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How effective is policing in protecting civilians in peace operations?

Lessons from the UN Mission in South Sudan

Meressa Kahsu Dessu, Dawit Yohannes and Charles T Hunt

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Executive summary

Most contemporary multidimensional peace operations prioritise the protection of civilians (PoC) as one of their primary mandates. This is expected as current conflicts and crises are increasingly marked by high civilian casualties, emanating not least from the deliberate targeting of civilians and the blurred distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

As a key element of multidimensional peace operations, the United Nations (UN) Police have assumed diverse roles in implementing the mandate of such missions. Key decision-making entities such as the UN Security Council (UNSC) have increasingly acknowledged such roles. This can be illustrated by the UNSC's resolution that recognises the police's 'invaluable contribution to peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, security, the rule of law, and the creation of a basis for development.'[1] However, the evolving roles of the police have not matched with studies on its effectiveness in mandate implementation, particularly in PoC.

> Policing at PoC Sites has been a key mechanism of enabling shelter for over 200 000 civilians fleeing from physical attacks

This monograph contributes to debates around the role and effectiveness of policing in PoC based on the lessons from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The study combines two overarching debates: the effectiveness of peace operations and the role of policing in PoC. While the mission was established in 2011, this monograph pays particular attention since 2014, following the prioritisation of the PoC mandate. The analysis broadly focuses on the effectiveness of different structures of mission headquarters and Field Offices, with a special emphasis on policing at PoC Sites.

As one of its key findings, the study recognises the mixed record of the UNMISS police in fulfilling the mission's PoC mandate. The police component played key roles in supporting the mission to prevent protection challenges from worsening in the face of recurrent crime, violence and conflicts.

Policing at PoC Sites has been a key mechanism of enabling shelter for over 200 000 civilians fleeing from physical attacks by providing them with protection

and ensuring their safety. Other contributions include monitoring and reporting human rights violations, and influencing and working more proactively in the prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). They also include providing technical and logistical support to the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) to play its statutory roles in protecting civilians in the country, especially since 2019.

The study observes that the mission's overall effectiveness has been undermined by critical constraints such as the complex and dynamic political and security environment, capacity limitations, and coordination challenges.

The monograph analyses the effectiveness of the UN Police in UNMISS following the three-tiered operational concept for PoC relating to: protection through engagement and dialogue; providing physical protection; and, creating a protective environment. Key criteria applied to assess effectiveness include capacity or ability to implement its protection mandate, inclusion of gender perspective, and the overall outcome or results within the framework of the three-tiered PoC approach.

Protection through engagement and dialogue

There was a dire need to protect civilians against threats and human rights abuses in South Sudan following the outbreak of civil war in late 2013. One mechanism to address the problems related to the PoC has been engagement and dialogue. This has happened particularly through information gathering and analysis, frequent engagements with the SSNPS and the local communities, and collaborating with other mission components to provide regular monitoring and reporting of human rights violations. The UN Police have also applied a gender-responsive approach of policing and established a special SGBV team to foster protection. This has helped prevent the worsening of key protection problems in the face of South Sudan's unresolved sources of insecurity. The UN Police's effectiveness has been constrained in this regard due to political and security dynamics emerging from ongoing security issues and capacity constraints to fulfil the mission's mandates, such as adequately supporting the SSNPS. These include human, financial, and logistical challenges.

Providing physical protection

The provision of physical protection is another key mechanism that has helped save hundreds of thousands of civilians' lives. Following the outbreak of civil war in late 2013, UNMISS established PoC Sites in seven locations within or close to the mission's bases and provided sanctuary to vulnerable civilians facing imminent threats of physical violence. The PoC Sites have sheltered as many as 200 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at times.

The UN Police were responsible for policing the PoC Sites in attempts to prevent, deter and respond to crimes and violence, for example. As part of providing physical protection and engagement, the UN Police made efforts to play a proactive role in deterring violent acts by armed criminal groups through gathering and analysing crime intelligence, community policing engagements, and regular cordon and search operations.

The UN Police used their comparative advantages, emanating from their legal jurisdiction in the PoC Sites and given their non-military character, to partner and engage with the IDPs and local law enforcement institutions, such as the SSNPS. The fairly good representation of female police officers was another comparative advantage of the UN Police in South Sudan in providing civilians with physical protection.

> There was a dire need to protect civilians against threats and human rights abuses in South Sudan following the outbreak of civil war in 2013

At the same time, the mission was criticised for failing to protect civilians from armed attacks, including at the PoC Sites between 2014 and 2016. This showed the limited effectiveness of the police due to capacity limitations, including not enough formed police units, and blurred distinction between civilians and combatants at the PoC Sites.

Creating a protective environment

The UN Police in South Sudan played essential but temporally variable roles in creating a protective environment for civilians. They increased high-visibility confidence- and trust-building patrols that better protect IDPs through a more secure environment, prevent crime, deter violence, and restore confidence. They expanded daily colocation at various police stations and posts, which included mentoring and advising SSNPS officers. They also demonstrated some level of effectiveness in building and developing the capacities of the SSNPS, including with respect to gender mainstreaming throughout the organisation. The SSNPS's structural and institutional limitations and the broader security environment affected the UN Police's efforts to create a protective environment for civilians.

Recommendations

Aiming to address some of the challenges and enhance the effectiveness of the UN Police in meeting their mandated PoC functions, the study offers recommendations to be considered by the UNSC, UN Police, UNMISS, and other concerned actors.

These include:

- Including security sector reform in the UN Police mandate;
- Establishing a mission-wide integrated information- and intelligence-gathering and analysis system;
- Improving coordination between the UN mission and external stakeholders and partners supporting the SSNPS;
- Increasing the ceiling for the UN Police officers in the mission;
- Improving organisational learning and building a repository of institutional memory; and
- Enhancing the training and capacity-building and development modality.

Acronyms

ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
AU	African Union
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network
EU	European Union
FPU	formed police unit
IDP	internally displaced persons
IPO	individual police officer
PoC	protection of civilians
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SSNPS	South Sudan National Police Service
SSR	security sector reform
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
UN	United Nations
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General

Chapter 1

Introduction

Protection of civilians (PoC) is a prioritised mandate of most contemporary multidimensional peace operations that include police, civilians and military components. Broadly defined as protecting civilians under threat of physical violence, PoC tasks and functions in peace operations have grown largely as a result of the nature of contemporary conflicts and crises. High civilian casualty rates and deliberate targeting of civilians mark most contemporary violent conflicts.[2]

Since the first deployment of police officers to the United Nations (UN) Operation in the Congo in the early 1960s, the police have become essential to UN efforts in maintaining international peace and security. As a function of governance responsible for preventing, detecting, and investigating crime, protecting civilian people and property, and maintaining public order and safety, policing in peace operations helps protect civilians, promote human rights, and advance the rule of law and justice.[3]

> Police roles in peace operations have evolved from mere observation of ceasefire agreements to complex mandated tasks

Since the early 2000s, the multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping operations gained prominence, and police units in peace missions significantly increased. This indicated the start of a greater recognition of the police's role.[4] Reflecting this trend, the UN Police have been part of more than 20 UN peace missions worldwide since the early 1990s, with a total strength of around 13 000 officers at their high point.[5]

Over recent decades, police roles in peace operations have evolved significantly, from mere observation of ceasefire agreements to more complex mandated tasks. Notably, since the 1990s, the roles have at times been expanded into executive policing[6] and transformed into complex PoC and capacity-building mandates.[7]

The changing role of the police has received attention at the apex of the UN, including the Security Council (UNSC). For instance in 1999, the UNSC recognised the important role of the UN Police in PoC in assuring the safety and wellbeing of

vulnerable people in conflict and post-conflict environments. It also acknowledged the need to enhance UN capacity for the rapid deployment of qualified and well-trained police officers to peace operations.[8]

In 2014, the UNSC further acknowledged the importance of policing to international peace by stressing its 'invaluable contribution to peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, security, the rule of law, and the creation of a basis for development.'[9]

Notwithstanding the evolving roles of the UN Police, research on their effectiveness in mandate implementation, particularly in PoC, is still limited. Various studies have been conducted on UN peace operations in general. The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) has published many analytical studies on the overall effectiveness of peace operations in mandate implementations in Africa.[10] Among others, EPON assessed the effectiveness of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), focusing on its overall authorised mandate between 2014 and 2018, and followed this up with a subsequent report in 2022.[11]

> UN Police demonstrated some level of effectiveness in the PoC, especially protecting against recurrent crime, violence and conflicts

Also, a few studies were conducted on the overall role of the UN Police in PoC and analysed the comparative advantage of the police over the other military and civilian components in a range of UN peace operations.[12] However, there is still a need for a study centred on the effectiveness of policing in PoC in South Sudan.

This study aims to contribute to debates around the role of policing in PoC by drawing lessons from UNMISS, a multidimensional peace operation where PoC has been the overarching priority. The study builds on previous investigations into the effectiveness of UNMISS. These studies identified key areas of the effectiveness of UNMISS, such as preventing genocide and protecting hundreds of thousands of civilian lives in the country.[13]

This study assesses the effectiveness of UNMISS police in the implementation of the PoC mandate since the creation of the mission in 2011, and particularly since 2014 when the PoC mandate was priortised. The analysis broadly focuses on the effectiveness of different structures of mission headquarters (HQ) and Field Offices, with a special emphasis on policing at PoC Sites. It also seeks to provide concrete recommendations on enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Police in protecting civilians in peace operations.

