



Africa in a time of global crisis: Some trends

Morten Bøås, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, Jon Harald Sande Lie og Kari Osland

Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2023
ISSN: 1894-650X



Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the publisher.

Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d
Address: PO box 7024 St. Olavs Plass
0130 Oslo, Norge
Internet: www.nupi.no
E-mail: post@nupi.no
Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50
Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00

Contents

1. Introduction	4
2. The Global Backdrop	5
Economic stagnation	5
Great power rivalries	5
Climate crisis	6
3. Peace, conflict and security	7
Armed conflicts	7
Jihadism and violent extremism	8
Sahel - a failure of international engagement?	8
Women, peace and security	9
The UN's last major peace - keeping operations?	10
Regional implications	10
Maritime security	10
4. Living conditions and economic development	11
Economic development	11
Great power rivalries in Africa	12
Population growth, employment and urbanisation	13
Agriculture and food security	14
5. Climate and energy	15
Energy	15
Climate	16
6. Democracy, governance and multilateral cooperation	17
Democracy and governance	17
Regional and multilateral cooperation	19
7. Concluding remarks	21
References	22

1. Introduction

Africa is facing major challenges. Poverty is increasing again after many years of decline, and many countries are experiencing an economic crisis as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including rising inflation. Several countries are indirectly affected by Russia's war in Ukraine, which has led to high energy prices and reduced access to grain and fertiliser. Several countries and regions are also marked by terrorism and violent conflicts, and climate change is creating increased risks of floods, droughts and heatwaves.

Parallel to this, the role of the great powers in Africa is changing rapidly. After a period of strong European and American dominance, other great powers, such as China and Russia, have stepped up their activities in Africa. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, trade and development aid, while Russia has gained an important role in a number of countries, particularly through military aid and arms supply. Other countries, such as India, Turkey and Qatar, have also invested heavily in Africa.

These developments are taking place simultaneously as Africa's global significance is set to increase. First, the region has important natural resources, such as oil and gas, as well as rare minerals and earth metals that are in high demand in the context of the green transition. Second, Africa is severely affected by climate change, which can lead to social unrest, violent conflicts and extensive migration. In a time of increasing geopolitical rivalries and instability, this means that developments in Africa will have considerable global ramifications.

Although other countries have increased their interest in and become more important partners for African countries, the EU and Europe are still Africa's largest trading partners and providers of development aid. The influence of the EU and Europe in Africa is not challenged in this respect, but rather in areas such as governance, infrastructure and energy, and specifically from the Russian side within what we can call a niche of security markets. Russia has been able to operate here by offering arms sales, military training and services from the Wagner Group (a private military company) to regimes that Europe and the United States are not willing to provide that type of support for. The struggle for political and economic influence in Africa is stronger and more intense than since the Cold War, and there is reason to believe this will continue.

This also gives African countries more choice and autonomy vis-à-vis external actors. African states are not just objects to be acted upon by the international community, whether through development aid, investment or in international forums; they are also active agents who, with increased self-awareness, will seek to navigate the new landscape of global power rivalries and fragmentation. This is a development that must be taken seriously. Neither Norway nor Europe can afford to take Africa and African support for our positions in international politics for granted.

This report provides a brief overview of the key trends in Africa, which form the basis for Norway's development of a new strategy for Africa.

2. The global backdrop

Economic stagnation

The global economy is in crisis. Growth has come to a halt, and poverty is increasing, while inflation and interest rates continue to rise. Growth has been low ever since the financial crisis in 2008, but the situation has worsened over the past three years. First, the economy was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Lockdowns brought trade and investment to a standstill, causing major bottlenecks in global supply chains. There was an acute shortage of medical equipment and vaccines, and the health service was overwhelmed. Many countries artificially sustained their economies through large-scale, loan-financed crisis measures.

After the acute phase of the pandemic had passed and restrictions were lifted, a scarcity of essential goods pushed up inflation. The war in Ukraine began shortly after, creating a crisis in the energy market, with sky-high oil and gas prices and problems with the export of, among other things, agricultural goods and fertilisers from Russia and Ukraine.

The globalised nature of the economy means that the crisis impacts all countries. The economic situation in Africa in 2023 is characterised by a series of external shocks and global economic stagnation. Falling commodity prices severely impacted the continent after the 2008 financial crisis. The high growth experienced prior to this was largely a result of high commodity prices, and growth has not picked up since then. Although Africa was not as severely affected by the pandemic as other parts of the world, the ensuing global economic slowdown has led to a decline in trade and investment and a decrease in revenue from goods exports and tourism. Combined with increased borrowing in the years following the financial crisis, this has resulted in a sharp rise in external debt.

Great power rivalries

The relationships between the great powers are changing rapidly. After a period of strong American dominance, other powers, such as China, the Gulf States, Turkey and Russia, have become more assertive and taken on a more active role in global politics. This is reflected in their increasingly confrontational stance in bilateral relations with the United States and their relationships with other countries. As a result, we are now witnessing increased competition and rivalry between the great powers in various parts of the world.

Furthermore, there are strong indications that the global economic integration of recent decades is being reversed. Global economic fragmentation and an increasing prevalence of rivalry in economic interactions are becoming evident. There are tendencies towards protectionism and the formation of regional economic alliances, while the great powers compete for influence in various parts of the world.

