc crisis responses on international organisations? In this way, ADHOCISM wants to contribute to filling this knowledge gap through a systematic study of ad hoc crisis responses in two policy domains: security and health. With this paired comparison, ADHOCISM wants to tap into a broader empirical governance phenomenon. Ad hoc crisis responses are here understood as loose groups of actors that agree to solve a particular crisis at a given time and location outside of an existing international organisation in the same policy domain. Ad hoc crisis reponses can, in the short-term, lead to more rapid and effective crisis responses among like-minded states, but if international organisations are no longer seen as the principal instruments to confront global challenges, the risk is also that the relevance of these international organisations will diminish, and similar trends may unfold in other domains.
The Georgian far right and the post-election crisis
This article examines the role of the far right in political polarisation in Georgia. Polarisation has been a constant feature of Georgian politics, reaching new levels after the 2020 parliamentary elections. On the one hand, polarisation leaves little (if any) room in the political space for newcomers and small actors, including the far right. Carving out a niche in an extremely polarised political space requires a strong, consolidated, alternative force. To date, the fragmented nature of the Georgian far-right movement has hindered its mobilisation as a viable alternative to either the ruling party, Georgian Dream, or the opposition. On the other hand, the far right has also played a role in polarisation: Critics have argued that far-right groups have been used as an instrument to fuel polarisation further. Even though the activities of the far right seem to play into the interests of one end of the polarised political space more than the other, this article asserts that the far-right movement should not be reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of political powers.
Huawei, 5G and Security: Technological Limitations and Political Responses
How did Chinese 5G providers, such as Huawei, become a security concern in the USA and Europe? Were the security concerns related to 5G and Chinese suppliers based upon technological features of the systems, or were they a product of geopolitical rivalry? How did European approaches to 5G distinguish themselves from those of the USA? This article addresses these questions using an interdisciplinary approach via the framework of securitization theory. The authors argue that the technological features of 5G made securitization more likely compared to 4G, and that screening and control of software was unlikely to defuse securitization concerns. They also show how Europe chose its own path for the securitization of 5G. In short, the article argues that the American macrosecuritization of China largely failed in Europe, whereas the niche securitization of 5G was more successful.
Nye våpen, gamle vrangforestillinger: Hvordan forstå Boris Johnsons atomvåpen-politikk
If you want to make Britain’s nuclear weapon policy make sense, you need to look inwards not outwards. Just as go-faster stripes please the owner, Britain’s new nuclear policy is better understood as a symbolic gesture performed mainly for its domestic audience. It is crucial here to understand the political function that publicly established force-limits have played British nuclear politics
Redd kulturlivet – planlegg en post-koronafest!
A debate is raging about how to save Norwegian cultural life from Corona. The government’s rescue package is widely considered insufficient and thus the argument is concentrated upon how much is needed and to whom it should go. This is sensible, but the depressive terms of the debate have blinded everyone to a unique opportunity. Now we know vaccines are coming, it’s time to think bigger, more collective and long term. Why not put these unemployed cultural workers to do something they are good at: throwing a party? Not just any old party: a month-long, state-sponsored, Norway-wide, series of festivities to celebrate Corona’s passing. Like an end of the world party, but celebrating the world not ending. It could be spread throughout public spaces, like the Edinburgh festival, but less exclusive, as big as the Olympics, but less lycra. If that sounds crazy, hear me out. First of all, Norway has a lot of latent party talent unemployed through no fault of their own. That means, in practice, NAV is currently paying professional event-organisers not to organise parties. Likewise, the state is currently paying 60-80% of the income of musicians, technicians, actors, theatre workers, and many more who could contribute. Thus, we could treat whatever the government is paying them now as a free subsidy, and just top it up so they can put on a massive party instead. It would not only make financial sense. A post-Corona party would also provide these workers with a purpose, and give the country something to look forward to amidst a year of depression and uncertainty. Indeed, Norwegians are unusually well-trained for just such an event: generations of Russ, who would surely relish the opportunity to get back on a bus. The key to a successful post-corona party would be inclusiveness. First, it should take place in July when schools are out. Second, the party should be spread throughout the communes. Third, it should embrace the broadest definition of culture possible; from futbal to opera, comedy to skateboarding, cinema to puppetry. Fourth, all events should be free at the point of use; like the British NHS. In short, there should be something for everybody and everybody should be able to afford it. Ultimately, the event would pay for itself. Norway will need to instigate a stimulus to kick start the economy anyway. A massive party would be like a New Deal, except with culture instead of infrastructure. Indeed, like infrastructure, investing in culture would produce what economists call a “multiplier effect”; whereby money injected into the economy fosters growth above the initial outlay. Further, turn it into a global event and it will generate tourist revenues. It may even persuade Norwegians to take a vacation at home instead of Syden. Beyond helping to save culture, it would be cathartic for citizens. Providing a much needed release after a dark period. Let’s face it, we deserve a big party, having spent the last year staying in, following the rules, and cancelling Christmas.