The study employed a qualitative research approach. Data was collected through a review of relevant literature and reports, and interviews. A research team travelled

to Juba, South Sudan, between 6 and 12 September 2022. The team collected data through key informant interviews and focus group discussions at HQ and Field Offices in Juba and through telephone interviews with officers in the Field Offices in Malakal, Wau and Bentiu. About 22 mission experts from UNMISS, the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), and internally displaced persons (IDPs) representatives were involved in the study.

For confidentiality reasons, all interviews are referenced anonymously. The study's analysis was based on aggregated data obtained through fieldwork in Juba, given the limitations to cover all the HQs and Field Offices. However, the overall analysis focused on the mission's performance on key indicators of the PoC mandates at the various levels.

Key findings of the study show that the UN Police demonstrated some level of effectiveness in the PoC, especially in maintaining protection in the face of recurrent crime, violence and conflicts. Some key mechanisms include policing of the PoC Sites, which have at times held over 200 000 civilians fleeing from physical attacks. They have also monitored and reported human rights violations, influenced and worked proactively to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and provided technical and logistical support to SSNPS to play its statutory roles in protecting civilians, especially since 2019. Given the massive scale of internal displacement across the country, UNMISS established PoC Sites in seven locations in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, Bor and Juba.[14]

However, the mission's overall effectiveness was undermined by critical constraints including the complex and dynamic political and security environment, capacity limitations, and coordination problems. In addition, the mission had to operate by maintaining an ambivalent relationship with the government.[15]

This report has seven chapters. The next chapter conceptualises the PoC mandate and police roles in implementing it, and defines effectiveness in peace operations. Chapter 3 assesses the conflict in South Sudan and the evolving mandate of UNMISS. Chapter 4 examines the overall roles and structure of the UN Police in UNMISS. Chapter 5 explores the UN Police's effectiveness in implementing its protection mandate. Drawing on this analysis, Chapter 6 presents the major cross-cutting challenges facing the UNMISS police in pursuing their protection obligations. The concluding chapter highlights the key lessons and recommendations that should be considered by practitioners and policymakers.

Chapter 2

Conceptualising the PoC and measuring effectiveness in peace operations

The PoC is a prioritised mandate of most contemporary UN peace operations.[16] By 2017, over 95% of UN peace operations were authorised with PoC mandates.[17] Features of contemporary conflicts, such as the blurred distinction between belligerents and civilians, growing civilian casualties, and the consequent impact on reconciliation, durable peace and development,[18] have combined to increase the demand for PoC tasks.

However, the concept of PoC is rooted in the customary practice of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. For example, the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949[19] and the 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions[20] protect civilians from any attack during international and non-international armed conflicts.

> Features of contemporary conflicts, such as the growing civilian casualties, have increased the demand for PoC tasks

The concept of PoC in peace operations particularly has evolved since 1999 when the UNSC issued its first resolution 1265 on the deliberate targeting of civilians during armed conflicts.[21] For the first time in history, the UNSC mandated the UN Mission in Sierra Leone to protect civilians in 1999 based on resolution 1270 (1999).[22] This was followed by resolution 1296, which reaffirmed the council's intention to ensure that peace operations were given suitable mandates and adequate resources to protect civilians under imminent threat.[23]

These resolutions were essentially rooted in the UNSC's duty to fulfil its responsibility for international peace and security, and took cognisance of the unique vulnerability

of civilians in conflicts. Following resolution 1296, the UNSC mandate formulations included language that explicitly authorised and directed peace operations 'to provide protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence' such as 'using all necessary means' and 'within the capacity of the mission.'[24] The precise wording has varied from mission to mission, however most mandates emphasise the primary responsibility of the host state to protect civilians on its territory.[25]

Within the UN peace operations context, PoC is understood as 'integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment through the use [of] all necessary means, up to and including deadly force.'[26] The 'civilians' in the UN's PoC concept are defined as 'everyone except persons falling to members of the armed forces, or members of an organised armed group with continuous combat functions, or civilians directly participating in the hostilities for such time as they do so.'[27]

The UN's peace operations implement their PoC mandate through a three-tiered approach that is integrated, mutually accommodating and reinforcing. The first tier focuses on protection through dialogue and engagement, the second on providing protection from physical violence, and the third on establishing a protective environment.[28] PoC has also featured in non-UN peace operations, including those deployed by the African Union (AU). However, while sharing some common features, the AU's PoC operational concept includes a fourth tier by adding a 'rights-based protection' approach.[29]

UN Police roles in PoC

As indicated above, the PoC mandate is a cross-cutting obligation for all components of a multidimensional mission – civilian, military and police. Particular to the police component, the Security Council in its first resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians recognised the important role of the police in assuring the safety and wellbeing of civilians in conflict and post-conflict environments.[30] Accordingly, the resolution acknowledged the need to enhance the capacity of the UN for the rapid deployment of qualified and well-trained police officers.[31] Since that time, PoC has evolved as one of the core functions and operational activities of the UN Police in peace operations.[32] This has been reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions 2185 (2014) and 2382 (2017) of the UNSC.

Research on the role of the UN Police in protecting civilians shows the comparative advantages of the police over other components. For instance, our previous work identified four comparative advantages of the UN Police in peace operations over their military and civilian counterparts.[33]

First, by virtue of its core duties and structure, the UN Police are well positioned to partner with national law enforcement agencies, local populations, and other mission

components to protect civilians. Second, the police are often better placed to play a proactive role in deterring violent acts by armed criminal groups and reducing civilian harm. Third, the UN Police can play enabling roles in facilitating the work of the military component and providing armed escorts to and collaborating with civilian components. Last, the UN Police are better placed to conduct robust operations to protect civilians when the violence does not involve the continued use of firearms or military weaponry.

Other studies have also demonstrated how the UN Police contribute to PoC at various stages of mission life cycles and across all three tiers of the operational concept discussed above.[34]

Measuring effectiveness

The UN and regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and AU employ peace operations as a tool for conflict management and peacebuilding. While the UN deployed 72 peace operations and special political missions, 13 regional organisations, including the EU and AU, conducted 65 similar peace missions in their respective regions between 1946 and 2016.[35] However measuring the effectiveness of these peace operations remains a key puzzle within the growing trend in the deployment of peace operations, sparking a new wave of research over recent decades.

Despite an emerging body of literature on the effectiveness of peace operations, including implementing the PoC mandate,[36] there is no consensus among researchers on the concepts of effectiveness or success when it comes to PoC.[37] The key question when measuring success or effectiveness in peace operations pertains to what to measure and how to measure it.[38]

Different researchers apply varied criteria to measure the success or effectiveness of peace operations. Some of the authors and their criteria are summarised in the following table.

Chart 1: Summary of criteria for measuring effectiveness

Authors	Criteria
Paul Diehl[39]	Two criteria: (1) The mission's capacity to limit armed conflict and prevent relapse and (2) the ability to foster peaceful settlement.
Robert Johansen[40]	The effects made in the quality of life of the local population, such as reducing the likelihood of violence.
Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman[41]	The full gamut of mission goals from conflict mitigation, containment, and settlement, to the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Authors	Criteria
Michael W Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis[42]	Supporting peace processes, including ending the violence and establishing peaceful and stable politics.
Virginia Fortna and Lise Howard[43]	Compliance of belligerents with ceasefire agreement.
Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon[44]	Reducing the level of battlefield violence between belligerents.
Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall[45]	The gender perspective of the mission and increased percentage of female military personnel on peace operations.
Vincenzo Bove and Andrea Ruggeri,[46] and Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon[47]	The peace operation's ability and results in protecting civilians or local populations from violence.

Considering the lack of consensus on the standard for assessing peace operations' effectiveness,[48] this study applies mixed criteria. This includes the UN Police's capacity or ability to implement their PoC mandate, outcome or result of the mission in implementing its PoC mandate, and inclusion of a gender perspective.

Chapter 3

South Sudan conflict and the evolving mandate of UNMISS

UNMISS was established in July 2011 with the objective of supporting South Sudan in state building following the country's secession from Sudan. The country emerged as an independent state after nearly 40 years of bloody armed conflict with Sudan.[49] A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was concluded between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in 2005, marking the end of the prolonged north-south conflict in Sudan. Following the signing of the agreement, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established to monitor and support its implementation.[50] Finally, based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, South Sudan decided to secede from Sudan by a popular referendum, in which more than 98% of the people voted for separation in 2011.[51]

Following the popular vote for secession and declaration of independence, UNMIS transformed to UNMISS with the primary mandate of capacity building to support long-term state building, strengthening the security and justice sectors of the new state.[52] However, in less than three years after independence, the country descended into a civil war between government forces and a faction of the ruling SPLA/M in December 2013.

With international pressure, the conflicting parties signed a peace agreement – the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) – in 2015, and the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018.[53] The agreements paved the way for a power-sharing agreement that led to the re-establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in 2018 to facilitate conditions to resolve the civil war in the country.

