Training for Peace 2011 - 2019

A Forgotten People in An Unstable Region - The Effectiveness of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei Executive Summary

Established in June 2011, UNISFA aims to foster peace, stability, and development in the disputed Abyei region. Focused on implementing the Abyei Protocol, the mission addresses border demarcation (through the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism for the Sudan-South Sudan boundary since South Sudan’s independence in 2011) and security concerns and supports local governance through engagement with administrations. However, since 2011, UNISFA’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate and protecting civilians has been questioned as sporadic and spontaneous violence remains very high. While the overall security situation in Abyei has shown signs of improvement, persistent conflict dynamics stemming from intra- and inter-communal tensions, hired armed elements, and humanitarian challenges continue to set the region back. The rise of communal conflicts between new ethnicities and communities entering the “Abyei box” – often referred to as the Abyei area – has led to further tensions with the mission over its ability to protect civilians. In this Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) study, the authors set out to explore the effectiveness of UNISFA in meeting its mandated tasks in several areas. These include: 1. Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; 2. Support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism; 3. Provide de-mining assistance, technical advice, and security; and 4. Provide aid to humanitarian personnel and oil infrastructure in the Abyei Administrative Area (AAA), respectively. The report examines how effective the mission has been in meeting its core mandate, what we can understand from the mission’s success and challenges, and how adaptive the mission has been regarding the ongoing crisis in Sudan and South Sudan and its impact on Abyei, which has strategic and broader implications for the mission. Co-authors Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie – Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Training for Peace Programme. Dr Fiifi Edu-Afful – Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service and the University of Maryland Department of Government & Politics. He was formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Contributing authors Christian Ulfsten – former Research Assistant with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Ruth Adwoa Frimpong – Project Consultant with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) Nigeria. EPON series editor Dr Cedric de Coning, Research Professor – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

A Forgotten People in an Unstable Region - The Effectiveness of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

Established in June 2011, UNISFA aims to foster peace, stability, and development in the disputed Abyei region. Focused on implementing the Abyei Protocol, the mission addresses border demarcation (through the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism for the Sudan-South Sudan boundary since South Sudan’s independence in 2011) and security concerns and supports local governance through engagement with administrations. However, since 2011, UNISFA’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mandate and protecting civilians has been questioned as sporadic and spontaneous violence remains very high. While the overall security situation in Abyei has shown signs of improvement, persistent conflict dynamics stemming from intra- and inter-communal tensions, hired armed elements, and humanitarian challenges continue to set the region back. The rise of communal conflicts between new ethnicities and communities entering the “Abyei box” – often referred to as the Abyei area – has led to further tensions with the mission over its ability to protect civilians. In this Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) study, the authors set out to explore the effectiveness of UNISFA in meeting its mandated tasks in several areas. These include: 1. Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; 2. Support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism; 3. Provide de-mining assistance, technical advice, and security; and 4. Provide aid to humanitarian personnel and oil infrastructure in the Abyei Administrative Area (AAA), respectively. The report examines how effective the mission has been in meeting its core mandate, what we can understand from the mission’s success and challenges, and how adaptive the mission has been regarding the ongoing crisis in Sudan and South Sudan and its impact on Abyei, which has strategic and broader implications for the mission. Co-authors Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie – Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Training for Peace Programme. Dr Fiifi Edu-Afful – Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service and the University of Maryland Department of Government & Politics. He was formerly a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Contributing authors Christian Ulfsten – former Research Assistant with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Ruth Adwoa Frimpong – Project Consultant with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) Nigeria. EPON series editor Dr Cedric de Coning, Research Professor – Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

This report assesses the extent to which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is achieving its current strategic objectives, and the impact the Mission has had on the political and security situation in Mali. Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.

The Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell in the African Union Mission in Somalia: an emerging best practice for AU peace support o...

The Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) tracks harm to civilians caused by the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) operations including death, injury, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and damage to property including livestock. The cell faces three main types of challenges: • Structural: the sectoral composition of AMISOM hinders effective exchange of information. • Operational: there is no fund to pay amends to victims. • Political: in the midst of competing strategic pressures, the CCTARC has not been adequately prioritised by the mission, African Union Commission, Troop Contributing Countries, and donors.

Tangled up in glue: Multilateral crisis responses in Mali

The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.

Multinational Rapid Response Mechanisms: From Institutional Proliferation to Institutional Exploitation

The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.

Conclusion: Military rapid response—from institutional investment to ad hoc solutions

The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.

Africa and UN Peace Operations: Implications for the Future Role of Regional Organisations

Over the last decade and a half, Africa’s peace operations capacity has significantly increased. African states have deployed operations of their own and they now contribute half of all UN peacekeepers. The African Union (AU) and the UN have developed a strategic partnership that plays out at the political, policy, and operational levels, and reflects the reality that neither will deploy peace operations in Africa without close consultations and some form of cooperation with the other. While the UN peacekeeping model is not found to be well-suited to enforcement, counter-terrorism or trans-national operations, the AU, sub-regional organisations and ad hoc regional coalitions have developed capabilities designed to address these challenges. These African capabilities help relieve the pressure on the UN to conduct such operations.

Multinational rapid response mechanisms: Past promises and future prospects

Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame. Yet, the overall track record of the existing multinational rapid response mechanisms within the European Union, the African Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains disappointing, and the United Nations does not even have a rapidly deployable capacity anymore. Meanwhile, despite that calls for the further development of these mechanisms are still being voiced politically, scholarly literature remains fragmented. This is problematic as many of the obstacles faced by these organizations are similar. This forum uniquely compares experiences from the four aforementioned organizations. Drawing on these insights, this introductory article identifies some key factors that hamper or enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms.

The Role of the Civilian Component in African Union Peace Operations

The role of civilians in African Union (AU) peace support operations (PSOs) is still not fully understood. As a result, civilian capacity development has not been well resourced in comparison with the military and police dimensions of the African Standby Force (ASF) and has only modestly developed since 2006. As at the end of 2016 the AU has deployed approximately 400 civilians across its PSOs in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Somalia and Sudan. The average size of the actual civilian component in each mission totalled approximately fifty people. The civilian components most commonly found in AU PSOs are Political Affairs, Human Rights and Protection, Public Information, Humanitarian Liaison, Safety and Security, Civil Affairs, Gender and Mission Support. Despite AU policies and PSO doctrine, the value of a multidimensional approach to PSOs, and the role that civilians perform in this larger context, is not widely recognised in the AU Commission, AU PSOs or among the AU’s key PSO partners. The AU has struggled to articulate clearly why it needs a multidimensional approach, what the function and contribution of the civilian components are, and how the civilians staff contribute to achieving the mandate of a particular mission. This will have to change if the AU is serious about undertaking comprehensive stabilisation operations.

Strengthening the Peace and Governance Nexus within the African Union. Enhancing synergy between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the...

The vision of the African Union (AU) is to achieve “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”. The attainment of that vision hinges on three foundational imperatives: democratic governance, peace and security, and sustainable development. The focus of this report is on the interlinkages between democratic governance on the one hand and peace and security on the other. The report examines the two overarching mechanisms that were established by the AU to strengthen democratic governance and attain peace and security; namely the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, the author questions whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? This article answers the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. The author then uses the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, he considers the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.

Future of African Peace Operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram

UN peacekeeping as a learning organisation : From Brahimi to the HIPPO (2000-2015)

Measuring the Success of Peace Operations: Directions in Academic Literature

This background paper examines how the academic literature has approached the question of success in peace operations. Here it should be noted that many theoretical and methodological issues have not been settled, nor does this contribution seek to resolve them. The aim here is to shed light on the issue, and indicate where choices need to be made for research into success to be rigorous. The first section examines differences between the way that scholarly and practitioner analyses approach this question. The section that follows looks at how the academic literature has approached the definition of success and where some of the fault-lines lie. In the conclusion I outline a number of methodological decisions that need to be made when conducting research on success.