The trend of increased rivalry between the great powers is also evident in Africa. With a few exceptions (such as Libya under Gaddafi, and Zimbabwe), African countries have, to a greater or lesser extent, been allied with the West since the end of the Cold War. However, this has changed in recent times. First, the United States has deprioritised Africa, and American influence has significantly diminished. Second, China has assumed an increasingly pivotal role. The most visible manifestation of this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with massive investment in infrastructure. This has been accompanied by a considerable increase

in trade and development aid, including arms sales and military support. Finally, Russia has escalated its activity in Africa, particularly through military support and arms sales. One clear indication of Russia's return to the African continent is the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in 2019, in which 43 African heads of state participated. The EU is also escalating its ambitions in Africa.

The EU has ambitious intentions in Africa, but its influence has diminished despite remaining the continent's leading trading partner and provider of development aid. A concrete indication of this is the African countries' response to the war in Ukraine, with several abstaining from the voting on relevant issues in the United Nations and refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. Europe has also experienced a significant loss of influence in the Sahel region, reflected in, for example, the large anti-French demonstrations and increased cooperation with Russia. Another problem for the EU and Europe is the lack of harmonisation in their countries' relationships with Africa.

The plan for an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been highlighted as a positive measure that will boost investment and counteract protectionist trends in Africa. In the long term, AfCFTA could become an important instrument, but it is worth remembering previous failures of similar plans, such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Despite the slight increase in intra-continental trade, African countries continue to face greater competition in the international commodity markets compared to economies that cooperate and trade with each other.

Climate crisis

Global warming has dramatic implications for all countries. More extreme weather, floods, droughts and natural disasters threaten the livelihoods of millions of people. Although Africa has made little contribution to climate change, it is one of the regions most affected and whose climate has changed the most, threatening the food and water supply. The problem is further exacerbated by high fuel and fertiliser prices. This, in turn, creates a breeding ground for social and political conflicts.

Climate change must be addressed on multiple levels: reducing emissions, adapting to changes that have already occurred, compensating for the harm people have suffered and investing in the transition to a 'green economy'. All of these measures are fraught with conflict. There is disagreement about priorities, who should bear the costs and how the measures should be organised. Coordination and cooperation are necessary but are challenging to achieve. African governments are seeking more support from wealthy nations for climate adaptation and reparations for loss and damage as a result of climate change. However, despite some increase in support, the steps taken so far are far from sufficient.

The developments in the global economy, the dynamics between the great powers, and climate policy all have a large impact on Africa. This constitutes an important backdrop and context for the developments in the continent, which both African states and others must take into account.

3. Peace, conflict and security

In an overall and historical perspective, there are many positive aspects to Africa's development in recent decades, but the situation remains bleak in terms of conflict and insecurity.

Armed conflicts

Countries such as Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) are experiencing armed secular conflicts, while violent extremist Jihadi groups are wreaking havoc in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – particularly in the border areas between these countries, as well as in Somalia, Mozambique and northern Nigeria.

In Ethiopia, the conflict is mainly concentrated in the northern Tigray region. Several hundred thousand people have been killed, millions have been driven from their homes and a famine is looming. The fronts are entrenched around reform plans and the degree of self-governance between the leaders of the rebel group Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the incumbent government, represented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

In DR Congo, several million people have lost their lives since the mid-1990s. Numerous armed groups and neighbouring countries are involved. The situation is particularly precarious in the eastern part of the country, where the former rebel group M23 has resurfaced. It controls several cities and the areas around the regional capital Goma, where UN forces are stationed. The current situation was triggered when Congo's President Tshisekedi invited military forces from Uganda and Burundi to help fight rebel groups. Rwanda is accusing Tshisekedi of supporting the rebel group Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), a remnant of the Hutu militia responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, while Tshisekedi is accusing Rwanda of supporting M23.

In South Sudan, the civil war is officially over, but various complex conflicts are still ongoing in a country overflowing with weapons. The country is also severely affected by climate change, with floods forcing people to flee and impeding access to food and water.

In Sudan, a bitter power struggle is raging between various military leaders. The head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia is pitted against the army generals. The implications of this conflict are yet to be fully understood, but it is a complicated situation with major regional implications. It involves not only neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Egypt but also Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, Russia's involvement through the Wagner Group and its relations with the RSF, as well as the Russian state's agreement for a new naval base in Port Sudan, further adds to the complexity of the conflict.

CAR has been plagued by war, conflicts and humanitarian crises for many decades, resulting in thousands of people being killed and many more displaced. Despite the signing of several peace agreements, conflicts are currently ongoing between the army, Russian Wagner forces and Rwandan forces on the one side, and elements of the Séléka coalition (primarily Muslim armed groups) on the other. In addition, the Anti-balaka coalition (said to be composed mainly of Christian militia groups) is at war with the latter.

The new armed conflict over political and economic power in Khartoum reflects how future conflicts in Africa might unfold. Actors on the ground will be intertwined and entangled in complex regional and international alliances, making any attempts at conflict resolution extremely challenging. If we add the escalating rivalry between the great powers to the mix, this could create even more unfavourable conditions for future collective international efforts in conflict resolution.