As part of the agreement, elections were scheduled for 2022, but the signatories of the R-ARCSS agreed to extend the transitional period of the TGoNU, including the election, for another two years until December 2024, with inadequate consultation with all concerned actors and supporters of the peace process.[54] The justification given for the extension relates to better preparation for the election.

Salva Kiir, the president of the TGoNU, said: 'We have decided to prepare the soil over the next 24 months to plant the seeds of South Sudan's elections ... upon which to build a government that can complete the war on poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.'[55]

PoC and the evolving mandate of UNMISS

UNMISS's mandate has evolved over its lifetime with three major inflection points. Its initial mandate adopted in 2011 was focused on three pillars: (i) support for peace consolidation, thereby fostering longer-term state building and economic development; (ii) support for the government in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and protecting civilians; and (iii) support for the government in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.[56]

During this time, the focus of the UN Police was on capacity building and development through reforming the SSNPS. The capacity of the UN Police was limited to individual police officers (IPOs) and specialised police teams, and with no formed police unit (FPU) representation.

> The current UNMISS mandate includes protecting civilians, supporting humanitarian assistance, implementing the peace agreement and reporting human rights violations

After civil war broke out in 2013, the UNSC modified the original mandate to realign the mission's tasks and capacity to the evolving situation.[57] In 2014, the UNSC provided UNMISS with a four-pronged mandate: (i) protection of civilians; (ii) monitoring and investigation of human rights violations; (iii) creating the conditions for delivering humanitarian assistance; and, (iv) supporting the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.[58]

This and the subsequent mandate renewals have strongly emphasised PoC, especially in addressing the immediate consequences of the war, which include atrocities against civilians, massive displacement, and severe humanitarian crises.[59] Despite the prioritisation of the PoC mandate, the UN Police were still limited in number during this time though they began receiving FPUs in addition to the existing IPOs and specialised police teams.

The third change in mandate came after the de-escalation of conflict and the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018. With the peace agreement in place, the mission's mandate was adjusted to address the most burning needs of the time and emerging imperatives. Therefore, UNMISS's mandate was designed to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent relapse into civil war, build durable peace, and

support the establishment of inclusive and accountable government through free, fair, and peaceful elections in accordance with the R-ARCSS.[60]

As part of this vision, the mission operates with a four-pillar mandate: protecting civilians, supporting humanitarian assistance, supporting the implementation of the R-ARCSS, and monitoring, investigating, and reporting human rights violations.[61]

To deliver on this mandate, UNMISS was authorised between 2019 and 2022 with troop and police ceilings of 17 000 and 2 101 respectively. It was also authorised to use all necessary means to ensure effective, timely, and dynamic protection of civilians under threat of physical violence through a comprehensive and integrated approach, irrespective of the source or location of such violence.[62]

In 2022, the signatories of the R-ARCSS agreed to extend the transition period including the postponement of the planned elections by two years. The extension in the transition period has affected the operating environment and the timeline of UNMISS's strategic vision. This fluid political and security context has affected the mission's ability to implement the current mandate, which was extended in March this year for a further 12 months.[63]

Chapter 4

Roles and structure of the UN Police in UNMISS

Implementation of the UNMISS mandate is a shared responsibility across its police, military and civilian components. Reflecting the changes to the mission's mandate, the roles of these different actors have evolved significantly over time. When the UNMISS was established, the police component was mainly tasked with building the capacity of the SSNPS through monitoring, advising and training with an authorised strength of 900 police advisers.[64]

The SSNPS was established in 2011 by Article 155 of the country's Transitional Constitution. The Constitution provides for establishing the SSNPS as a decentralised professional service with the mission to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain law and public order, protect the people and their properties, and uphold and enforce the interim Constitution and other laws of the country.[65]

> Following the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, the UN Police reoriented to focus its role and function on PoC

However, following the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, the UN Police reoriented to focus its role and function on PoC. Drawing from the overall four-pillar mission mandate, the UN Police, in collaboration with relevant mission components, undertook various key functions that contributed directly or indirectly to implementing the PoC mandate via the three-tier concept described in Chapter 2. These activities included community policing engagement, building the capacity of the SSNPS through mentoring, advising and training, prevention and response to SGBV, monitoring and reporting of human right violations, crowd management, and crime intelligence gathering and analysis.[66]

The UNMISS police component includes senior management team or police professional staff, IPOs including specialised police teams, and FPUs.[67] All these units contribute to the implementation of the mission's overall mandate, particularly

the PoC. A challenge is that the UN Police operate below the UNSC's authorised strength. As indicated in Chart 2, the UN Police in South Sudan have increased their strength since the civil war broke out. However, they operate on roughly 70% of its Security Council's authorised strength on average. As of 31 August 2022, while the authorised strength of the police component was 2 101 police officers,[68] the actual strength (69.6%) on the ground was 1 462.

Chart 2: Authorised and actual strength of UN Police in UNMISS

Type	1 October 2012[69]		24 September 2014[70]		24 June 2016[71]		1 September 2018[72]		31 August 2022[73]	
IPO				578		591		642		616
FPU				363		829		1 099		846
Total	900	522 (58%)	1 323	941 (71%)	2 001	1 475 (including 55 correction officers) (70.94%)	2 101	1 807 (including 66 correction officers) (82%)	2 101	1 493 (including 31 correction officers) (69.6%)

Source: Authors' compilation

Authorised Actual

This actual figure includes 454 (31%) female officers deployed at HQ and Field Offices across the country's 10 states. While the number of IPOs was 616 (including 39.3% female officers), the FPUs comprised 846 police officers (including 25.1% female officers). At the time of the field research, 47 nationalities from across the world were represented in the UN Police. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the police component's limited capacity adversely affects how it operates every day.

Since 2019, the UNMISS police component has been structured reflecting its roles and functions as indicated in Chart 3. The component is headed by a Police Commissioner (PC), who is also part of the Senior Mission Leadership, supported by a Deputy Police Commissioner (DPC) and a team of professional officers to oversee the operational and administrative functions of the UN Police.

There are four pillars in the police component. The first is Operations, which includes units responsible for police operations, crime analysis and intelligence and FPU coordination. The second is Capacity Building and Development, which has two units – Reform and Advisory, and Training and Support. The Reform and Advisory unit encompasses various specialised sub-units such as police expertise on SGBV; community policing; gender, child, and vulnerable people's protection; traffic and public safety; crime investigation; international cooperation; standard and accountability; and human rights. The Training unit also has specialised sub-units

for basic (foundational) police training, advanced police training and curriculum development. Likewise, the Support unit has expertise on project and donor coordination and logistics (see Chart 3).

The third pillar is Administration, led by the Police Chief of Staff. This pillar encompasses various police expertise such as planning and budgeting, human resource management, logistics, immigration and rotations, and conduct and discipline. The fourth pillar comprises the 10 Field Offices that operationalise the mandate of the police at the tactical level and report to the DPC and PC. While the first three pillars are based within the mission HQ in Juba, the Field Offices are located in the main towns of South Sudan's 10 states: Juba, Wau, Awiel, Kwajok, Bentiu, Rumbek, Malakal, Bor, Yambio, and Torit.

All the Field Offices have had IPO representation, but not necessarily FPUs, due to the limited capacities of the mission. During the first phase of the mandate (2011–13), the UN Police were operating with IPOs, with no FPU presence. The mission got its FPUs in the second phase of the mandate after 2014. Still, the mission never got sufficient FPUs per the mandate to cover all the PoC Sites, including using Forward Operating Bases.

At the time of the field visit to South Sudan, UNMISS had four FPUs from Rwanda, Ghana and Nepal. While two FPUs were based in Juba (Nepal 180 and Rwanda 160), around the mission HQ, one was in Bentiu (Ghana FPU 270) and the other in Malakal (Rwanda FPU 240). In 2018, two FPUs from Rwanda and Nepal were repatriated, assuming that the security situation in South Sudan had improved. However, some informants believed the decision to downsize FPU strength was ill-advised.[74] These dynamics coincided with what some experts consider a change in the mission's approach, from a reactive to a proactive response.

> The UN Police have increased their strength since the civil war but they still operate on roughly 70% of its Security Council's authorised strength

Following a change in leadership, there was an attempt to ensure the mission focused on getting the UN Police and military component out of PoC Sites into the communities and encouraging the IDPs to return to their communities. However, this approach wasn't popular; people mostly didn't feel safe outside the camps.[75]

The FPUs work with a coordination office at the mission headquarters, and three cells in the Juba, Malakal and Bentiu Field Offices. The three FPU cells are coordinated by IPOs who link the FPUs in the various Field Offices with the HQ's FPU coordination office in Juba. The FPU coordination and cells comprise different units, including Operation, Reporting and Logistics units.

