Publications
Gender-Based Violence and Access to Justice: Grand Bassa County, Liberia
Liberia has a dual justice system: there is a formal court hierarchy under the judiciary (i.e. a statutory justice system), as well asa system of customary courts. In this project, this report examines the issue of gender-based violence (GBV) in relation o these two systems. This report is based on fieldwork in Grand Bassa County, and builds on qualitative data (interviews and focus groups) and quantitative data (survey). The survey showed that the majority of respondents (96%) have access to forms of local justice, i.e. a justice system that is affordable and nearby. This also corresponds well with our qualitative data. We have identified various challenges as well as potentials with both the customary and the statutory justice systems as regards GBV. First, the statutory system remains largely unavailable to the majority of the Liberian population, for reasons that include costs, travel distance, language and cultural barriers. That being said, the statutory system offers a more standardized procedure, with the potential of ensuring a more gender-equal form of justice compared to many of the customary systems. On the other hand, the customary systems are far more readily available, and are also efficient in handling various kinds of cases. However, there are also limitations, includingthe perceived low legitimacy of traditional authorities among youth as well as among influential organizations and institutions that support international human rights approaches, as women are often subordinate to men in the traditional institutions. Both system have many potentials. The authorities in charge of customary law acknowledge their limitations in handling GBV cases, and many are also motivated to include perspectives from youth and women in today’s Liberia. As the customary systems are available and affordable to most of the populace, there is much to be said for empowering and strengthening their roles and also improving communication with the statutory system. The statutory system is overburdened and could benefit from stronger working relations with the customary system.
Caught in the Act but not Punished: on Elite Rule of Law and Deterrence
Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people who are caught for a crime will be punished. The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural constraints.
Report: GoodGov: Work Together, Govern Better: Polish and Norwegian Cooperation towards More Efficient Security, Energy and Migration Policies
This report presents the main findings of the research project conducted between 2013 and 2016 by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), with support from the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN). It also maps the project’s achievements, examines its policy relevance and identifies various knowledge gaps revealed during the study that should be addressed by new research. The GoodGov project has revealed important governance-related differences between Poland and Norway. These result from the interaction of various internal and external factors, including historical experience and path dependence, geographical location and the challenges it poses, various types of resources and access to them, institutional solutions and membership in various international organisations and frameworks. The latter, such as the EU and the EEA, are of special note as they set their own governance-related priorities, rules and solutions that have both a direct and indirect bearing on national governance in Poland and Norway. Based on the analysis of available data, this research project found that the governance system in Norway is perceived as more efficient than in Poland. In addition to the factors mentioned above, this may also be linked to the application of domestic learning mechanisms in Norway, where review of governance and learning play an important role and the apparent lack of such mechanisms in Poland. Since Norway ranks systematically higher than Poland in all six key categories assessed within the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, one could expect the transfer of governance-related knowledge between Norway and Poland to be a possible means of improving governance in Poland, including in the three fields in focus in this study—security, energy and migration. However, the potential for governance learning seems to be hampered by structural differences between Norway and Poland, by the fact that Poland and Norway are in different categories in at least two of the examined fields (energy and migration), and because Norway has decided to remain outside of the EU while Poland is a fully-fledged member. What complicates the picture even more is that the experimentalist approach to governance learning works better in some fields, such as energy and migration, and is much less present and efficient in other governance fields, such as security. Another factor limiting governance transfer is a visible preference for the application of hierarchical, international means of learning instead of nonhierarchical transnational learning practices among professional equals, which is considered to be far more efficient. All the governance-related challenges and differences notwithstanding, Poland and Norway should seek to closely work together for the sake of governance-related improvements.
New European Diasporas and Migration Governance:Poles in Norway
The EU has usually considered immigration policy for third country nationals and the free movement framework for EU citizens to be two separate policy fields. Increasingly, they are being conflated. This places a country such as Poland in an ambivalent position. When it comes to the treatment of third country nationals, Central and Eastern European member governments—including that in Warsaw—are reluctant to agree on fixed quotas to relocate forced migrants from the south, fearing that this could strain their limited resources and entail heavy political costs. When it comes to free movement, by contrast, Poland and other sending countries of the region are having to defend the status of their own citizens residing in Western Europe and call on support and solidarity there. This report examines how this may affect the specific situation of the Polish migrant community in Norway. Poland can draw lessons from Norway, which has only recently made the transition to becoming a country of immigration.