Jihadism and violent extremism

Jihadist groups contribute to instability and insecurity in Mozambique, Somalia and the Sahel region, particularly in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. In Mozambique, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, militant Islamists have killed over 4500 people, forcing over a million people to flee since 2017.¹ In Somalia, Al-Shabab holds its position and poses a major risk to the civilian population and the state. In Nigeria, the challenges primarily lie in the three northeastern provinces with the presence of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the remnants of Boko Haram, along with other criminal groups.² Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) are operating in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. JNIM is inspired by al-Qaeda, while ISGS is formally a province of the Islamic State (IS). Recent research shows that although the stereotypical image of jihadists as Islamist terrorists is true to some extent, the reality is much more nuanced.³ When there is no functioning and recognised government, several of these groups step in to offer 'public' services, such as protection, tax collection and even their own mobile 'courts'. The latter, in particular, helps give local legitimacy to these groups because, unlike public local courts, they are seen as both effective and uncorrupted. We also observe that while the leaders of these groups play on religion, theology and ideology, the foot soldiers primarily join them due to a lack of security, a shortage of food and water and general poverty, as well as a lack of prospects.⁴ This has important policy implications. If it is true that the 'journey into the world of extremism' does not start with religion or theology but for entirely different and genuine material reasons, it means that this is where the fight against violent extremism must be targeted.

It has been claimed that it is difficult to distinguish between jihadist and criminal groups.⁵ While there are several examples of pragmatic cooperation between jihadists and purely criminal elements, there are also instances where the rebels have seized and burned narcotics. The doctrinal element of the jihadist groups is so strong that it is misleading to view what is happening as the development of a common nexus between terrorism and criminality.⁶ The Sahel is neither a nexus for terrorism and criminality nor a region without governance (ref. the ungoverned space argument⁷), but a complex landscape of conflict and pragmatic cooperation where armed non-state actors such as jihadists navigate political and economic objectives, with long-term political goals still being dominant.

Sahel – a failure of international engagement?

In the Sahel, there has been considerable national, regional and international engagement to prevent the spread of jihadist insurgency. The state and external actors have primarily addressed the problem through military force. However, the security situation has worsened, which has contributed to radicalisation. Many also point out that the regimes' security forces

and the international actors, particularly France, have not been effective enough. Specifically, this applies to the battle for jihadist hegemony between those inspired by al-Qaeda and those who have pledged allegiance to ISIS. If JNIM wins the war against ISGS, they will have eliminated an even more radical challenger. This could make JNIM strong enough to believe they can also defeat the state, but it could also make it less threatening for them to seek a negotiated solution. Currently, with France out of Mali, no external power opposes such negotiations. This could create an opportunity for negotiations. Ongoing research suggests that the general population welcomes this.⁸ Since the uprising in 2020 that ended with military leaders seizing power, relations between the new rulers and Paris have been in a downward spiral. The new military leaders in Burkina Faso have also terminated military cooperation with France but seek to maintain other relations.

The reason why France seems to be losing influence is complex. Still, the main problem is that they failed to prevent the conflict from escalating both in Mali and Burkina Faso while they had a heavy military presence. When Paris simultaneously made a number of demands related to negotiations and security cooperation agreements with Russia and the Wagner Group, it created a climate of mistrust that local authorities could exploit to bolster their own position.

This poses several dilemmas for Western European countries. The region has been considered a hotbed for terrorists and migrants, and efforts have been made to prevent them from reaching Europe.⁹ The regimes in both Mali and Burkina seem to prefer cooperating with Russia, while relations between Russia and the West are at a low point. This raises concerns about Russia potentially contributing to destabilisation in Europe (particularly in terms of the proliferation of terrorism and influx of refugees). Furthermore, the anti-French sentiment has transitioned into a more general anti-Western sentiment, fuelled by actors like Russia and China. However, there is no indication that Norway and the West have anything to gain from pulling out of the Sahel region. The situation is already critical, and withdrawal could lead to a major regional collapse. This would open the door for chaos and conflict to spread to Niger via Mali, and to Benin, the Ivory Coast and Ghana, where jihadists have already begun to operate.

Women, peace and security

According to the WHO, physical or sexual violence against women is the most prevalent human rights violation in the world, affecting one in three women during their lifetime.¹⁰ In times of war and conflict, where sexual violence increases, girls and women are particularly vulnerable. Still, boys and men are also exposed to this type of abuse. Recruiters for violent extremist groups often use gender as part of the narrative, idealising a historical, mythical Islamic warrior culture and a conservative view of the position of women. Recent studies show that although many external actors seek to improve the conditions for girls and women, they often end up either solidifying the identity of women as victims rather than strengthening their role, or acting as a type of agent of modernisation that contributes to solidifying and reinforcing the jihadists' narrative that this agenda is foreign, alien and not in line with true Islamic values (Berlingozzi, 2022).

The UN's last major peace-keeping operations?

The UN's four remaining multidimensional peace-keeping operations are currently in Africa, specifically in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Although it is claimed that most of the UN's peace-keeping operations have been successful in that they have prevented further violence and provided assistance for a large number of people,¹¹ these operations are struggling to achieve their goals, primarily because there is no peace to keep. The MINUSMA operation in Mali, in particular, has faced strong criticism for not making a more significant contribution to stabilising the country and for being the UN operation with the most UN personnel fatalities (281).¹² MINUSMA illustrates some of the dilemmas the UN faces in an ongoing conflict. First, the question of whether the UN should even be present when there is no ceasefire, peace agreement or viable political plan. In such situations, it is not possible to accomplish much, and the UN's presence becomes a contentious issue within the local community (as seen with the large, violent protests against the UN in DR Congo in 2022). This results in a loss of credibility for the UN. Second, and closely linked to that, is the question of whether the UN should cross the line by taking sides in a conflict, according to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter.¹³ Third, the more effectively a peace-keeping operation protects civilians and contributes to stability, the less incentive the ruling political elite has to find long-term political solutions.¹⁴ And fourth, there is a fear that if the UN pulls out of Mali there will be no support in the Security Council among the P5, especially Russia, to establish any new operation. Discussions are ongoing in various forums about whether to return to more traditional observer operations, where regional actors assume greater responsibility for more challenging tasks or to focus more on Special Political Missions, as reflected in current trends.¹⁵