Chart 3: UNMISS Police organogram



Source: UNMISS Police


Internal Evaluation Unit
(CU/3 IPOs)
Professional Standard Unit
(1 CU + 2)
PIO Office
(3 IPOs)
Operations Pillar
(1 P4 + 1 P3 + 4 IPOs)
Admin Officer
(1)
Police Operations Centre
(1 TL)
Crime Analysis and Intelligence Unit (1 TL +4)
FPU Coordination Unit
(1 P3 + 7)
Operation and Reporting Team
(1 TL +7)
Public Order Management/ SWAT (3)
Operation Planning Team
(3)
ECC and Database Support Team
(1 TL + 3)
LO to JMAC
(1)
LO to National JOC
(2)
LO to JOC
(3)
IOC
(3)
MOVCON Focal Point
(1)
COE Focal Point
(1)
Central Equatoria Field Office
JUBA
FPU (2)
Unity Field Office
BENTIU
FPU (1)
Upper Nile Field Office
MALAKAL
FPU (1)
Western Bahr el Ghazal Field Office
WAU
Jonglei Field Office
BOR
Northern Bahr el Ghazal Field Office
AWEIL
Warrap Field Office
KWAJOK
Western Equatoria Field Office
YAMBIO
Lakes Field Office
RUMBEK
Eastern Equatoria Field Office
TORIT

Chapter 5

UN Police: Approaches to protecting civilians in South Sudan

As previously mentioned, since 2013, PoC has been the priority mandate of UNMISS, implying it is also a key function of the police component. While this is the general expectation, a key question revolves around the effectiveness of the UN Police in UNMISS in implementing its PoC mandate and the efficacy of its approaches.

In principle, UN Police in peace operations with PoC mandates have both the authority and obligation to act independently to protect civilians from physical violence, irrespective of the source of the threat, including through using force.[76] According to the UN Guidelines on the role of the UN Police in PoC, the police component has a role in all of the three-tiered approaches. These are protection through engagement and dialogue, provision of physical protection, and creating a protective environment.[77]

As a component of the multidimensional peace operation, the effectiveness of the UN Police in UNMISS is herein analysed based on the criteria of capacity or ability to implement its protection mandate, inclusion of gender perspective, and the overall outcome or results within the framework of the three-tiered approaches of PoC.

Protection through engagement and dialogue

The UN Police in UNMISS have played essential roles in PoC through engagement and dialogue. According to the UN policy on PoC, protection through engagement and dialogue includes dialogue with perpetrators, and mediation between parties to a conflict and other conflict resolution activities. It also includes persuading government security institutions and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians or to refrain from committing violations, and reporting on human rights violations and protection concerns. Also, other initiatives that seek to protect civilians through communication, dialogue and direct or indirect engagement.[78]

The various approaches for fostering PoC include: communication, dialogue and engagement including gathering information and analysis of threats; preventing, pre-empting and responding to violence against civilians; monitoring and reporting on human rights violations; and supporting the implementation of peace agreements through various engagements.

Information gathering and analysis

The contribution of the UN Police in gathering information and analysing security threats is an essential part of mission PoC efforts. Some interviewees noted that the UN Police were one key source of essential information to UNMISS's senior leadership. Such information was critical in helping the leadership conduct evidence-based engagements in the political process and to influence South Sudan's political leaders in devising appropriate measures to protect civilians and help end the cycle of violence.

Given its comparative advantages in engaging with both local communities and security agencies, the UN Police played critical roles in gathering and sharing information in the existing coordination systems. These included the mission's joint operations centre and equivalents located in each of the Field Offices.

One major source of the UNMISS police's comparative advantage was its gender composition. At the time of the fieldwork, 31% of the UN Police in UNMISS were female officers – one of the highest proportions in the history of the UN Police in peace operations and even more so compared to military components.[79] Furthermore, the police component has been led by female police commissioners since 2016.

Informants stressed that the UN Police female officers were able to earn the trust and confidence of their counterparts in the SSNPS, and more easily engage with all parts of the community in information gathering and confidence-building activities. This could be one indicator of the effectiveness of the UN Police in having a more gender-aware approach in implementing its PoC mandate. Such an approach could help tackle cultural barriers and facilitate information flow among female community members and peacekeepers.

Engagements

The UN Police implemented its protection mandate through frequent engagements with the SSNPS and the community at large. The engagements also extended to creating a conducive environment for the peace process in the country through the implementation of the ARCSS and the R-ARCSS. The UN Police engaged in these critical areas at two levels: national police and the community.

Firstly, the engagement with SSNPS at strategic, operational and tactical levels provided technical assistance and advice about the implementation

of the provisions of the transitional security arrangements as provided in the R-ARCSS.[80]

The senior management team of the UN Police, which includes the Police Commissioner, DPC, and heads of the main pillars of the component, often engaged strategically with the SSNPS senior authority and advocated towards the state's primary responsibility to protect civilians. At the operational and tactical level, IPOs regularly engage with SSNPS middle- and lower-level officers and advise on initiatives to protect civilians and uphold human rights standards.

Secondly, the UN Police regularly engaged with various groups of the community through community policing initiatives to create awareness and build confidence on their own security and roles in the peace process. The IPOs deployed to the Field Offices often have access to local communities, serve as a broad mission presence, and engage with the community, particularly traditional leaders and groups of IDPs. They gather information daily that helps to prevent and respond to crimes and threats of violence. They also conduct outreach activities to build confidence with communities at risk.

> The contribution of the UN Police in gathering information and analysing security threats is an essential part of the mission PoC efforts

Admittedly, the above measures don't indicate causality, but some form of correlation in terms of definitive outcomes on the effectiveness of the mission in PoC. However, the effectiveness of such measures, which potentially contribute to more impactful engagement of the UN Police in protecting civilians through engagement and dialogue, have been undermined by various political and operational challenges.

For one, South Sudan's broader political dynamics and its violent episodes continue to undermine effective engagement between the UN Police and its local counterparts and the community at large. The SSNPS is a victim of the politics of policing in South Sudan.[81] The police service's genesis is tied with the major political groups such as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Government) and SPLM/A in Opposition (IO).

With the outbreak of the armed conflict in 2013, some officers were aligned with the different sides. While some were loyal to the government, others were affiliated to the opposition. Some segments of the security forces, including the SSNPS, have been dragged into the various stages of the political and security crisis. The political, ethnic, and other societal divisions within the political class were also mirrored in the SSNPS. Just as in the political establishment, two factions

emerged within the police services, namely SSNPS in Government and SSNPS in Opposition. Some interviewees indicated that these groups had been reluctant to work together as there was mistrust among them.

The fraught relations among these police officers, along with the logistical and capacity constraints, imply that the UN Police should engage and help them play their roles in the protection of civilians. As it was difficult to fully bridge the gaps among the SSNPS factions, in a violent and mistrustful political environment, the effectiveness of the UN Police in implementing the PoC mandate through engagement and dialogue has been difficult.

In addition, the UN Police at times faced the dilemma of whether they could or should work with the SSNPS (government or IO), given that some were complicit in the abuses that followed the 2013 civil war. This heightened the need to adhere to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy in all engagements with the SSNPS.

Another related constraint is the militarised nature of the SSNPS as an institution. Most SSNPS officers have military backgrounds, and they did not receive proper basic police training afterwards. The organisation is in fact in some ways subservient to the SPLA or South Sudan People's Defense Force (SSPDF), and mostly operates according to military command in effect. This challenge also affects the UN Police, who have to deal with this. Professional communication between the UN Police and SSNPS is often not easy, as they come from different disciplines of professional training and experiences.

Monitoring and reporting HR violations

One avenue for the UN Police to contribute to PoC through dialogue and engagement (tier one) is by monitoring and reporting human rights violations. Human rights bodies, including UNMISS, have documented and reported these violations. For example, the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan reported gross violations of human rights, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, during the conflict between December 2013 and April 2014.[82]

Violations included extrajudicial killings, SGBV, forced displacement, abducted children, violations of freedom of expression, ethnic-based discrimination, looting, pillage and destruction of property, torture, and targeting of humanitarian workers and property. The Commission noted UNMISS's reports on these serious violations of human rights that could amount to crimes against humanity.

Despite efforts by the mission and South Sudanese actors, human rights violations remain prevalent countrywide. In March 2022, the UNSC pointed to this persistent challenge, expressing its concern regarding the reports on the human rights situation.[83] The UNMISS Human Rights Division reported that in three months, between April and June 2022, 188 acts of violence were recorded

affecting 922 civilians. A total of 549 were killed, 183 injured, 69 abducted, and 121 subjected to conflict-related sexual violence.[84]

Compared with the previous three months, January to March 2022, the violence increased by 9%, and civilian victims by 22%.[85] This report indicates the gravity of the problem, and implies more measures should be carried out by the mission and other concerned stakeholders and partners.

The UN Police contributed to protecting civilians through monitoring and reporting human rights violations. The mission took measures to mitigate the violence and continue supporting local capacities to prevent and respond to the various abuses. As highlighted in the UN Secretary-General's report of September 2022, UNMISS 'conducted 123 capacity-building and awareness-raising activities for 4 423 persons, focusing on basic human rights principles, transitional justice mechanisms, and sexual and gender-based violence.'[86] As indicated by many informants, the UN Police worked closely with the UNMISS Human Rights Division to monitor, verify and report any abuse and violations daily.

Despite efforts by the mission and South Sudanese actors, human rights violations remain prevalent countrywide

One human rights officer noted that the UN Police had comparative advantages in monitoring violations of human rights as they worked with the SSNPS and other law enforcement agencies and had access to police stations and detention cells, which they could visit regularly.[87]

Second, to ensure respect and protection of human rights in the country, the UN Police in South Sudan provided technical assistance and advice to SSNPS and other law enforcement agencies in line with human rights principles and international humanitarian law.[88] The technical assistance included a sensitisation programme for SSNPS officers and community members, particularly IDPs, on prevention and response to SGBV and other conflict-related issues such as sexual violence, children and armed conflict, and other human rights violations and abuses.

