Ole Jacob Sending

Contested Professionalization in a Weak Transnational Field

I analyse the contested emergence of so-called needs assessments and the push towards ‘evidence-based action’ within humanitarian organisations. The introduction of evidence-based action since the late 1990s inaugurated a systematic change within humanitarian organisations: it implied that practical experience from humanitarian crises - since long a hallmark of authority among humanitarian professionals - was no longer sufficient alone to establish authority and dominate humanitarian organisations. The push to use ‘objective’ methods to assess humanitarian needs came primarily from donors, who demanded that humanitarian organisations better demonstrate efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. While humanitarian professionals across different organisations can be said to share moral commitments and expertise, they were nonetheless not able to push back against the introduction of standardised needs assessments. The explanation for this is to be found in the fact that the humanitarian field lacks autonomy: Because humanitarian organisations rely extensively on outside actors (donors) for financial and political support, their internal organisation and outlook is heavily shaped by non-humanitarian actors. As a result, the ability of transnationally organised humanitarian professionals - operating in humanitarian crises - to shape humanitarian priorities and modes of work is undercut by their respective organisations´ relative dependence on outside actors. Present-day humanitarian organisations are thus marked by two different strands of professionalism: one with basis in practical experience from humanitarian crises, emphasising proximity to those in need and the role of bearing witness, and one with basis in more abstract models of knowledge of management, resource-mobilisation, and measuring needs through standardised methods.

Wielding influence in a new governance architecture: Norway, the G20 and the 2030 Agenda

The G20 is by dint of its membership – the 20 largest economies in the world – an important decision-making body. Moreover, the challenges currently facing established inter-governmental organi- zations (IGOs) arguably make the G20 even more important. The G20 is perceived as agile, e ective and powerful whereas established IGOs – such as the UN and the World Bank - appear to be bogged down by overly bureaucratic rules, organizational inertia, and a lack of resources to ful l their mandates. This was on display when the G20 convened in Washington DC during the global nancial crisis, and its swift actions, in all likelihood, prevented a more severe glo- bal crisis. For Norway, the power of the G20 as an arena for shaping global gov- ernance represents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a chal- lenge because Norway has for the last half-century invested heavily in multilateral institutions both as an end in itself, and as a means to embed Norwegian interest within multilateral rules. This was made clear in the government ́s recent White Paper “Veivalg i Utenriks- og Sikkerhetspolitikken.” The G20 may pose a challenge if its seen to undermine the credibility of multilateral institutions with regard to uphold established rules. This in turn, may reduce Norway ́s ability to in uence global governance through these multilateral institutions. It is an opportunity to the degree that the G20 can strengthen global governance on key areas of importance for Norway, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The G20 also rep- resents an underexplored channel for wielding in uence on other issues, which requires a different type of strategy than the one pur- sued vis a vis multilateral institutions.

Consequences of integrating foreign policy and development policy

There has in recent years been a clear trend among OECD countries to integrate their development and foreign policies. This paper has two parts. Part one reviews how some key donor countries have approached such integration, and examines what we know about their effects on the overall coherence and effectiveness of development and foreign policy. The working paper finds that there is a clear knowledge gap on the consequences of integrating development and foreign policy.

Recognition and Liquid Authority

To analyze how authority emerges, become institutionalized, and may be transformed, we are best served with a concept of authority that highlights its dynamic features, and that captures the multiplicity of actors involved in producing and sustaining it. Extant accounts tend to operate with a view of ‘solid’ authority, but such a concept of authority is mainly descriptive, not explanatory. A turn to the liquid features of authority is not only better suited to account for global authority, but also for those pockets of ‘solid’ authority that we can find in the global or international sphere. I develop an account of authority that draws selectively from some of Bourdieu’s core concepts and highlight the inherently relational aspect of authority. Authority, I submit, is based on actors’ search for recognition. Such a perspective is better able to account for how authority emerges and may stabilize as ‘solid,’ and also be transformed over time. I draw on examples from the World Health Organization and the UN Security Council to illustrate the argument.

Global Governance