Regional implications

All conflicts have repercussions beyond the areas where the conflict takes place. This is not a uniquely African phenomenon. However, the weaker the states and the less legitimate the governing regimes are, the greater the likelihood that a conflict will have cross-border effects. We have witnessed this in several places in Africa, from the Mano River basin in the late 1990s and early 2000s to the current conflicts in DR Congo, Mali and Somalia. This trend is not set to abate anytime soon. The conflicts in the Sahel will continue, and the international community should have more containment strategies available than before. It will be essential to deploy resources to prevent the conflicts from spreading to coastal states such as Benin, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Any such spread will also have implications for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Similarly, we can see how the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are intertwined; be it the role of Ethiopia in Tigray and Eritrea or al-Shabaab's cross-border terrorist attacks on neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Uganda. This is particularly concerning in a region where the Nile and its resources could be a source of cooperation and increasing regional prosperity, but it could also bring yet another actor, Egypt, into what currently resembles more of an architecture of uncertainty than anything else.

Maritime security

Along the African coastline, we also find some of the world's most important commercial maritime supply lines. Somalia boasts Africa's longest coastline, providing access to the

Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal via the Red Sea. Given the current tense geopolitical situation, the importance of this area has not diminished, as evidenced by the presence of all the major military powers in naval bases in Djibouti. The Gulf of Guinea and ports such as Accra, Dakar, Lagos, Port Harcourt and Lomé form a dense network of commercial and political actors, competing against each other as well as the rest of the global trade. As a maritime nation with a large sovereign wealth fund, Norway is a global economic player. As such, it is crucial that, in light of the growing interest in strategic resources from the African continent in a world marked by intense geopolitical conflicts that are likely to persist for a long time to come, Norway actively pursues a policy that fosters as much global cooperation as possible on maritime security in Africa. This pertains to activities such as piracy at sea and other threats to shipping lanes, as well as the security of strategic ports, which should be an integral part of Norway's security policy agenda in Africa.

4. Living conditions and economic development

Economic development

As a result of the crisis in the global economy, Africa's economy has been the subject of severe external shocks, including rising inflation, higher borrowing costs and reduced demand in major export markets. In addition, several regions have experienced adverse weather conditions, such as floods and droughts. This will dampen future growth.

The proportion of Africans living below the poverty line fell from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012. However, the trend has now reversed. Meanwhile, population growth is contributing to the record number of poor people. Since 1990, there have been 100 million more people living in poverty, with an additional 18 million in 2022 alone.¹⁶ The debt crisis, the pandemic and the impacts of the war in Ukraine are reducing the possibility for eradicating poverty by 2030.

Nevertheless, there are no expectations of a sharp economic downturn. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa will experience growth of 3.2% in 2023 and that almost all countries in Africa will continue to see growth. With a population growth of 2.4%, this equates to 0.8% growth per inhabitant. However, growth will vary significantly, and some states may experience stagnation or decline. It should be noted that these forecasts are subject to considerable uncertainty.

The main reason for the IMF's relatively optimistic forecasts is that commodity prices – especially for energy products, metals and minerals – are expected to remain relatively high. Major commodity exporters will benefit from the intensified international competition for access to Africa's strategically important resources. European countries' decision to replace Russian oil and gas will increase the demand for energy from Africa and may lead to new investments in countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Republic of Congo, DR Congo, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. Similarly, African mining companies, particularly in Botswana, DR Congo, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, could become more attractive if Western companies and commodity traders increasingly shun Russian and Chinese supplies of minerals, including copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, iron, manganese, nickel, platinum, palladium, uranium and zinc.

Conversely, there is a high risk that many countries could end up facing a severe debt crisis.¹⁷

African governments have taken on more loans in recent years, and the debt-to-GDP ratio in the public sector is almost as high as in the early 2000s, before the restructuring through the HIPC programme in 2005. On average, public sector debt will be more than 60% of Africa's GDP in 2022 and 2023, and some countries' debt levels will far exceed this.

In a situation with increased inflation, higher interest rates and a strong US dollar, servicing the debt becomes much more challenging. According to the Debt Justice Network, 24 African countries were in a debt crisis at the end of 2021.¹⁸ Ghana, Tunisia, Egypt, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have vast amounts of debt relative to their GDP. Other countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have seemingly manageable debt, but they will also struggle with higher interest rates and a strong dollar. Based on the developments in the past year, there is every reason to believe that the situation has worsened.

An important difference between the current and previous debt crises is the composition of the countries debt. Today, a much smaller share of the foreign debt is linked to loans from multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank compared to 20 years ago. First, China has become a significant lender to many countries. Second, a much larger share of the debt today is linked to loans from private international banks. This also makes it more difficult to establish arrangements for debt forgiveness or for easing repayment terms. This will require negotiations and cooperation between creditors with competing interests, which cannot be easily achieved.