Gender Based Violence and Access to Justice: the Case of Ganta, Liberia

Amongst the various civil and criminal issues plaguing post-war Liberia, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (GBV) is one of the most prominent. A number of historical and contemporary realities are expressed through the issues of GBV in Liberia. Among these are the traditional gender roles that codify the domestic subordination of the women in Liberian society, and the widespread practices of GBV that emerged as a consequence of the ‘nationalisation of local conflict’ that the civil war in such a weak state brought about. Against this background, the Mapping Gender-based Violence and Access to Justice: Re-traditionalisationin Liberia (GENTRA) project was established to address the knowledge gap between assumptions about how GBV is best attended, and the actual preferences of Liberians. The focus of GENTRA is not on GBV cases as such, but rather on how people chose to address GBV in the plural legal system of Liberia, why people make these choices, how the different legal systems address GBV cases, and how people perceive the outcomesof these processes. Through this focus, GENTRA is mapping GBV and access to justice in Liberia, while creating a local database and capacity to help inform policymakers on GBV issues. The GENTRA project is funded by the Norwegian Research Council and is a collaborative effort between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation at the University of Liberia. In this Working Paper the researchers will document and analyse how people make these choice in and around the town of Ganta in Nimba County.

Crime, Coping, and Resistance in the Mali-Sahel Periphery

How can the UN move towards more people-centered peace operations?

Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations: From ‘Extension of State Authority’ to ‘Strengthening Inclusive State-Society Relations

Periods of conflict erode trust between national and local authorities and the people they govern, a trust that needs to be re-established. As peace operations are undertaken by inter-governmental bodies that tend to be inherently state-centric, however, peace operations need to go beyond merely supporting the extension of state-authority and strengthen inclusive state-society relations by supporting and facilitating inclusive processes that can address social cohesion, inequalities and marginalization. In order to support the emergence of resilient societies, these operations must help states and their societies to develop inclusive processes that enable participatory and responsive state institutions that are closely connected to the social institutions in the communities they serve. Furthermore, peace operations are often perceived as being partial to the party in government, while the government of the day often discourages peace operations from engaging with civil society. In the first part of this paper we explain why strengthening inclusive state-society relations is an important issue to address when peace operations are mandated to foster peace processes that can resist relapse. The second half of the paper shifts the attention to how peace operations can enhance and support state-society relations. In addition to monitoring the effect peace operations have on state institutions, operations should monitor how people experience the role and impact of peace operations. This can be assessed in a number of ways, including by involving representative advisory groups from civil society and local communities in assessments, analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation, so as to ensure continuous direct input and feedback from the society on the work of the peace operation.

New Tools for Blue Helmets

UN peace operations and counter-terrorism - A bridge too far?

The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali

The UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali were in 2013 given peace enforcement mandates, ordering them to use all necessary measures to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ identified groups in the eastern DRC and to ‘stabilise’ CAR and northern Mali. It is not new that UN missions have mandates authorising the use of force, but these have normally not specified enemies and have been of short duration. This article investigates these missions to better understand the short- and long-term consequences, in terms of the willingness of traditional as well as Western troop contributors to provide troops, and of the perception of the missions by host states, neighbouring states, rebel groups, and humanitarian and human rights actors. The paper explores normative, security and legitimacy implications of the expanded will of the UN to use force in peacekeeping operations. It argues that the urge to equip UN peacekeeping operations with enforcement mandates that target particular groups has significant long-term implications for the UN and its role as an impartial arbitrator in post-conflict countries.

The Role of the Police in the African Union - United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

What people think does matter: Understanding and integrating local perceptions into UN peacekeeping

Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations