Researcher
Tine Gade
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Tine Gade is Senior Research Fellow in NUPI’s Research Group on Peace, Conflict and Development. She holds a PhD in political science from Sciences Po in Paris and works predominantly issues related to contentious politics and state-society relationships in the Middle East.
Gade has previously worked as a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, and as a senior lecturer at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo. She has conducted in-depth fieldwork in Lebanon and Iraq, and has resided in Egypt and Syria.
Expertise
EDUCATION:
2008 - 2014 PhD in Political Science (summa cum laude), Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), France. Title: The crisis of the political-religious field in Tripoli, Lebanon (1967-2011)
2007 - 2008 Research Master in Comparative Politics, Specialization "Muslim World". Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), France
WORK EXPERIENCE:
2016 - Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI)
2016 - 2018 Max Weber Post-doctoral Fellow, RSCAS, European University Institute
2015 - 2017 Associated doctor, CERI, Sciences Po Paris
2015 - 2016 Senior Lecturer, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo
2014 Lecturer, Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo
2008 - 2013 Instructor, Sciences Po Paris University College2008-2011 Funded PhD student (“Allocataire de recherche”), SciencesPo Paris-CERI
Aktivitet
Filter
Clear all filters
Breakfast seminar: Street versus system – the protest wave in the Middle East
Over the past months, popular protests have shaken the rulers of Algeria, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. In this breakfast seminar, NUPI researchers discuss the nature of the protests and the prospects for change.
Lebanese Sunni Islamism: A Post-Election Review
This research note analyses the internal and external factors that led to Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya‘s loss of its only parliamentary seat in 2018. Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya is the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Through this case, the author assesses the status of Lebanon’s Sunni community and the electoral fortunes of regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations more generally. The main external factors leading to Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya’s electoral decline included the abandonment by the Future Movement, the law on proportional representation, potential regional involvement in the Lebanese elections and the rise of pro-Hezbollah Sunni MPs like those belonging to al-Ahbash. The internal challenges faced by Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, on the other hand, include its strategic dilemma on how to position itself in the sectarianized 'New Middle East' after the Arab uprisings, as well as its organizational structure and its inability to properly convince its supporters of the last-minute alliance with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). This note also analyses the fate of Lebanon’s Salafis and their absence from the elections, a result of the security pressures they face following their political support of the Islamist armed opposition in neighboring Syria. Furthermore, the research note explores the trajectory of the Al Masharee’ Association known as Al-Ahbash which, by returning to parliament in 2018, presented a fatal blow to the electoral hopes of Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists.
How do Islamist movements relate to the modern state?
The first research notes from the HYRES project are out, analyzing several very timely questions related to Islamist movements in Mali, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon.
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
Islam Keeping Violent Jihadism at Bay in Times of Daesh: State Religious Institutions in Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia since 2013
Can official Islamic institutions play a role to curb Sunni jihadi violence? Most Arab governments have granted a role to such institutions in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences: Sunni religious institutions in Lebanon are weak and only have a domestic role, and face difficulties fulfilling this role. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, however, are powerful and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy. Mainstream Muslim scholars want to be recognised as allies in the global struggle against jihadi violence; they have common interests with Western and Arab governments in combating jihadi violence. However, in the current climate of government control over official religious institutions, they lack the popular legitimacy needed to fight against violent jihadism. Religious institutions cannot be efficient when used as tools by authoritarian Arab governments. Political subjugation of religious clerics is a major reason for the fragmentation of the religious field and a driver of radicalisation.
The reconfiguration of clientelism and the failure of vote buying in Lebanon
One common demand in the 2011 uprisings in the MENA region was the call for ‘freedom, dignity, and social justice.’ Citizens rallied against corruption and clientelism, which for many protesters were deeply linked to political tyranny. This book takes the phenomenon of the 2011 uprisings as a point of departure for reassessing clientelism and patronage across the entire MENA region. Using case studies covering Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies, it looks at how the relationships within and between clientelist and patronage networks changed before 2011. The book assesses how these changes contributed to the destabilization of the established political and social order, and how they affected less visible political processes. It then turns to look at how the political transformations since 2011 have in turn reconfigured these networks in terms of strategies and dynamics, and concomitantly, what implications this has had for the inclusion or exclusion of new actors. Are specific networks expanding or shrinking in the post-2011 contexts? Do these networks reproduce established forms of patron-client relations or do they translate into new modes and mechanisms? As the first book to systematically discuss clientelism, patronage and corruption against the background of the 2011 uprisings, it will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Middle Eastern Studies. The book also addresses major debates in comparative politics and political sociology by offering ‘networks of dependency’ as an interdisciplinary conceptual approach that can ‘travel’ across place and time.