Can the Polish shale gas dog still bark? Politics and policy of unconventional hydrocarbons in Poland
EU referendum: the beginning, not the end, of Brexiteers’ problems
On 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union. The referendum outcome triggered resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron and his replacement by former Home Secretary Theresa May. This brief enquires into why Cameron lost the referendum battle and what the major challenges facing the new prime minister are. May, who supported the ‘Remain’ campaign, will have to prove that she can deliver Brexit. That will not be an easy task, with obstacles at home and abroad. Scotland and Northern Ire-land voted to remain in the EU, and their reluctance to leave the EU could complicate May’s plans. PM May will also find it difficult to win hearts in Brussels. Britain tested the patience of the EU institutions with its reform demands, and Brussels will be reluctant to make things easier for the UK in Brexit talks. Member-states may be more receptive to Britain’s concerns, but the UK will prob-ably not be offered any special treatment.
Energy: The Missing Link in Globalization
Energy resources are transported long distances and create powerful interlinkages between countries. Energy thus contributes to the globalization of the world, but has received little attention in the globalization literature. This article hypothesizes that energy globalization is growing and accelerating. The hypothesis is tested by developing an index to measure changes in the extent of energy globalization during the 20-year period from 1992 to 2011. The following sub-indicators are included in the index: number of energy trade relationships, average distance of energy trade relationships, and energy dependency of the countries in the world. The development of the index encounters a number of conceptual and methodological challenges related to globalization, which, it turns out, have not been addressed properly in the broader literature. Clarification of these issues can help improve the analysis of globalization.
Oljefondet og utenrikspolitikken: Gorillaen i rommet
Oljefondet reiser en rekke utenrikspolitiske spørsmål. Noen hevder at Oljefondet bør brukes som et virkemiddel for å fremme norske utenrikspolitiske interesser. Det er ikke mitt poeng. Jeg tror det er gode grunner å unngå en utvikling i den retning. Historien har vist at organiseringen av Oljefondet så langt har gitt gode resultater og det kan være risikabelt å gjøre en slik kobling. Samtidig mener jeg det er direkte uklokt, for både Oljefondet og utenrikspolitikken, å lukke øynene for de mange direkte, og indirekte, utenrikspolitiske funksjonene og virkningene som Oljefondet allerede i dag har og vil få i tiden fremover. Det er derfor på høy tid at vi undersøker nærmere hvordan og i hvilken grad Oljefondet og Norges finansielle investeringer former Norges internasjonale relasjoner, og på sikt også Norges interesser i utenrikspolitikken? Hvordan påvirker Oljefondet hvilke partnere, allianser og internasjonale grupperinger Norge inngår i, og hvordan påvirker Oljefondet Norges status og omdømme i det internasjonale samfunn? Med et stadig større Oljefond reises også spørsmålet om å sikre koherens mellom Oljefondets investeringer og andre sider ved den norske utenrikspolitikken. Selv om ikke Oljefondet skal være et virkemiddel for norsk utenrikspolitikk, bør vi kanskje snu om på forholdet, og, satt på spissen, spørre hvilken utenrikspolitikk Norge skal føre for å ivareta Oljefondets interesser. I denne artikkelen skal jeg bare kort belyse noen sider av forholdet mellom Oljefondet og norsk utenrikspolitikk. Tematikken er stor, og artikkelen er ingenlunde uttømmende, men jeg vil vise hvordan Oljefondet på ulike måter påvirker sentrale utenrikspolitiske størrelser, som Norges nasjonale interesser og posisjoner, ressurser, makt, allianser, forventninger, representasjon, status og koherens.
Market-specific Sunk Export Costs: The Impact of Learning and Spillovers
Firms may face sunk costs when entering an export market. Previous studies have focused on global or country-specific sunk export costs. This study analyses the importance of market-specific sunk export costs (defining ‘market’ as a product–country combination). We also study how market-specific export costs can be affected by various kinds of learning and spillover effects. We use firm-level panel data for Norwegian seafood exports distributed on products and countries. The results lend support to the hypothesis of market-specific sunk costs. We also find evidence of learning and spillover effects, particularly within the same product group.