Åsmund Weltzien

New Momentum for European Defence Cooperation

For better or for worse, the politics of Brexit, in combination with the implementation of the new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, have generated renewed momentum for European defence cooperation. EU member states have tabled a range of proposals. Some consolidation will be necessary, especially if effective defence integration is the aim – and that is the way to overcome current fragmentation. National forces can cooperate and be made interoperable with other forces in various formats simultaneously, but they can be integrated only once. Two levels of defence cooperation and integration must be addressed. At the level of the EU as such, and using EU incentives such as Commission funding for R&T, largescale projects for the development and acquisition of strategic enablers can be mounted, with the European Defence Agency acting as manager. At the level of state clusters, large deployable multinational formations can be created (such as army corps and air wings), with fully integrated maintenance, logistics and other structures in support of the national manoeuvre units that each participant can contribute. By pooling all-too-limited national military sovereignty in this way, defence cooperation and integration can revive sovereignty, understood as the capacity for action, at a higher level.

Emissions trading and climate diplomacy between Europe and China

Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context

Swedish security policy has experienced dramatic developments in recent decades. With the end of the Cold War, Swedish security policy could not identify any military threat to the country’s security, and so the armed forces were dramatically reduced. What remained of Swedish defence shifted the focus to international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. At this point it was said that Swedish security started in Afghanistan; the doctrine of Swedish security policy was accordingly referred to as the ‘Afghanistan doctrine’. But in 2008 the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission (För­svars­beredningen) presented a report which, for the first time in many years, recognized what might become a new security context. The Defence Commission argued that the litmus test of Russia’s choice of future path would be how it came to behave toward former members of the Soviet Union over the coming years (Försvarsberedningen 2007: 36). Accordingly, many Swedish politicians and commentators saw the Russian–Georgian war later that same year as proof of a more assertive Russia (see Brommesson 2015). After 2008, tension levels in Sweden’s neighbourhood have risen – including what the Swedish Armed Forces have deemed to be violation of Swedish territorial waters by a foreign power, confrontational behaviour in the airspace over the Baltic Sea and reports of heightened levels of espionage in Sweden. Against this background, the Swedish security policy has gradually refocused and has once again defined the defence of Swedish territory as its first priority. Military spending has increased, various types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the defence area have gained momentum and there is now lively discussion on what Sweden’s future secur ity policy should look like. In this debate one central issue concerns the character of Sweden’s future security policy cooperation. In particular, two forms of cooperation have featured in discussions in the past decade: Sweden’s extensive cooperation with NATO, which now includes almost all aspects of NATO membership except the core of such membership: the mutual defence assurances under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and Sweden’s equally extensive bilateral cooperation with Finland. This Policy Brief discusses these two forms of security policy cooperation as points of departure for alternative paths for Swedish security policy. In particular this policy brief focuses on the idea of the bilateral relationship between the two post-neutral Nordic states, Sweden and Finland, as a potential solution to cut the Gordian knot of the Swedish security dilemma.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the New Eurasian Order

As Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has redirected the structures and the objectives of both foreign and domestic policy in the PRC. BRI’s goal is primarily economic: to increase trade and investment along China’s periphery by funding and building infrastructure projects. But it is more. Through an analysis of official and semiofficial sources, this policy brief will show that BRI aims to weave neighboring countries into a network of economic, political, cultural, and security relations centered around China. BRI is a new project that is still taking shape. Yet, its objectives are ambitious: Beijing’s grand strategy is to re-constitute the Eurasian regional order with new governance ideas, norms, and rules. The policy brief concludes that European countries should address China’s challenge by stressing their commitment to the normative goals of multilateralism, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law in an open, rule-based global order.

EU referendum: the beginning, not the end, of Brexiteers’ problems

On 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union. The referendum outcome triggered resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron and his replacement by former Home Secretary Theresa May. This brief enquires into why Cameron lost the referendum battle and what the major challenges facing the new prime minister are. May, who supported the ‘Remain’ campaign, will have to prove that she can deliver Brexit. That will not be an easy task, with obstacles at home and abroad. Scotland and Northern Ire-land voted to remain in the EU, and their reluctance to leave the EU could complicate May’s plans. PM May will also find it difficult to win hearts in Brussels. Britain tested the patience of the EU institutions with its reform demands, and Brussels will be reluctant to make things easier for the UK in Brexit talks. Member-states may be more receptive to Britain’s concerns, but the UK will prob-ably not be offered any special treatment.

China's New Development Bank and Infrastructure-led Growth

In view of China’s recent launch of several new development banks (AIIB, OBOR, NDB) with a central focus on infrastructure, this NUPI Brief takes a look at how China’s infrastructure projects have fared both at home and abroad in the past. It asks the question: Does economic growth, boosted by infrastructure investment, necessarily benefit development? Admitting that infrastructure has played a crucial role in China’s development, as well as contributed to the changes in other developing countries, this brief cautions against several potential economic risks. To be more specific, three issues are highlighted: first, low usage and low profitability; second, debt and broken contracts; third, favouritism towards state-owned companies.

More teeth for the NATO-Tiger How the Framework Nation Concept can reduce NATO’s growing formation – capability gap

How can the Framework Nation Concept reduce NATO’s growing formation – capability gap?

Military non-alignment, political solidarity, and a retreat to territorial defence: how to understand the Swedish NATO-debate

Expectations for the Warsaw Summit: Conventional and nuclear responses to Russian belligerence

This paper describes two aspects of the changed security environment. First, it discusses NATO’s response to the new threats on its eastern and southern borders. The Alliance took a number of modest steps at the Wales Summit in september 2014 to deal with those, but were they enough? Will it announce a more robust response at the Warsaw Summit this summer? Second, what is the role for NATO nuclear policy in strategic deterrence? Why is this topic back in discussion after years of benign neglect within the Alliance? Given its sensitivity, this subject is unlikely to be discussed at the next summit—but perhaps it should be. This paper addresses some of the key elements of deterrence strategy in an alliance that has not had to think about the subject for more than two decades.

Can NATO’s new Very High Readiness Joint Task force deter?

This Policy Brief is an extended version of an article that first published in the journal Atlantisch Perspeetief (39:6) under the headline ”NATO’s new spearhead force: Credible deterrence?”