Islamist radicalisation in Europe – characteristics and drivers
Professor Olivier Roy visits NUPI to give a lecture on the characteristics and drivers of Islamist radicalisation in European societies.
Together all the way? Abeyance and co-optation of Sunni networks in Lebanon
This article assesses how social movement continuity may vary in non-democratic and repressive contexts. Using a single case study of Islamist networks in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli over three decades, I ask: Under what conditions is social movement continuity possible, and in what form? Former studies have three levels of abeyance - activist network and personnel; movement goals and repertoires; and collective identities and symbols - are instructive. Network survival and abeyance structures can facilitate rapid mass protests in case of a facilitating external conjuncture. This analysis relies on data collected during fieldwork conducted over a decade in Tripoli, triangulated with secondary literature and primary sources in Arabic. I find that four individual-level continuity pathways are available in authoritarian contexts: continuation of activism; disengagement; co-optation; and arena shifts. These pathways should not be seen as final and stable outcomes but as fluctuating and contingent processes, or pathways. Due to the ambiguity of informal networks, co-opted movements may easily turn against the authorities once again. Moreover, local legacies of protests may be used as resources by new protest leaders.
Hybrid paths to resistance in the Muslim world: Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali (HYRES)
HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups purs...
Lebanon: Political leadership confronted by Salafist ideology
Force est de constater que les débordements de la crise syrienne au Liban sur le plan sécuritaire sont restés relativement limités, comparé à la violence massive de l’autre côté de la frontière. Cette note de recherche fait l’hypothèse que si le calme au Liban est tout relatif, il est aussi le résultat de mécanismes de contrôle politique et social bien établis, et notamment les liens entretenus par les notables et leaders communautaires avec la population. Comme nous le savons, le modèle consociatif libanais fait de ces élites des « champions communautaires » et des médiateurs entre leurs communautés et l’État libanais : porte-paroles, responsables de négociations intercommunautaires et régulateurs de conflits intercommunautaires. Les leaders doivent en effet composer avec les radicaux de leurs communautés et « contrôler » leurs « rues politiques ». A travers le cas de la communauté sunnite libanaise, cette note de recherche analyse dans une première partie l’essor de l’extrémisme sunnite, le salafisme djihadiste. Dans une seconde partie, nous nous pencherons sur les mécanismes de contrôle et d’interaction entre la jeunesse urbaine pauvre et les notables sunnites, et plus particulièrement la question des mécanismes communautaires. Il s’agit là de comprendre dans quelle(s) mesure(s) ces mécanismes existant de manière similaire dans les communautés chiite, maronite et druze, expliquent l’adaptation de l’État libanais face à la crise syrienne. Nous démontrerons que contrairement aux études décrivant les islamistes comme constituant une menace à la stabilité libanaise et à la cohésion nationale, ces derniers s’adaptent et s’intègrent à la réalité locale. Les islamistes sont aussi pragmatiques : les intérêts privés, communautaires, politiques et familiaux peuvent aussi aisément prendre le pas sur l’élément religieux. Cela rend possible une position consensuelle vis-à-vis des élites politiques sunnites, et du phénomène de libanisation du salafisme, par leur entrée dans des réseaux clientélistes. Les militants de Daech ont quant à eux un ancrage international, ce qui les rendrait plus dangereux, car moins facilement contrôlables par les notables salafistes ou par les élites politiques. Ils sont jeunes et en rupture avec leurs parents et leur communauté. Toutefois, puisque les jeunes de Daech se réclament du salafisme, les notables salafistes jouissent encore d’un certain respect parmi eux. L’inclusion des cheikhs salafistes libanais dans des processus de négociation avec Daech continue donc d’être d’une grande importance. Finalement, le courant du Futur et Hariri sont de plus en plus contestés en interne par les électeurs sunnites. Le plus grand rival de Hariri n’est pas représenté par les salafistes mais par d’autres leaders sunnites plus en phase avec les positions de la communauté, tels qu’Achraf Rifi.