Hvem har tid til å delta?
A debate around the internationalization of Norwegian universities was clumsily set into motion last week by Cecilie Hellestveit from Folkerettsinstituttet. In short, she argued that the Norwegian public sphere is impoverished as a result of foreign scholars taking all the Norwegian academic jobs and neither having the will nor ability to contribute to the public debate. While I disagree profoundly with Hellestveit reasoning she is certainly right that internationalization of Norwegian universities poses dilemmas that warrant concern. However, rather than prompting discussion, the debate was de-railed by the rektor or NMBU, Curt Rice, who countered with an even clumsier assertion that she should apologise and that journalists should stop citing her. Predictably, if boringly, this has led to an outcry about freedom of speech. I can empathise with Rice’s hurt, as a international academic myself, Hellestveit certainly provoked me. But one can and should rebut her argument without resorting to censorship.
Grading greatness: evaluating the status performance of the BRICS
An impressive portfolio of case-study research has now demonstrated how and through what means the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have sought higher social status. However, this field of research lacks systematic means of evaluating this status-seeking. This article fills this lacuna by developing a mixed-methods framework enabling scholars to zoom in and compare individual states’ relative status performance. Using diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and comparing it to a country’s status resources (wealth), the framework indicates how successfully countries have generated recognition from the international society. The findings show that China’s economic ascent has been matched by increased recognition, and that South Africa enjoyed an almost immediate ‘status bounce’ following apartheid, turning it from a pariah to a significant overperformer. Russia should be understood as an ‘overperforming status-dissatisfied power’ while India’s status performance has been around ‘par’ for a country of its economic resources. Lastly, Brazil underperforms more than any of the other BRICS, especially since its democratic transition. The findings highlight considerable variance in the type and duration of gaps between status resource and recognition and suggests that rather than treating these as ‘inconsistencies’ awaiting correction, they can and should be accounted for by case study analyses.
MONUSCO’s 2021 Mandate Renewal Transition and exit
In December 2021, in the context of mounting political tensions and growing insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will decide whether to renew the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The state of siege declared by President Tshisekedi in May 2021 has yet to stabilize the provinces in which it has been implemented. The political coalition in power remains fragile, and social and iden- tity-based conflicts are on the increase. Everyone expresses the need for stability, but effective strategies and decisive actions are still lacking. The joint transition plan developed by the United Nations team with participants from agencies, funds and programmes, and the DRC govern- ment recognizes the complexity of stabilization and provides a holistic plan for long-term sta- bility and peace recovery. This plan goes beyond traditional peace processes and expands its reach to social and economic issues. Although very ambitious, it offers a necessary bold step toward a responsible transition with clear benchmarks and a timeframe. This transition plan speaks to Congolese expectations toward MONUSCO, with priority accorded to the security situation in eastern DRC and the eradication of armed groups, based on three focus areas: the need for institutional reforms, an emphasis on holistic peacebuilding, and a people-centred approach to stabilization. The Security Council will have to decide how to strengthen and support these multiple reform processes by ensuring they are depoliticized and objective. Security sector reforms, administrative reforms, and fair redistribution of the dividends from natural resource exploitation will be central to the effectiveness of institutional reforms. The upcoming mandate should also look at how instability is caused/driven by not only violence and armed conflict, but also by socio-economic factors (inequalities, competition) and the weak social contract. For instance, despite the estimated labour participation of 64.07 per cent, the persistent high poverty rate (80 per cent, according to the 2019 UN Human Development Index Report) constitutes one element with the potential for social instability. One example of the weak social contract is the government’s struggle to provide essential services such as free education. Since the beginning of the 2021/2022 school year, in October 2021, many primary and secondary school children, and their teachers, have been protesting the lack of governmen- tal support to provide funding to public schools. These protests come in addition to others in sectors such as healthcare and public transport. All these elements fuel social and institutional instabilities, in turn affecting the prospects for a sustainable peace. It is important that the terms and framework of the mandate and logistical support to the DRC be expanded to include these areas as key determinants of stability. There is a need for a people-centred approach in defining stabilization, which must be locally owned and driven. While the UN mission supports the DRC in re-establishing peace, MONUSCO remains an outsider in this setting: it is up to Congolese and the DRC government to lead the process: local voices and adaptation to local contexts and strategies must be taken into consider- ation and included. MONUSCO can achieve its goals only if it focuses on ensuring local own- ership of the peace process. The Security Council can empower the mission to this end, through a more reflective and context-sensitive mandate.