With the support of Finland's government, in 2019, the UN Police established a specialised police team of experts as a project to foster gender-responsive policing and deal particularly with SGBV in South Sudan. At the time of the fieldwork, the special police team comprised 10 IPOs (six female and four male) from Finland and Kenya. This project was developed to support the special needs in addressing the prevalence and challenging SGBV issues in the country.

According to a December 2019 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report, '65% of women and girls in South Sudan have experienced physical and sexual violence in their lifetime.'[89] The UNSC in March 2022 also expressed concern at ongoing reports of SGBV in the country.[90] The objectives of this special project included enhancing the capacity of the SSNPS in the prevention and investigation of SGBV cases and contributing to efforts to reduce the adverse impacts of the country's patriarchally dominated socio-political system. The specialised police team was mainly engaged in outreach programmes (meeting people in IDP camps, local chiefs, and most-affected women) and conducting training of SSNPS officers on SGBV prevention and investigation.

Activities in the outreach programme included sensitisation and gathering information related to the mission mandate and particularly SGBV. The team was based at the mission headquarters in Juba. However, they sometimes visit the Field Offices in the 10 states and provide guidance related to prevention and response to SGBV to the police advisers in the Field Offices.

As some informants indicated, the project has brought some encouraging changes, such as improved engagements with the SSNPS and the community. However, the project has limited capacity and geographic scope and thus has struggled to realise the huge potential for contributing to the mission's protection mandate. With only 10 police officers, albeit with high levels of specialist expertise, it's difficult to cover all the special needs across the mission area. Strengthening this project by enhancing the capacity and expanding it to all the Field Offices would be helpful in the process of prevention and response to all kinds of SGBV throughout the country. To do so, the UN Police need more IPOs with specialised skills in dealing with SGBV.

Noting that the protection threats and human rights situation remain dire, the UN Police have been somewhat effective in protecting civilians through engagement and dialogue. Particularly through information gathering and analysis, frequent engagements with the SSNPS and the local communities, and collaborating with other mission components to provide regular monitoring and reporting of human rights violations. One key contribution in this regard is preventing the exacerbation of key protection challenges in the face of South Sudan's unresolved sources of insecurity.

Providing physical protection

The most notable contribution of UNMISS was arguably the practice of providing physical protection to civilians, including to women and children, under imminent security threats. According to the UN Guidelines on the role of police in PoC, providing physical protection to civilians includes 'the show or use of force to

prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence.'[91]

Following the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013, civilians bore the brunt of atrocities, including deaths, mass rapes, the destruction of towns, displacement and a severe humanitarian crisis.[92] UNMISS established PoC Sites in seven locations in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, Bor, and Juba to provide sanctuary to vulnerable civilians facing imminent threats of physical violence across the country.[93] Adam Day credits UNMISS for saving the lives of over 200 000 civilians, mostly women and children.[94] The mission provided shelter inside the mission's camps for those fleeing massive and widespread violence between 2013 and 2016 and offered immediate physical protections throughout.

Day further noted that 'without UNMISS there would have been a genocide in South Sudan, a sentiment that is also echoed by dozens of South Sudanese.'[95] As many informants mentioned, the armed groups were targeting civilians discriminately along ethnic lines. While those civilians who reached UNMISS camps were saved, many died on the way.

The establishment of the PoC Sites within or close to the mission's bases has been acknowledged as an innovation of the mission

The establishment of the PoC Sites within or close to the mission's bases has been acknowledged as an innovation of the mission.[96] Josias Marcos de Resende Silva said that 'even though this phenomenon occurred at one stage or another in most UN peace operations, the implementation of "PoC Sites" on such a large scale at the bases of UNMISS was an innovation in UN history.'[97] Informants echoed this sentiment, as such an experience was unprecedented in its scale in the history of UN peace operations.

The UN Police were responsible for policing the PoC Sites that also contributed to the prevention and deterrence of, and response to, crimes and violence. As a 2019 EPON study noted, the constant presence of UN Police at the PoC Sites had a deterrent effect in limiting criminality and mitigating other risks.[98] With all its limited experts and personal strength and capacity, the UN Police in South Sudan made some effort to play a proactive role in deterring violent acts by armed criminal groups through gathering and analysing crime intelligence, community policing engagements, and regular cordon and search operations.[99]

The activities to provide physical protection were primarily undertaken by the FPUs alongside the IPOs. As cohesive armed units, the FPUs carried out high-visibility

patrols both inside and outside the PoC Sites and IDP camps, and assessed security threats. They frisked and searched people entering the PoC Sites to prevent and respond to threats to civilians.

The IPOs supported the provision of physical protection by working closely with FPUs and partners such as human rights officers, PoC advisers and other mission entities. They helped identify areas and situations where physical protection measures should be undertaken by FPUs or the military. In collaboration with other stakeholders and partners, the FPU and IPOs created a safe environment for delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians at the PoC Sites. However, the low presence of human rights observers[100] to an extent limited such efforts to create a safe environment through policing the PoC Sites.

> Female police officers communicated better with vulnerable groups, building trust and increasing confidence among community members

In 2020, the government took primary responsibility to protect civilians at the PoC Sites, except in Malakal, where most sites were transitioned to conventional IDP camps. At the time of the fieldwork, 34 529 civilians inside the PoC Site in Malakal were still under the mission's physical protection. As the threats of physical violence to civilians, including killings, abductions, and sexual violence, grew, the mission continued providing physical protection to the civilians in the PoC Site and enhancing safety and security in the country.

The UN Police were not limited in their protection of civilians at the PoC Sites. As reflected in the UN Secretary-General's report of February 2021, the UN Police 'continued to expand [their] outward protection posture and footprint beyond the PoC Sites, focusing on deterring and mitigating violence against civilians and building confidence.'[101] Also the Secretary-General's report of September 2022[102] reflected the UN Police in South Sudan's increased protection for the IDPs through enhancing prevention of crimes and deterring violence.

According to some informants, the UN Police in UNMISS had comparative advantages over the other components in partnering and engaging with the IDPs and local law enforcement institutions such as the SSNPS. The fairly high representation of female police officers was another advantage of the UN Police in South Sudan. Research shows that female participation in peacekeeping operations increases acceptance by the host-country population as they perceive the mission as legitimate, trustworthy, and fair.[103]

This seems to hold true in the South Sudan case. The female police officers communicated better with the most vulnerable groups of the community, mainly

women and children, in the PoC Sites and IDP camps. This helped build trust and increase confidence among community members. They responded to and understood the special needs of women and children in the PoC Sites and of IDPs, including SGBV victims. Female UN Police officers more easily gathered valuable information to help with proactive measures to protect civilians from physical violence. Despite these efforts, SGBV cases remain prevalent[104] both inside and outside the PoC Sites and IDP camps, indicating the limited effectiveness of the UN Police and the mission in the broader sense.

Coordination with other components and partners was another pathway that enhanced the UN Police's effectiveness, especially the ability to partner with national law enforcement agencies and local populations. Informants further noted that the UN Police were in a better position to facilitate coordination with the civilian and military components of the mission. One factor pertains to the 'legal jurisdiction' of the police within the PoC Sites, as the police had key advantages that as 'civilians' (i.e. non-military) they could operate inside IDP camps without compromising the non-military character of the sites. Charles Hunt (2022) argues:

> With the PoC [Sites] (generally) on supposedly inviolable UN premises and [international humanitarian law] obligations to preserve civilian character of IDP camps, UN [Police] have become the pseudo-law enforcement agency inside the sites. As one UNMISS police officer put it, 'we are the main source of protection to the IDPs inside the sites'. IPOs backed up by armed FPUs independently maintain public security and address serious criminality inside these sites, including through detentions where necessary.[105]

In addition, policing, by its nature, requires close interaction with the community to fulfil its functions, almost on a daily basis. Some of the key aspects of policing are collaboration and coordination in community engagement, information gathering and crime intelligence analysis. It is in this context, unlike the military, that the police's presence, especially the IPOs, at the PoC Sites helps them be more informed and engaged in facilitating the coordination processes. The UN Police also coordinated with humanitarian actors and other relevant stakeholders to work towards a conducive environment for the safe return or relocation of IDPs.

Despite these contributions, the UN Police faced various challenges, both mission-wide and specific to the police component, in the process of providing physical protection to civilians. The first challenge related to distinguishing civilians from combatants among the population who sought protection. Hundreds of thousands of people fled to UNMISS camps seeking protection when the civil war erupted in 2013. The mission did not have the time or capacity to make this distinction. Only two simple rules were established for the identification of civilians: no uniforms and no weapons.[106]

Many fighters entered the camps by laying down their guns and changing clothes. This later drew criticism from the government accusing the mission of harbouring enemy fighters.[107] This experience offers lessons on proactively planning and developing guidelines and standards to help the UN Police manage similar situations in the future.