In terms of inequality, the picture is complex.¹⁹ Seven of the 10 most unequal countries in the world are in Africa. The countries with the highest internal inequality are in Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia) and the Central African Republic. An analysis of 23 countries with comparable data shows that inequality has increased in about half of the countries while decreasing in the rest.²⁰ If we exclude the most unequal countries, inequality in Africa is no greater than in other parts of the world, but the number of extremely wealthy Africans is increasing. There are considerable differences between urban and rural areas and across regions.

Great power rivalries in Africa

The increased tension between the great powers has important implications for Africa as well. While the continent has been relatively marginal in global power politics in the post-Cold War period, there is reason to believe that this is changing. First, the region is home to important natural resources, including oil, gas, copper, cobalt and rare earth metals needed in the transition to green energy. This will lead to increased rivalry and competition for access to such resources. The great powers' interest in Africa will therefore grow.

Second, Africa is among the regions most affected by climate change, which could have major consequences for other parts of the world. One aspect is that climate change is likely to result in a substantial increase in migration from Africa, particularly to Europe, but also internally within Africa and to other continents such as North America. Third, much of the global terrorism takes place in, or originates in, North Africa and the Sahel region.

In a time of increasing geopolitical rivalry and heightened instability, political developments in Africa will have significant implications for global security and the global economic trajectory. This, in turn, will influence the great powers' interest in and prioritisation of Africa

in their foreign policies.

The consequences of this for Africa are ambiguous. On the one hand, as more states compete for access to resources and alliance partners, African countries may have greater leeway and a stronger negotiating position when entering into agreements with states or international companies. They can attract more and larger investments and gain access to capital and development aid on more favourable terms. In principle, this can provide African countries with economic opportunities and higher growth than they would otherwise have had. On the other hand, there is a risk that when Africa becomes an arena for great power rivalry, it may lead to increased exploitation and further dependence of African countries on external actors.

Population growth, employment and urbanisation

Africa has the fastest-growing population in the world, with an annual growth rate of approximately 2.6%.²¹ The main reasons for the growth are reduced child mortality and increased life expectancy. Life expectancy in Africa as a whole is 64 but varies between 77 in Algeria and 53 in Chad.²² The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman) is 4.7, and this has not increased. However, there are large regional variations. While women in Southern Africa have an average of 2.5 children, women in Niger have almost 7 children on average.²³

Due to its high fertility rate, Africa has the fastest growing labour force in the world. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, a population with a large proportion of working age young people can represent a potential for rapid growth (known as a 'demographic dividend'). On the other hand, it can be challenging to create enough jobs for large cohorts of young people. Keeping the rapidly growing population in employment will require economic growth in labour-intensive industries, but also a labour force with sufficient and relevant skills.

Africa faces both an under- and over-skilling problem. Unemployment is highest among those with the highest levels of education. The lack of jobs and the poor standard of education systems mean that more years of education do not necessarily increase employment opportunities. New jobs are therefore needed for workers with high and low levels of education. Insufficient job creation poses a risk of escalating social and political unrest, particularly in urban areas, along with an upsurge in criminal activities and recruitment into violent movements, as seen in the Sahel, Somalia and DR Congo.

However, the need to create jobs is less than the population growth would suggest. First, the average number of years of education is increasing, which means that the number of job seekers is decreasing. Second, birth rates are falling in many countries, and this will eventually curb population growth and reduce the need for new jobs. Declining fertility rates will slow down future growth in the labour force, which can lead to better employment opportunities.

Africa's cities are the fastest-growing cities in the world. Since 1990, the total population of African cities has increased by 500 million.²⁴ Urbanisation in Africa has been accompanied by economic progress, higher standards of living, population growth, educational opportunities, job prospects and aspirations, as well as land scarcity and challenging conditions in rural areas. UN forecasts indicate that Africa's cities will grow by an additional

900 million inhabitants by 2050. For African policymakers, this presents significant challenges in terms of planning, governance and infrastructure development to ensure job creation and foster sustainable development. Meanwhile, the economic growth in the cities has generally been better than in the countries as a whole.

Agriculture and food security

Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing one of the most severe food crises in decades. Approximately 146 million people suffer from acute food insecurity and need humanitarian assistance.²⁵ In the Horn of Africa, 50 million people are severely impacted, and in the Sahel, the number of people in need of emergency aid has quadrupled to 30 million in the past seven years. In the last five years, the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity has increased by 83%, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), which expects the situation to worsen in 2023.²⁶

The primary causes of the current food shortage are drought and armed conflict, which lead to reduced food production. Countries such as Mali, Niger, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan are among the hardest hit. East Africa experienced a massive locust invasion in 2019 and 2020 – the worst in 25 years in Ethiopia and 70 years in Kenya – severely affected crops, production and the national and household economies. An economic crisis has also emerged as a result of inflation, higher interest rates and soaring energy prices.

High fertiliser prices may lead to a long-term decline in production, as African countries primarily rely on imported fertiliser.²⁷ However, it should also be noted that agriculture productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa is very low, partly due to the small-scale and low-capital-intensive units, weak public institutions, irrational regulations and limited use of fertiliser. According to the African Development Bank, the average supply of fertiliser per hectare of cultivated land is 17 kg, compared to a global average of 135 kg.²⁸ This means that even though higher prices will reduce fertiliser usage, the impact on production capacity will be more limited than in other regions. The low fertiliser utilisation also indicates significant potential for increased food production. However, realising this potential will require investment, institutional reform and capacity-building.

