Norway meets Europe

FOKUS: 25 år med EØS

Special edition of Internasjonal Politikk with focus on the 25 year anniversary of the EEA agreement.

Tre trender som utfordrer norsk utenrikspolitikk

(Available in Norwegian only): Denne policy briefen tar utgangspunkt i tre globale trender, og gir en analyse og vurderinger av hva trendene innebærer av utfordringer og muligheter for norsk utenrikspolitikk i tiden fremover: 1. Nye stormakter vokser frem. 2. Migrasjon brer om seg. 3. Utenrikspolitikk blir innenrikspolitikk.

Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight

Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019, this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.

Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions

This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.

50 Years After the Moon Landing: Why Europe Should Lead the Next 50

50 years since the first astronauts stepped foot on the moon, it would be easy to be complacent about human space exploration today. After all, humans have not ventured out of low-earth orbit since 1972. Achievements in space since the Apollo missions have flown under the radar for most of the regular public. However, the world is actually in a very different place now than it was 50 years ago, when the Soviet Union and United States were the sole spacefaring powers. Today, 72 countries have space programs, 14 have launch capability, and six have highly developed space capabilities (China, Europe, India, Japan, the US, and Russia). Space agencies, private commercial entities, international organizations, amateur space enthusiasts, multi-national corporations, and public-private partnerships comprise the diverse landscape of actors involved in space today. The total global space economy is estimated to be well over $383.5 billion.1 In particular, the European space industry is one of the largest in the world, and contributes around €53-62 billion to the European economy. Manufacturing is a significant part of this, with European companies producing around one-third of the world’s satellites.2 Within 10 years, it is expected that there will be a thriving low-earth orbit eco-system, space tourism, a permanent moon base, and shortly thereafter, a manned trip to Mars.

French Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Practising Grandeur

This book investigates how modern French foreign policy is practiced. France finds its traditional power status challenged by internal as well as external developments. Internally, it faces societal challenges related to unemployment, integration, social exclusion, Islamist terrorism and the rise of populism. Externally, its status is challenged by global and regional developments – including the financial crises, competition from emerging states, EU enlargement and a more powerful Germany. While the French recognise that they no longer have great-power economic or military power capacities, the conviction of the universal value of French civilization and culture remains strong. As this book argues, for France to be able to punch above its weight in international politics, it must effectively promote the value of ‘French universalism’ and culture. This study investigates how this is reflected in modern French foreign policy by examining foreign policy practices towards selected regions/countries and in relation to external and internal security. Written by a senior researcher specializing in French and EU foreign and security policy, this book will be an invaluable resource for practitioners of foreign policy and students of French politics, international relations and European studies.

New Momentum for European Defence Cooperation

For better or for worse, the politics of Brexit, in combination with the implementation of the new EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, have generated renewed momentum for European defence cooperation. EU member states have tabled a range of proposals. Some consolidation will be necessary, especially if effective defence integration is the aim – and that is the way to overcome current fragmentation. National forces can cooperate and be made interoperable with other forces in various formats simultaneously, but they can be integrated only once. Two levels of defence cooperation and integration must be addressed. At the level of the EU as such, and using EU incentives such as Commission funding for R&T, largescale projects for the development and acquisition of strategic enablers can be mounted, with the European Defence Agency acting as manager. At the level of state clusters, large deployable multinational formations can be created (such as army corps and air wings), with fully integrated maintenance, logistics and other structures in support of the national manoeuvre units that each participant can contribute. By pooling all-too-limited national military sovereignty in this way, defence cooperation and integration can revive sovereignty, understood as the capacity for action, at a higher level.

Emissions trading and climate diplomacy between Europe and China

Non-allied states in a changing Europe: Sweden and its bilateral relationship with Finland in a new security context

Swedish security policy has experienced dramatic developments in recent decades. With the end of the Cold War, Swedish security policy could not identify any military threat to the country’s security, and so the armed forces were dramatically reduced. What remained of Swedish defence shifted the focus to international peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. At this point it was said that Swedish security started in Afghanistan; the doctrine of Swedish security policy was accordingly referred to as the ‘Afghanistan doctrine’. But in 2008 the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission (För­svars­beredningen) presented a report which, for the first time in many years, recognized what might become a new security context. The Defence Commission argued that the litmus test of Russia’s choice of future path would be how it came to behave toward former members of the Soviet Union over the coming years (Försvarsberedningen 2007: 36). Accordingly, many Swedish politicians and commentators saw the Russian–Georgian war later that same year as proof of a more assertive Russia (see Brommesson 2015). After 2008, tension levels in Sweden’s neighbourhood have risen – including what the Swedish Armed Forces have deemed to be violation of Swedish territorial waters by a foreign power, confrontational behaviour in the airspace over the Baltic Sea and reports of heightened levels of espionage in Sweden. Against this background, the Swedish security policy has gradually refocused and has once again defined the defence of Swedish territory as its first priority. Military spending has increased, various types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the defence area have gained momentum and there is now lively discussion on what Sweden’s future secur ity policy should look like. In this debate one central issue concerns the character of Sweden’s future security policy cooperation. In particular, two forms of cooperation have featured in discussions in the past decade: Sweden’s extensive cooperation with NATO, which now includes almost all aspects of NATO membership except the core of such membership: the mutual defence assurances under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and Sweden’s equally extensive bilateral cooperation with Finland. This Policy Brief discusses these two forms of security policy cooperation as points of departure for alternative paths for Swedish security policy. In particular this policy brief focuses on the idea of the bilateral relationship between the two post-neutral Nordic states, Sweden and Finland, as a potential solution to cut the Gordian knot of the Swedish security dilemma.