The second challenge related to the failure to fully protect civilians from armed attacks owing to capacity constraints. The mission was widely accused of gross failure in providing physical protection to civilians adequately against armed attacks throughout the country, including at PoC Sites, particularly during renewed fighting in 2016[108] that resulted in many civilian and peacekeeper deaths. Studies recognised the failure, but they associated it with the mission's lack of capacity.[109]

Despite its mandate to protect civilians countrywide, the capacity deficits caused the mission to limit its scope to only those at the PoC Sites

Some reports accuse the UN Police of not doing enough during attacks at the PoC Sites when armed actors overran the camps in Juba, Bor and Malakal.[110] At the same time, the UN Guidelines on the role of the UN Police in protecting civilians indicate 'the primacy of FPUs over the military component in providing a response in situations where there is no sustained and large-scale use of firearms or military weaponry.'[111] In this case, the UN Police were overpowered by the large-scale attacks on those PoC Sites.

Despite its mandate to protect civilians countrywide, the capacity deficits also caused the mission to limit its scope only to those at the PoC Sites.[112] The incapacity particularly applies to the FPUs, who were tasked with the inner perimeter and access control of the PoC Sites.[113] Previously, the UN Police had six FPUs; this number was reduced to four in 2020.[114] The 2020 report of the independent strategic review of UNMISS highlighted this problem. It said 'the gradual reduction in the strength of the FPU should not occur before UNMISS has had sufficient time to observe the situation and has a high level of confidence in the capacity and will of the SSNPS to provide policing services in the redesignated areas.'[115]

The capability shortfall of the FPUs was not only in size, but also at times in the quality of the units. The September 2022 UN Secretary-General's report that includes a performance assessment of uniformed components indicates the variable quality of the FPUs.[116] The report states that despite the performance of the FPUs being satisfactory, 'the units had shortfalls in contingent-owned equipment, training and administration (documentation) and were put on a performance improvement plan.'[117]

Creating a protective environment

The UN Police in UNMISS have played essential roles in creating a protective environment for civilians. Creating a protective environment as another approach to PoC includes activities undertaken by the UN Police to create a conducive environment for civilians' safety and security, building good governance, adherence to the rule of law, and building the capacity of state authorities to promote, respect and protect human rights.[118]

The role of the UN Police in establishing a protective environment in South Sudan mainly focuses on building the capacity of the national and local police and other law enforcement services to protect civilians. This includes reform and structuring, vetting, training, mentoring and advising, establishing and enhancing oversight and accountability systems, and mainstreaming gender as a means of promoting equality.

In this context, the UN Police in South Sudan played essential but temporally variable roles in creating a protective environment for civilians. During the initial phase of the mission (2011-13), the UN police focused on building capacities for creating a protective environment, though there was no FPU presence during this period. During the second phase following the outbreak of civil war (2014–18), the mission had a broader focus on protecting civilians, with a particular emphasis on physical protection, but with limited engagement on capacity building. Following the signing of the R-ARCSS and re-establishment of the TGoNU mission, it re-engaged through technical assistance and advice and then more direct capacity-building support.

As reflected in the UN Secretary-General's Report of September 2022,[119] the UN Police increased high-visibility confidence and trust-building patrols that strengthen the protection of IDPs through more secure environments, prevent crime, deter violence, and restore confidence. The report further highlights that the UN Police expanded daily colocation at various police stations and posts, which includes mentoring and advising the SSNPS officers. As will be discussed below, various interviews and mission reports indicate that the UN Police demonstrated some level of effectiveness in building and developing capacities of and mainstreaming gender in South Sudan.

Capacity building and development

The UN Police implemented projects around five pillars of capacity building in coordination with other UN agencies and international donors. First, the UN Police provided technical assistance and advice to the SSNPS through workshops and training to build their capacities in professional policing. The courses include human rights, protection of civilians, SGBV, and community policing. For instance,

as indicated in Chart 4, the UN Police trained many SSNPS and other law enforcement agencies.

The second and third projects focused on restoring and maintaining peace in the country and protection of human rights and preventing SGBV respectively. As a senior mission leader highlighted, one of the mission's priorities was influencing and working more proactively to prevent and respond to SGBV. The UN Police thus contributed to enhancing awareness and capacities of the SSNPS to respect and protect human rights as well as prevent and respond to SGBV in the country through mentoring, advising, and training.

Confidence and trust-building initiatives established a level of trust and partnership between the SSNPS and the community

Using its SGBV specialised police team, the UN Police trained SSNPS trainers on preventing and responding to SGBV cases. These courses contributed to creating a pool of SSNPS trainers who delivered the training to their officers. In addition, the UN Police engaged with the community to create awareness on the consequences of human rights violations and SGBV to the individual victim, the community, and the peace process in general.

The fourth project focus area was confidence and trust building. Through these initiatives, the UN Police established some level of trust and partnership between the SSNPS and the community. The UN Police signed an agreement with the SSNPS on operational coordination that advances coordinated patrols, joint security coordination and enhanced colocation arrangements. The UN Police also bridged gaps between the community and SSNPS through community policing initiatives, such as establishing a Police Community Relations Committee (PCRC). For example, during the fieldwork, 163 PCRCs were established across the country. As some informants said, these PCRCs helped prevent and investigate crimes and promote community cohesiveness.

The fifth focus area was creating community awareness and building capacity of the SSNPS on PoC. The UN Police undertook various initiatives targeted at IDPs and other community members to sensitise them on PoC. Also, the UN Police supported the SSNPS on developing strategic guidance, including developing standard operating procedures on community policing, prevention and response to SGBV and detection and arrest procedures. They also helped develop a five-year Strategic Plan for the SSNPS and contributed to their Action Plan on preventing and responding to SGBV and conflict-related sexual violence.

By supporting these critical areas to the community, SSNPS and other law enforcement agencies, the UN Police contributed significantly to efforts to create a more conducive environment, particularly for PoC. For example, as indicated in Chart 4, between 2021 and 2022, the UN Police trained 20 289, including 10 900 female, SSNPS and community members in human rights, SGBV, PoC, confidence and trust building, and other policing-related issues.

To undertake these trainings, the UN Police operated with an over $1.5 million budget for the year July 2021 to June 2022 to implement initiatives related to the five thematic areas. However, questions were raised regarding the cost-effectiveness of these training courses, which were conducted in hotels. They were expensive and not necessarily suitable venues for effective police training. Furthermore, the general impact of the training courses is unknown, as systemic impact evaluation practices were not put in place.[120]

Chart 4: Funded project activities from July 2021 to June 2022 (organised for SSNPS/law enforcement agencies/PCRC and schoolchildren

S/N	Project line/ focus areas	Target	No. of activities	No. of participants		Total partici-pants
				Male	Female	
1	Technical assistance and advice	4 000 persons	227	5 178	4 919	10 097
2	Confidence and trust building	70 activities	82	2 827	2 632	5 459
3	Sexual and gender-based violence	20 activities	28	1 030	1 203	2 233
4	Protection of civilians	1 000 persons	31	836	1 346	2 182
5	Human rights	20 activities	36	1 138	800	318
	Total		**404**	**10 959**	**10 900**	**20 289**

Source: Authors' compilation from UNMISS internal reports

Moreover, the UN Police provided support to the SSNPS in buttressing their limited organisational capacity, including to meet some basic demands. These included providing patrol police cars and motorbikes to all the states, as well as constructing police stations and police posts. The UN Police supported the SSNPS's institutional capacity using quick impact projects with a limited budget of $50 000 maximum

per project. They facilitated the construction of police stations and police posts for the SSNPS to enhance police service delivery and PoC.[121]

Mainstreaming gender

The UN Police contributed to creating protective environments by supporting the SSNPS in mainstreaming gender and promoting gender parity in the police service. Such engagements were targeted at addressing gender disparities, which also extends to the SSNPS due to entrenched social and cultural norms such as the patriarchal culture. The UN Police supported efforts to enhance the number of women in the SSNPS, which was estimated at roughly 6 000 before the eruption of the civil war, making up about 10.7% of the 56 000 police officers.

Despite these efforts, problems remain. For example those recruited female police officers are not fully enjoying their freedom of employment. Some informants said female SSNPS officers' husbands still had a legitimate right to take their salaries without their consent.

The UNMISS police set a target to achieve a 35%-women ratio in the SSNPS. To achieve this, they supported the SSNPS in developing gender-sensitive policies by including a gender-responsive approach in all strategic and operational guiding documents. Also, the UN Police supported the SSNPS in establishing the Women's Network in the organisation, with the aim of creating a unified voice of the few female officers to promote gender equality.

> The Women's Network helped female police officers to channel their voices in the police organisation and beyond in the country

The network helped the female police officers to channel their voices in the police organisation and beyond in the country. It also helped empower the female police officers in the SSNPS.

The UN Police supported the establishment of SSNPS male gender champions. They nominated and trained 12 male gender champions who also mentored their female partners to promote gender equality. These gender champions also helped in the process of nomination, screening and selection of SSNPS officers for capacity building and gender-related courses.

Despite these efforts towards creating a protective environment, the UN Police in South Sudan faced a range of challenges that limited the effectiveness of this aspect of promoting PoC. First, a lack of transparency and accountability of its counterpart, the SSNPS, affected the UN Police's effectiveness in planning and executing its protection mandate. For example, the actual strength of the SSNPS

remained unknown to the UN Police. In the absence of such critical information, it's difficult for the UN Police to plan and support the organisation in capacity building objectively.