Higher food prices can also affect donors' ability to provide emergency aid to Africa. If world market prices rise significantly, organisations such as the UN, Red Cross and others will need more funding to provide the same amount of food aid to countries facing drought, conflict or other crises. States that depend on such aid may therefore face an even more critical situation if food aid is not increased.

Another risk is that African countries will not receive the support they need to deal with the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Donors may prioritise giving aid to Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees. If this is done within existing development aid budgets, it will reduce the amount available for the traditional aid recipients. And even if they do not receive less aid than before, they may not receive the increase in aid necessary to address the food shortage.

However, the effect of rising food prices in the global market on food security should not be overstated. For most countries in Africa, imports account for a relatively small proportion of total food consumption.²⁹

5. Climate and energy

Energy

Africa accounts for 17% of the world's population but represents only 4% of investment in global power supply and 3% of global CO₂ emissions.³⁰ An estimated 58% of the continent's population has no access to electricity, and two-thirds of the power grid is considered unreliable. Around one billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) share the same energy capacity as Germany's 83 million inhabitants.³¹ Africa is the continent with the highest growth in demand, with approximately 3% annual growth, but the energy supply is not meeting demand. Furthermore, the distribution lines and power supply are uneven and unstable, both between and within countries. The disparity between electricity production, distribution and demand is expected to increase due to a combination of a weaker economy and insufficient investment due to the Ukraine conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, and because the population is expected to exceed two billion by 2040. Failure to address the growing imbalance between supply and demand would be detrimental to living standards and economic growth. This has implications for the climate and environment, and is a source of both conflict and cooperation between countries and regions. Energy resources are unevenly distributed between countries, and some resources, such as hydropower and oil and gas fields, can span multiple countries. Regional integration can facilitate the development and utilisation of these resources and make energy an arena for increased cooperation.

Access to stable, affordable and modern energy is crucial for development at both national and household level. It enables investment, innovation and the establishment of new industries and enterprises, which in turn stimulates job creation and economic growth for households and countries. Energy is essential for children's schooling and studies, for the workplace and production, for heating and cooling food and homes, and for enabling social and economic digital connectivity with the outside world. The poorest families and countries are the hardest hit by unstable energy supplies and shocks in energy markets, with rising energy prices affecting food production and distribution, as seen in 2022 as an effect of the war in Ukraine.³²

Africa's energy mix has remained relatively constant over the past three decades. Despite several large and successful renewable energy projects, its share of total energy production is still small. African energy production is dominated by fossil fuel sources, with oil (38.7%), natural gas (29.7%) and coal (22.1%) all having large shares, while hydropower, the only renewable source of some significance, accounts for 6.8%. Despite increased efforts in wind power and solar energy, their combined contribution is currently only 1.6%.³³ In Africa, the share of renewable energy is slowly increasing, but for some countries, fossil fuel production is increasing as a result of continued extraction of fossil reserves and the discovery of new natural gas sources.

About 600 million people (43%) – the majority of whom are in Sub-Saharan Africa – have no access to electric power. This makes the divide and transition between traditional and modern energy as relevant as the shift from fossil to renewable energy. There is considerable potential for production and access to both renewable and fossil energy, but population growth and inadequate infrastructure and power grid development present challenges: soon, 85% of the population will have no access to electricity. Africa possesses 60% of the world's best solar resources, but currently harnesses only 1%. With a focus on green energy,

it is estimated that Africa has the potential to produce 40% of the world's solar energy and 10% of the world's wind energy by 2050.³⁴ Africa has abundant energy reserves and access to large amounts of modern energy. One of the challenges in the transition to renewable energy is ensuring sufficient investment willingness and access to capital for investing in new sources at the expense of continuing to exploit existing fossil fuel sources and developing new ones.

Energy production is one thing, distribution is a separate matter. Access to electric power is unevenly distributed. At the moment, electricity access and the development of new sources mainly benefit urban areas and industry. According to Afrobarometer, approximately 68% of Africa's population lives in areas where they can access electricity via the grid, but this figure is only four percentage points higher than a decade ago. In rural areas, only 45% have the potential for access to electricity, while in urban areas, the figure is 94%. There are also significant disparities between countries. For example, Tunisia (99%), Mauritius (99%) and Morocco (98%) have near-universal access to electricity, while in Malawi (14%), Burkina Faso (22%) and Niger (24%), fewer than one in four people are connected to the power grid.³⁵ The development and expansion of national power grids are considered the most cost-effective way to increase access to electricity for cities, households and industry. The lack of electric power leads to the use of other off-grid energy sources, with the disadvantages this entails for the climate, health, environment and biomass. In Mali, for example, 59% of households report relying on various off-grid energy sources. In more peripheral and rural areas, solar-based mini grids and systems could replace energy production based on diesel generators and biomass fuel.

Population growth in rural areas is leading to an increasing proportion resorting to off-grid systems, either because the area is not connected to any power grid, the grid is unstable or the prices are too high. Meanwhile, access to such mini-systems is unevenly distributed and dependent on personal resources.