European Integration Reset: Lessons from Brexit, Norway, and Eastern Europe

Given the severity and length of the Great Recession, whether or not Europe needs more or less integration is a much less consequential discussion than that Europe needs better and more effective integration. In this policy brief, we argue that taking stock of the integration experience may be the key to support the search for novel and more effective policy initiatives, resume growth and leave the current crisis behind. The brief presents three historical examples that illustrate the power deep integration has had in propelling the European project. The first demonstrates how deep integration contributed significantly to stop the relative economic decline of the United Kingdom (UK) vis-à-vis the EU founding members. We suggest EU membership played a greater role in this respect than Thatcher’s reforms. The second example displays how deep integration drove increases in labor productivity in Sweden, Austria and Finland (which gained unrestricted access to the Single Market by joining the European Economic Area, EEA, in 1994 and later the EU in 1995) compared to similar developments in Norway (which joined only the EEA in 1994). The third example draws from the experience of the Central European new member members to illustrate that a crucial (yet less appreciated than trade openness, foreign investment and migration) mechanism to these advancements has been the ability of deep integration to increase State capacity and hence to shore up positive institutional change.

EU referendum: the beginning, not the end, of Brexiteers’ problems

On 23 June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union. The referendum outcome triggered resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron and his replacement by former Home Secretary Theresa May. This brief enquires into why Cameron lost the referendum battle and what the major challenges facing the new prime minister are. May, who supported the ‘Remain’ campaign, will have to prove that she can deliver Brexit. That will not be an easy task, with obstacles at home and abroad. Scotland and Northern Ire-land voted to remain in the EU, and their reluctance to leave the EU could complicate May’s plans. PM May will also find it difficult to win hearts in Brussels. Britain tested the patience of the EU institutions with its reform demands, and Brussels will be reluctant to make things easier for the UK in Brexit talks. Member-states may be more receptive to Britain’s concerns, but the UK will prob-ably not be offered any special treatment.

Reform, Renegotiation and Referendum

The UK stands on the brink of a momentous decision: whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Unlike all the other states that have sought late entry to the EU, the UK did not hold a referendum on whether to join in 1973: the decision was taken on the basis of a parliamentary vote. However, in 1975 voters were asked whether they wished to stay in the European Community, and a strong vote to remain was thought to have resolved the matter. However, in 2013, divisions within the Conservative Party led Prime Minister David Cameron to promise to engage in reform of the EU and to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership before holding a referendum on whether to stay in. It was a high-risk, high-stakes proposition. Cameron must persuade his party, the British lectorate and his partners in the other EU member states of the merits of his case. The negotiation covers four areas of concern for the UK: economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. To some British Eurosceptics, the emands seem woefully inadequate; to fellow EU leaders, they pose significant difficulties. The formal negotiations began in late 2015, after months of exploratory talks with the other member states, and are expected to be completed by the end of February, with the referendum coming as early as June 2016. While those who seek to leave the EU have been honing their arguments at least since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, just that they envisage leaving the EU to look like is unclear. Brexit could take many forms, representing a journey to an unknown destination.

Nord Stream 2: policy dilemmas and the future of EU gas market

The Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline project is one of the most controversial issues in EU gas-related debates today. Its proponents hold that the project is driven by purely commercial considerations, while opponents label it as political and contradictory to EU goals and rules. The project has also contributed to raising several questions concerning the role of commercial actors in the shaping and realization of the EU energy policy as well as the impact on EU internal cohesion and relations with Ukraine and Russia. Realization of NS2 may boost the role of Russian gas in the European energy mix, especially in northwestern Europe; however, it could also undermine the credibility of the common EU energy policy, which aims, at least formally, at diversification of supply routes and suppliers as a joint and coordinated response to the energy-security challenges faced by the EU as a whole and by its member states. This Policy Brief sheds light on the current state of the debate on this project and examines the possible short-, mid- and long-term implications.

Towards Multi-level Security Community Building: The EU’s and Norway’s External Governance in Ukraine

initial objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was to expand the European zone of peace beyond the EU’s borders through processes of external governance. It was seen as an instrument for promoting security in the region through processes of integration and association. Although initially developed as a rather coherent policy, it has over the years become something very different. In this paper, we examine what these changes have actually entailed. Our main argument is that the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy –the lead framework of the EU’s external governance has been developing from the original concept of a set of rationally planned processes coherent across countries of this Neighbourhood, towards a complex and ambiguous set of ‘garbage can’ type of processes in individual countries. We focus on the latter dimension, specifically analysing the nature of coordination of reform processes in Ukraine. Here, the original model of a rational process, with detailed action plans, monitoring, reporting and progress assessment of reforms, has given way to a set of loosely coupled processes involving various interests, problems, solutions and decision-making situations–what Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) termed the garbage can model of change. EU institutions and EU member states are involved in various forms of engagement with Ukraine, resulting in complex and often loosely coupled forms of adaptation. Nevertheless, Ukraine is experiencing unprecedented levels of extensive transformation processes connecting its various societal segments with the EU.