Second, the organisation also lacked a retirement and succession plan, including a clear age limit for service. This meant that officers who were not fit for the police services due to age factors continued to serve in the SSNPS. This affected the effectiveness of the UN Police in building the capacity of the SSNPS by engaging young officers who could easily embrace new knowledge, skills and attitudes for the country's police service.

More fundamentally though, the UN Police's effectiveness in creating a protective environment and fulfilling its overall PoC mandate relies on its relationship with SSNPS and political actors such as the government. For example, such engagements are adversely affected when the UN Police's relationship with the SSNPS is strained, and when the mission needs to have a more hands-off approach (including when applying the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy with the SSNPS).

Chapter 6

Major cross-cutting challenges

UNMISS is among the UN's most challenging contemporary peace operations.[122] The UN Police component thus shares many of these burdens. In addition to the problems highlighted above, there are some major cross-cutting challenges related to the UN Police. These include: the implications of a dynamic political and security environment; mismatch between its PoC mandate and institutional capacity regarding local expectations; lack of integrated mission coordination system; and disruption in the continuity of keeping institutional memory. These specific challenges directly or indirectly limit the effectiveness of the UN Police in implementing its protection mandate and are discussed further in the following sections.

Implications of a dynamic political and security environment

South Sudan has been embroiled in a protracted civil war that followed the long struggle for independence from Sudan. The civil war in 2013 interrupted the initial capacity-building mandate of UNMISS, including security sector reform (SSR). When the conflict affected the country's political and security environment, the mission's mandate shifted to prioritise and focus on PoC. Although the ARCSS and R-ARCSS were signed and the TGoNU was established, implementation of the peace agreements has been slow, and has at times stalled. Among other illustrations of this, elections scheduled for 2022 have been deferred to 2024.

The stagnation of the political process has affected the country's law enforcement, security and justice environment. The ongoing political and security uncertainties have significantly shaped the SSNPS's organisational culture and practices. The divergent political interests of the SPLM/A in Government and SPLM/A-IO have clear and direct implications for the other parts of the security apparatus that have historical ties to both groups. The security agencies, including the SSNPS, have been dragged into various stages of political and security violence. This adversely affects the effectiveness of the UN Police as the SSNPS is its critical counterpart in protecting civilians.

Mismatch between mandate, capacities and expectations

UNMISS and therefore the UN Police have been operating with a clear gap between their authorised mandate and the host nation's expectation on the one hand, and

the capacity to deliver on the other. The mission has struggled with lingering limitations regarding the availability of adequate police resources, notably the FPUs, finance, and logistics. This mismatch has affected the UN Police's fulfilling of its PoC mandate, and applying a more robust approach and meeting the basic demands of the SSNPS.

The first challenge relates to the limited number of UN Police officers. Despite demands on the representation of all IPO and FPU units in all parts of South Sudan, the UN Police operated with limited capacity of personnel, especially FPUs, to cover the vast territory of the mission area. South Sudan has 10 states, and UNMISS has a Field Office in each. While the UN Police have some presence in all the Field Offices through its IPOs, it has only had FPU presence in three Field Offices. As mentioned, the mission has only four FPUs, with a total actual strength of 848, less than the mandated strength of 1 280, from Ghana, Nepal and Rwanda, and deployed only around the PoC Sites in Juba, Malakal and Bentiu.

The mismatch between mandate and capacity speaks to the need to manage the perception and expectation of local counterparts and the community

When most PoC Sites, except one, were transformed into IDP camps, the strength of the FPUs was downsized. In addition to its limited capacity of FPU personnel, the downsize affected UN Police capacity in UNMISS, both with crowd management and with providing physical protection to civilians from low-scale violence in all areas of South Sudan beyond PoC Sites and IDP camps.[123] Furthermore, the FPUs' limited capacity affected the operational effectiveness of the IPOs in all 10 Field Offices, as the latter could not call on FPU protection at all times while engaging with the SSNPS and the community regularly.[124]

The second challenge is the mismatch between mandate and capacity, which speaks to the need to manage the perception and expectation of local counterparts and the community. While the UN Police have limited financial and logistical capacity for providing technical support to the SSNPS and other law enforcement agencies, the latter have held expectations that proved difficult for the UN Police to meet. A perception exists that the UN Police have the capacity to cover most, if not all, the financial and logistical requirements of the SSNPS.

Some informants felt the mission was perceived as South Sudan's alternative government, and it faced demands for full coverage of the logistical and financial requirements for the national police. As the UN Police did not have the mandate or capacity to meet all the technical, financial and logistical needs of the SSNPS,

the mismatch between the expectation and capacity and mandate of the mission directly or indirectly affected the UN Police's operational effectiveness.

Lack of integrated coordination system

Effective mandate implementation in peace operations rests on the level of coordination among the mission's components and the various stakeholders and partners. In peace operations with a major PoC mandate like UNMISS, coordination among the military, police, and civilian components, between the mission and UN agencies, and between the UN system and other protection actors, has increased impact in the field.[125] Coordination is noted to be critical to fostering collaborative planning and response at all these levels, leveraging various types of knowledge, resources, and actions in a comprehensive and integrated manner to better prevent security threats to civilians.[126]

Like many other peace operations, the UN Police in UNMISS have lacked coordination among the different components.[127] Internally, there was little coordination with the other mission components, especially at the Field Offices, resulting in working at cross-purposes. One informant said: 'There are times when the UN Police go to the left, the military go to the right.'

This problem partly arises due to misunderstanding the specific roles each component plays. As an informant noted, some of the mission's personnel, including at the leadership level, lack understanding of the specific mandate and role of the UN Police component. They sometimes made demands or asked questions that were not in line with the mandate. For example, some mission leaders from the other components asked the UN Police to 'investigate SGBV cases reported in the mission area.' But the UN Police in UNMISS have never been given an executive mandate to investigate crimes, including SGBV.

The coordination issue extends to external stakeholders and partners. The UN Police work with the SSNPS on specific projects, such as SGBV. Many international organisations and UN agencies, such as UNICEF and the UN Development Programme, also work on this thematic area, targeting the SSNPS as a beneficiary.

These stakeholders and partners have different policies and practices when conducting capacity-building training with the SSNPS, and these differences at times create a seemingly competing environment among themselves. For example, their policies and practices regarding allowance payments to SSNPS participants in training frequently created challenges. The UN Police did not pay allowances, while others did. This developed a perception in the eyes of the SSNPS that partners who paid allowances were more helpful than the UN Police.

There was little effort among stakeholders and partners to reduce such negative effects arising from the limited synergy of standard operating procedures and policies and partners' approaches in engaging with the SSNPS and wider

community. Part of the problem was the lack of donor coordination capabilities in the UN Police component.

The mission also lacked integrated and coordinated intelligence analysis and usage. Intelligence is key for effective mandate implementation, including PoC and the roles of the UN Police in that. As the organogram shows, the UNMISS generally did not have an integrated intelligence gathering and analysis system, despite the presence of separate intelligence units under the military and police components. Similar to the military's Intelligence Team at mission HQ, the police have a Crime Analysis and Intelligence Unit under its Operations pillar.

These units should have been structured in an integrated way from mission HQ down to Field Offices. The absence of such a dedicated integrated Intelligence Unit at HQ and the Field Offices has affected the coordinated approach to intelligence gathering, analysis, sharing, and usage.

> With no proper handover, new officers have difficulty establishing networks with key interlocutors and building on previous initiatives

Also, there were challenges related to integrated planning and operations at the mission HQ in Juba. This limitation affected the mission's joint operational planning, meaning the mission's responses were based on a reactive operational plan rather than intelligence-based proactive efforts. An intelligence officer mentioned in an interview that the senior mission leaders, including the Police Commissioner, received a lot of information in the form of daily reports from the Field Offices, but much of it was irrelevant. Such information would be of limited value for an informed decision-making process, unless it is well analysed. This highlights the need to improve the integration of the system of intelligence gathering, analysis, sharing and execution.

There are attempts at mission HQ to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis capacity. The military intelligence team organised in-mission training on information analysis for 16 people, including two police advisers, in 2022. After the training, some relational improvements were seen between the military intelligence team and the police crime analysis and intelligence unit.

Continuity interruption in sustaining institutional memory

Sustaining institutional memory was a challenge for the UN Police in UNMISS. The absence of proper handover was noted as one issue, especially when police advisers were leaving the mission. Informants mentioned that there had not been a policy and practice in place for proper handovers for officers ending

their tour of duties. Institutional memory depends on individual efforts through handover reports.

In 2015, there were initiatives to develop standard operating procedures to guide the handover process via an electronic archive system, share point document system, and assignment of the best practice officer in the PC office. This has not been fully realised. Also, the initiatives are not enough for keeping proper institutional memory, as some documents are confidential and cannot be shared in an electronic archive.

A major cause of this problem is the often-delayed recruitment process in the UN system for replacing police officers finishing their tour of duty, and the reality that police contributing countries rarely allow UN Police officers to remain in the mission until proper handover. For a professional level position, the recruitment process, handled by UN HQ in New York, takes months to complete.[128] By the time the recruitment is done and the replacement is deployed, the departing officer has usually left the post. With no proper handover, it proves difficult for new officers to establish their networks with key interlocutors and develop plans building on previous initiatives. More systematic handover could help maintain the institutional memory of the UN Police as it minimises the risk of starting from scratch.

