Natasja Rupesinghe
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Natasja Rupesinghe worked as a PhD fellow in the Research group on peace, conflict and development at NUPI until 2023, while being a DPhil candidate in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford at Nuffield College.
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Clear all filtersAssessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
This report assesses the extent to which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved its current strategic objectives and what impact, if any, the mission has had on broader political and security dynamics in Somalia.
The Sahel’s jihadists don’t all govern alike: context matters
The way jihadist insurgents in the Sahel governs differs between but also within groups. Jihadists do not follow strict ideological templates for imposing their rule or rely only on the use of violence. They continuously adapt the manner in which they govern in response to internal factional dynamics and pressure from state and non-state actors. They also respond to local politics and conflicts.
Understanding Ad-Hoc Security Intitiatives in Africa
The policy brief examines the rise of ad-hoc security initiatives (ASIs) as an established type of collective security mechanism. ASIs are intended to eliminate threats posed by non-state armed groups, and operate across the borders of participating countries to enable the pursuit of such groups. ASIs have emerged because existing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) mechanisms were not specific or responsive enough to meet this ongoing need. The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Multinational Joint Task Force, and the G5 Sahel can all be categorised as ASIs.
Jihadist Governance in the Sahel
Often depicted as “Islamic terrorists”, jihadist insurgent governance has rarely been systematically researched in the academic literature. In this seminar, we will discuss what the research tells us about how jihadists govern and why their governance differs not only between different groups but also within the same group.
Reviewing Jihadist Governance in the Sahel
The ways in which jihadist insurgents in the Sahel govern is rarely considered in the academic literature. They have often been portrayed as ‘Islamic terrorists’, who achieve their objectives by using brutal force against the civilian population and who finance their activities through criminal networks and activities. However, scattered empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgent groups, often use a variety of strategies to rule territory and populations. The scale, character and form of how such groups govern differs not only between countries but also at the sub-national level within the same group. Nevertheless, until recently jihadist insurgent governance in Africa and particularly the Sahel region has largely been overlooked. This synthesis reviews the existing literature on jihadist governance in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on the understudied region of the Sahel. The review is organised as follows: first, we clarify key concepts and provide definitions. Second, we provide a brief overview of Islam and politics in the Sahel, contextualising the rise of Salafist-jihadism as well as historical cases of jihadist governance. Third, we provide a brief overview of the literature and synthesise the existing research on jihadist insurgent governance in the Sahel. Fourth, we examine some key cases of jihadist governance in northern Mali, Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Finally, we conclude by summarising our findings, discussing the implications for the study of civil war and insurgency and consider avenues for future research.
Jihadist Governance in the Sahel (JIGOV-Sahel)
This project is about jihadist insurgent governance in West Africa's Sahel region....
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali
Until 2016 MINUSMA managed to strengthen stability in northern Mali, decreasing the number of civilians killed in the conflict, and allowing large numbers of displaced persons to return home. MINUSMA also assisted the peace process, culminating in the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Many of these achievements are still standing. However, since 2016 MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilisation and the protection of civilians has decreased. In the North, the signatory parties have been making slow progress in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and the 2018 Pact for Peace. In addition, central Mali has destabilised significantly, as Jihadist activities have stoked a vicious cycle of inter-communal violence that has reached unprecedented levels. MINUSMA has only been mandated to help the Malian government address the situation since June 2018. As one of the largest multidimensional peacekeeping operations – currently including nearly 13,000 soldiers and 1,800 police officers from 57 contributing countries, and almost 750 civilians – MINUSMA has been provided with significant resources and an extraordinarily ambitious mandate. However, the Mission finds itself at a crossroads. It needs time to succeed, but this is valuable time Mali does not have. Civilians have come under increasing attack, and the US, in particular, is losing interest in supporting a costly UN peace operation that is not able to deliver quick results. This report considers the degree to which there is an alignment between the mission’s resources and its mandate. It also makes an assessment of the options available to the Mission to increase its effectiveness in the face of extremely challenging circumstances.
Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Mali
This policy brief examines the processes of violent extremist mobilisation and radicalisation in Mopti, Central Mali. Specifically, it looks at the strategies employed by one of the most salient radical jihadist groups in the region, the Katiba Macina. It seeks to answer the following questions: 1) Given that violent extremist mobilisation has not taken root uniformly across regions in Mali, and because it is often endogenous to local dynamics, how has Mopti as a region become an enabling environment for jihadist actors like the Katiba Macina? 2) How do groups like the Katiba Macina mobilise local support and integrate themselves among communities? 3) Why do individuals join, adhere to or accept the Katiba Macina?
Women and the Katiba Macina in Central Mali
This policy brief examines the local rule of the Katiba Macina from a gender perspective and addresses the question of women’s participation in the insurgency. The key findings can be summarised as follows. First,controlling gender relations is an important element of the Katiba Macina’s rule, allowing the insurgency to demonstrate its authority over the community. Second, its rule has also had a gendered impact, which has restricted livelihoods in ways that threaten not only women’s socio-economic security, but also their way of life and identity. Third, women, like in most other jihadist insurgencies, are not recruited as combatants, but have multi-faceted supporting roles as wives of ‘men of the bush’ and as informants in informal surveillance mechanisms that pass on information and contribute to maintaining law and order. Moreover, women are more likely to actively participate when they are bonded to the insurgency through familial ties.