The next big European project? The migration and asylum crisis: a vital challenge for the EU

The summer of 2015 may well be remembered as a turning point in the history of both migration to Europe and European integration. There was a further rise in mixed inflows of migrants and refugees, with a diversification of the routes employed – in particular, a surge in transits across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans. Secondly,the already dynamic map of political reactions and policy responses entered a phase of hectic and deep change, due primarily to a major shift in the position of Germany.

How Do Little Frogs Fly? Small States in the European Union

Small EU member states need to exploit the special characteristics of their small public administrations in order to secure their interests and have influence within the Union. They must develop an administrative competence based on features like informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of officials operating according to guidelines rather than fixed negotiating instructions. They also need to acknowledge their limitations, and set priorities to a much greater extent than the large states. A strategy based on these features, combined with a positive image and political willingness, can bring negotiating success within the EU’s decision-making processes.

France and the European Union: a story of reason rather than love

In France, the push for the European integration process has come historically for a large part from the political and administrative elite. Over the past 60 years, they have expressed not only interest but also belief in European integration, as the US scholar Craig Parsons has rightly noted. Three beliefs about the EU have been recurrent fundamentals for French political and administrative elites: 1. The EU must have a ‘core’ consisting in the major member states which exercise a leadership on the rest. In this regard, France and Germany must share the role of motor or driving force. 2. The EU must not be limited to a single market. It should develop as a political project including a foreign and security policy. This is usually called in France l’Europe puissance, a term difficult to translate. 3. The EU governance should be a combination of supranational and intergovernmental institutions

The EU, Russia and Ukraine: a double track with no end?

European Security & the Power of Knowledge-based Networks

Reality check for the EU: The stand-off with Russia challenges the European Union in its fundaments

Russia’s military attacks in Ukraine are not only an assault on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of one of the European Union’s largest neighbours. They also impose multiple important challenges to the European Union (EU). Moscow has questioned the architecture, rules and institutions of the European post-Cold War security order and forces the EU to reconsider its external policies, particularly in its Eastern neighbourhood. Reactions of EU member governments, of certain political parties and media have exposed the EU’s vulnerability to Russian influence, which risks undermining the EU’s ability to forge an impactful approach to Russia and the EU’s eastern neighborhood.

TTIP - Economic Consequences and Possibilities for Third Countries: the Case of Norway

The possible realisation of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the USA may have significant impacts, also for third countries. This policy brief analyses the economic consequences and possibilities for one third country – Norway – discussing both TTIP and a separate agreement on trade and investments between Norway and the USA.

Importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy: A role for Norway?

The European Gas Puzzle: Over-Securitization, Dilemmas and Multi-level Gas Politics on the European Continent a Year after ‘Euromaidan’

Whither the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership?

Failures in the World Trade Organisation’s Doha Round have prompted countries to turn to preferential trade agreements. Every country with a stake in world trade is now negotiating bilateral free trade agreements – with occasional infusions of regional attempts to forge greater trade ties by reducing barriers to trade and investments, e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Some claims Free Trade Agreements to be second-best alternatives to a dysfunctional multilateral system; others see them through the eyes of Jacob Viner and consider them to be termites of the trading system, diverting trade and causing bureaucratic obstacles to trade through Rules of Origin regulations. Yet regardless the side of the argument, the most outstanding feature of many FTAs is that they do not have impressive effects on growth in trade and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The EU, for instance, considers its FTA with South Korea to be a first-of-a-kind, “deep and comprehensive” bilateral agreement with a medium-sized growth market – and at the time when it was ratified, EU representatives hailed it as an important trade agreement for the European post-crisis recovery. The estimates of the European Commission, however, suggested this FTA to boost GDP in Europe by no more than 0.08 percent.

The rise of Euroscepticism and how to deal with it in the EU

It used to be seen as a British disease, but Euroscepticism has spread like a virus across the continent – infecting creditors, debtors, would-be euro-members and outs alike. Trust in the European project has fallen even faster than European interest rates. Since the beginning of the crisis, France losses 32 points, Germany -49, Italy -52, Spain -98, Poland -44, UK –36.The damage is so deep that it does not matter whether coun-tries are creditors, debtor countries, would-be members of the euro or countries with opt-outs: everybody is worse off. Back in 2007, people thought that the UK, which scored minus 13 points in trust, was the Eurosceptic outlier. Now, the four members of the eurozone come in well below Britain in their trust for EU institutions: Germany -29, France and Italy -22, Spain -52. What is happening?I think there is a fundamental crisis at the level of narrative for Europe, in the nature of the EU project and in political organization at a national level.

The EEA and Norway Grants as a source of Soft Power

Norms and Conditionality: The EU and Ukraine