Chapter 7

Conclusion and recommendations

Despite many limitations, since 2011 the UN Police in South Sudan have played a key role, with some level of effectiveness, in saving the lives of over 200 000 civilians. In line with the overall mission mandate, they have provided physical protection, facilitated humanitarian delivery, monitored and reported on human rights violations, and supported the political process.[129] This study finds that the UN Police have a mixed record of effectiveness and limitations in protecting civilians through dialogue and engagement, creating protective environments, and providing physical protection.

The UNMISS experience of distinguishing between civilians and combatants while screening and providing physical protection offers lessons on how to proactively plan and develop guidelines and standards to help the UN Police manage future situations. The study also has highlighted UNMISS police's contribution in gathering, analysing and sharing information; engaging with counterparts in national police agencies and different community actors; and monitoring and reporting on human rights violations.

> The UN Police in South Sudan have a mixed record of effectiveness and limitations in protecting civilians

UN officers policed the PoC Sites regularly. Working with the military component, they provided physical protection to civilians against threats of crime and violence. In more recent years, they have helped build the capacities of the SSNPS and the community. They have done this through providing technical assistance and advice, resolving and maintaining peace, building confidence and trust between the SSNPS and community, and helping mainstream gender in the SSNPS to redress gender imparity in the organisation and beyond.

At the same time, the study observed various factors that constrain the effectiveness of the police component, particularly regarding the fulfilment of the mission's PoC

mandate. Major challenges include the political and security dynamics that have stymied the peace process, a mismatch between the mandate and capacities to deliver on it, a lack of integration and coordination across the system, and deficits in organisational learning and institutional memory.

To address these challenges and enhance the effectiveness of the UN Police in meeting its PoC obligations, the UNSC, UN Police, UNMISS and other actors should consider the following recommendations.

Include SSR in the UNMISS mandate

South Sudan needs SSR, but UNMISS does not have the mandate to support this process. PoC could be better sustained through a protective environment that results when local security law enforcement, rule of law and justice institutions are effective. Only an overarching and coherent SSR process can achieve this.

The political and security dynamics in South Sudan did not allow for progress on SSR between 2013 and 2018. However, since the signing of the R-ARCSS, and establishment of the TGoNU, there is an opportunity to support more meaningful SSR. In parallel with the PoC mandate, and building on existing directives to assist in rule of law capacity-building, the mission could be tasked to coordinate and support more comprehensive security system reform initiatives.

Among other benefits, an effective SSR process would help tackle setbacks related to the policy gaps, transparency and accountability issues within the SSNPS mentioned in this study. While getting tangible buy-in from the host government for truly transformational SSR will remain a challenge, the UNSC should consider including more provisions for joint SSR in the March 2024 mandate renewal. This could offer the pathways for the UN Police to better support the SSNPS as part of wider criminal justice sector reform and a security sector that prioritises civilian protection and human rights as its core responsibility.

Establish an integrated information- and intelligence-gathering and analysis system

Integrated information or intelligence gathering and analysis is essential for PoC, especially in proactively identifying sources of threats and risks, and sharing information to trigger prevention and timely responses. The UN Police should be supported with sound understanding and knowledge of the problems on the ground, backed by effective information/intelligence analysis. Taking careful steps to adhere to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, this could be the basis for the mission's all-round support to the SSNPS and other law enforcement institutions in the country.

The findings presented above underscore the need to establish a mission-wide integrated structure for intelligence/information gathering, analysis and use. In the

case of the UN Police, it's essential to enhance the awareness and capacity of its crime analysis and intelligence unit situated at mission HQ by further defining its role and outcomes. This unit should also have derivative structures in each of the Field Offices.

In addition to structural and capacity improvements, the UN Police component could engage in more collective training with colleagues in the military component to use its experience to guide the structure, skill and use of information or intelligence. The military bases its operations on its *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook*, which structures and defines roles, responsibilities and outcomes. Developing such a guide for police components could further assist the UN Police in implementing PoC and other core mandated tasks. The UN Police Division should, therefore, develop an 'information analysis handbook for UN Police in peace operations' for distribution to all police components of peace operations – especially those with a PoC mandate.

Improve coordination between UN and external stakeholders and partners supporting SSNPS

Meeting PoC demands by creating a long-term protective environment in South Sudan requires concerted efforts from SSNPS partners. The lack of effective coordination, including on intelligence gathering and joint capacity-building efforts, has contributed at times to overlapping and misaligned interventions and a competitive rather than collaborative environment for police reform assistance. This has ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the mission's PoC mandate implementation.

Consequently, there is a need for the UNMISS police to improve coordination with stakeholders and partners. This applies both within the UN family of agencies, funds and programmes, and outside interfacing with bilateral donors and development actors who provide training and capacity-building support to the SSNPS.

Sound strategy and sustained engagement is key and could be driven by the senior leadership of the police component. A dedicated team for partner coordination could be created within the office of the police commissioner as a mechanism for more intentional and effective stakeholder and partner coordination.

Increase ceiling for UN Police officers in UNMISS

UNMISS police need more human resources. Increasing the number of officers, including FPUs and specialised police teams, is essential for enhanced engagement with the SSNPS. As part of supporting the implementation of the R-ARCSS and creating sustainable peace, the mission is expected to enhance its efforts in capacity building and development through initiatives of a broader SSR programme. This requires specialised police expertise on SSR, community policing and PoC.

As discussed, the specialised police team on SGBV offers excellent lessons in PoC. Strengthening the SGBV project by enhancing the capacity and expanding it to all Field Offices would be helpful in preventing and responding to all kinds of SGBV. For this, the UN Police would need more IPOs with specialised skills in dealing with SGBV.

There have not been enough FPUs to adequately cover parts of the mission area that need the PoC effects that the UN Police can achieve. Increasing the number of FPUs to cover the Field Offices and Forward Operating Bases would address current limitations. It would facilitate the IPOs' work by providing them with security to effectively engage with the community and SSNPS. This would allow the effective deployment and functioning of IPOs in all of South Sudan's states to support SSNPS capacities, community policing and confidence building.

Increasing the number of FPUs in the coming year is especially critical considering the upcoming national election in 2024. Supporting host states in organising national and local elections is a recurring responsibility of peace operations and the UN Police are often tasked with helping state police and other law enforcement agencies provide pre- and post-election security. UNMISS will support the upcoming election process, highlighting the need to have more FPUs, especially in the area of election security, which has implications for PoC.

Improve organisational learning and build a repository of institutional memory

As with most missions, the UN Police in South Sudan have a high turnover of officers, as the Tour of Duty is generally limited to a year, with some possibility for extension to a few years. Current gaps in an effective handover system should be addressed to allow for a more systematic and efficient transfer of experiences and initiatives from the outgoing to the incoming police officers. This is especially true for key positions filled by the professional police staff and senior management level.

A handover report guided by a template that includes completed and ongoing projects and activities, planned activities and new initiatives, expectations, and contact details of SSNPS counterparts and relevant stakeholders and partners, should be instituted. These reports should be stored and accumulated into a repository of institutional knowledge that can be referred to in future.

Enhance training, capacity building and development modalities

To support South Sudan's peace process and protect civilians through creating a protective environment, the UN Police have provided training to create awareness on policing matters and build the capacity of the SSNPS to deliver policing services. However, the effectiveness of these training and capacity-building initiatives has been varied, and certain crucial issues should be addressed. There is a need

for a clearer training strategy for the SSNPS that is informed or is part of a more comprehensive/coherent SSR strategy.

First, the training of South Sudanese police officers takes place in a broader institutional context that critically needs an effective SSR process. The training process has been unfolding at an inconsistent pace with no clear strategic implications for the professional policing function of the SSNPS and the support it gets from the UN Police. A clear training strategy is required that is informed by a sound analysis of the political and security dynamics and its implications for the full professional policing functioning of the SSNPS.

UNMISS police should introduce a post-course evaluation system to assess the outcomes of the training and the impact on policing culture and behaviours

Second, the impacts of training and other capacity-development initiatives are generally unknown as there have been few or no impact assessment practices. UNMISS police should introduce a post-course evaluation system to assess the outcomes of the training. Ideally, this would be connected to a follow-up evaluation of the subsequent impact on policing culture and behaviours.

Third, UNMISS police leadership should reconsider the venue for hosting police training courses in order to avoid, where possible, hotels. These were seen as unsuitable for police training designed to increase policing knowledge, skills and attitudes. Instead of conducting training in the form of workshops in a hotel environment, the UN Police should conduct all formal police training at the SSNPS's training facilities and use savings and perhaps other quick-impact project funding to invest in properly equipping the training centres. In addition to improving the training experience of police officers, this is more sustainable, as it strengthens the capacity of the SSNPS's centres for future training.

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About this monograph

Policing, as a governance service, is part of a multidimensional peace operation deployed to respond to conflict and other crises. It helps prevent conflict relapses, build sustainable peace, ensure the rule of law and justice, protect and promote human rights, and protect civilians. In various reports and resolutions, the United Nations (UN) recognises the invaluable role of the police in international peace interventions. This monograph analyses the effectiveness of policing in protecting civilians in the case of the UN Mission in South Sudan. It sets out lessons and prospects for enhancing the effectiveness of policing in peace operations in protecting civilians.

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