Climate

Africa is one of the continents that has contributed the least to emissions causing climate change but is also the hardest hit by climate change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Africa is responsible for only 3% of historical CO₂ emissions and 5% of current annual emissions. In comparison, high-income countries account for 57%.³⁶

Average temperatures have increased throughout Africa, with the greatest increases observed in North Africa and the least in Southern Africa.³⁷ The entire continent has experienced more frequent heatwaves with extreme temperatures. Precipitation patterns are also changing, leading to more extreme weather events and greater unpredictability in these patterns. Some regions have experienced flooding and inundation, while others have faced severe droughts.

The increased variability in precipitation has had significant negative impacts throughout Africa, affecting water supply, food security and power generation etc.³⁸ According to the IPCC, both precipitation variability and the frequency of heatwaves are set to increase in the future.

According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), rising temperatures have contributed to a 34% reduction in Africa's food production since 1961 compared to what

would have occurred without climate change.³⁹ This is higher than any other continent. This trend is expected to continue, increasing the risk of acute food insecurity and malnutrition. Global warming of 1.5 °C is projected to lead to a 9% decrease in the maize yield in West Africa and a 20–60% decrease in the wheat yield in Southern and North Africa.

There is also a substantial disparity in the emissions distribution within African countries. The carbon footprint of the poorest half of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest in the world by a large margin, while the richest 10% of the population in Africa emits 15 times more than the poorest 50%.⁴⁰

Climate change has led to reduced economic growth throughout Africa. It has also increased income inequality between African countries and countries in the northern hemisphere. One estimate suggests that Africa's GDP per capita for 1991–2010 was on average 13.6% lower than it would have been without climate change.⁴¹

One reason why African countries are severely affected economically by climate change is that the majority of the labour force in Sub-Saharan Africa (55-62%) is employed in agriculture. It is estimated that average agricultural productivity in Africa is almost 35% lower than it would have been without climate change. Crop yields have decreased for all products. Given that Africa is also the continent with the highest poverty rates and the poorest food security, reduced crop yields increase the risk of food shortages and famine.⁴²

Climate variability and climate change also have adverse health effects. More extreme weather events and the further spread of infectious diseases harm health. Mortality and morbidity will increase with further global warming, placing a more significant burden on health services and the economy. With 1.5 °C global warming, the risk of heat-related deaths increases sharply, with at least 15 additional deaths per 100 000 annually across large parts of Africa. With over 2 °C global warming, thousands of additional cases of diarrhoea are expected, mainly in West, Central and East Africa.⁴³

Climate change will also entail increased migration because many areas will become uninhabitable and unsuitable for agriculture. It will also increase the risk of violent conflicts, particularly in regions dependent on agriculture. However, climate is just one of many risk factors. Alleviating ethnic tensions, strengthening political institutions, and investing in alternative industries can help reduce the risk of conflicts relating to climate change.⁴⁴

6. Democracy, governance and multilateral cooperation

Democracy and governance

Democracy is being weakened worldwide, both in new and more established democracies. This trend is also being seen in Africa. Although there are significant regional variations, the general trend is that the democratisation that took place in the 1990s has reversed and that democracy is weakening. According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, most people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in electoral autocracies (68%), and a total of 79% live in autocracies, including large countries such as DR Congo, Nigeria and Tanzania. Seychelles is the only liberal democracy in the region.⁴⁵ Overall, the proportion of the African population living in democracies has declined in the past five years. At the end of 2021, the figure was just 27% – the same proportion as those living in authoritarian regimes. The majority of Africa's population (45%) now lives in hybrid regimes, which are formally democratic

systems but which do not, in practice, function according to democratic principles.⁴⁶

Democracy has faced setbacks from at least three fronts. The most obvious is the wave of military coups since 2020. Military coups were common in Africa during the first decades after independence. Despite being relatively infrequent since the start of the millennium, there has been a resurgence of coup attempts in recent years. Since 2020, there have been six successful coups in Africa. In 2021, there were six coup attempts, four of which were successful. Burkina Faso experienced two military takeovers in 2022, and there were failed coup attempts in Guinea Bissau, Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

There has also been further consolidation of authoritarian regimes in countries such as Egypt, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It should be mentioned, however, that democracy has been strengthened in some countries, such as Gambia, Niger and Zambia.⁴⁷

However, despite the increased incidence of coups and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, democracy in Africa is primarily weakening gradually. This is evident by the threats to freedom of expression, association and information, as well as the undermining of the rule of law by eroding the independence of the judiciary. This deterioration has been observed in several countries, including Benin, Mauritius, Senegal and Tanzania.

The causes of this decline in democracy are complex. Economic crises, corruption, unfulfilled expectations, broken election promises and populist politicians exploiting discontent to silence critics and tighten control over civil society all play a role. The growing discontent in turn, creates a self-reinforcing dynamic, where leaders tighten their grip on the opposition to prevent any threats to their own positions.

When examining governance development more broadly, i.e., beyond the scope of democracy, a different picture emerges. According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), more than half of Africa's population resides in a country where overall governance improved between 2012 and 2021. Two-thirds of African countries have seen improvements in governance. However, progress has stalled since 2019.⁴⁸ The IIAG comprises four main categories: 'Participation, Rights and Inclusion', 'Human Development', 'Security and Rule of Law' and 'Foundations for Economic Opportunity'. Each of these main categories is divided into four subcategories.

Although governance has improved overall, there are major variations between the different categories. The most notable progress has been made in the categories of 'Foundations for Economic Opportunity' and 'Human Development'. The development has been positive in these areas in more than 40 countries, with progress evident in all the subcategories when considering the continent as a whole. The most significant progress has been observed in the subcategory 'Infrastructure', followed by 'Health'.⁴⁹ The former is clearly linked to heavy state investment in infrastructure, financed through loans from China during the period. However, progress in this area has slowed in recent years, partly due to a decrease in the volume of new Chinese loans.

In contrast, the situation has deteriorated in over 30 countries in the categories 'Security and Rule of Law' and 'Participation, Rights and Inclusion' (which encompasses democracy). The largest decline has been observed in the subcategories 'Security and Safety' and 'Participation', reflecting the increased prevalence of violent conflicts and the general eroding of democracy.⁵⁰

There is also considerable variation between countries, with an overall decline in 19 countries: Mauritius, Cape Verde, Benin, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique, Egypt, Nigeria, Uganda, Niger, Cameroon, Mali, Comoros, Burundi, Libya, Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan.

The internal political developments in Africa can also have consequences for the countries' foreign policies and their adaptation to the increase in rivalry between the great powers. As mentioned above, there is every reason to expect that all the great powers will do what they can to secure support from African countries, for example, within the UN, where African countries represent a large share of the votes. However, it is not certain that the weakening of democracy itself will have a significant impact on how African countries engage with the great powers. In shaping foreign policy, the historical experiences with the various great powers, along with practical, interest-based considerations, can be just as important as regime type or ideological factors.

Regional and multilateral cooperation

International and regional organisations play a pivotal role in global governance and facilitate cooperation to address collective global and regional challenges in finding viable courses of action where intergovernmental solutions are insufficient. This is particularly relevant in conflict and crisis management, as well as in areas such as trade, investment, migration, development, poverty reduction, and increasingly in issues related to global commons, such as climate. Regional cooperation and the role of Africa-based international and regional organisations at country level are emphasised as crucial in Africa's own master plan for economic development, infrastructure and social integration, as outlined in Agenda 2063. To achieve the goals of Agenda 2063, cooperation, coordination and harmonisation of the diversity of the continent's regional organisations are required.

The first regional cooperation organisations in Africa were established in the 1950s. Since decolonisation, there has been a steady increase in the number of regional organisations, mainly with the aim of promoting development in the broad sense. Particularly during the two decades following the end of the Cold War, there was a considerable surge, resulting in the establishment of an estimated 156 different regional organisations in Africa.⁵¹ These organisations cover various policy areas, ranging from trade regulation and stimulation, promotion of shared technology and infrastructure development to enhancing good governance, providing health care and education, and ensuring peace and security. While a few organisations focus on areas such as gender, equality and social protection, over 30 regional organisations are dedicated to policy areas such as agriculture, business and trade.

The most important of these is the African Union (AU), which includes all African countries and plays a key role in coordinating and integrating the many regional organisations, especially the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The overall plan for this can be found in Agenda 2063, which the AU itself refers to as a blueprint and master plan for the comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable development of Africa. The AU has been tasked with implementing this ambitious plan, with goals of African unity and regional integration, self-determination, freedom, inclusive social and economic development, democratic governance, and peace and security. The aim is for Africa to become a dominant player on the global stage. The AU has emerged as an important political force in Africa, assuming the leadership role once held by the UN to address conflict situations and shape mandates for

peace operations.

There are several challenges associated with the AU's grand visions, as well as its more short-term objectives. The AU is never more than the sum of its member states' strengths, weaknesses, political interests and alliances. The extent to which member states are united and willing to invest in this varies, which is particularly evident in the financing of the AU. Political will to invest in cooperation is one thing, but whether African states themselves are willing and able to finance their own organisations is something else. More than 40% of the members fail to pay their annual contributions to the AU. This not only makes funding and operations unpredictable and unsustainable but also means that the AU is highly dependent on international donors.⁵² The lack of political and financial support from the member states also affects the AU's legitimacy, policy-making and ability to achieve its objectives.

Among the various regional organisations, the so-called RECs are the most crucial. There are eight RECs,⁵³ which group countries into sub-regions with the aim of promoting economic integration. While RECs are autonomous from the AU, they work closely together and are often considered the AU's building blocks. These regional organisations form a network of institutions with overlapping membership and areas of responsibility. Several countries have overlapping membership: Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone are all members of both ECOWAS and CENSAD. Uganda and Kenya are members of IGAD, EAC and COMESA, while Tanzania is a member of both SADC and EAC.

A common trend among the AU and RECs is the increasing inclusion of security issues in their mandates.⁵⁴ After the conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and notably the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, regional organisations have expanded their mandate to include conflict prevention and management. Meanwhile, since the 1990s, international organisations have placed greater emphasis on security, diplomacy, development and humanitarian work. For instance, IGADD was established in 1986 to address drought, desertification, hunger and famine. However, it changed its name to IGAD in 1996, expanding its mandate to include conflict (prevention, management and resolution), food security, environmental protection, infrastructure and humanitarian issues. Another sign of this development is the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 to promote unity and solidarity among African countries, into the African Union (AU) in 2002, with a significantly broader mandate. The establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture⁵⁵ (APSA) has also accelerated the development of continental security policy instruments.

The UN and the international financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) have long been Africa's most significant international organisations. In the last two decades, these organisations have undergone major changes in the way they work, driven partly by evolving local and regional conditions and partly by the organisations' shifts in policy and orientation. The World Bank is a key player in aid and development, both at country and regional level. It plays a key role in shaping prevailing development policies, coordinating other aid actors (bilateral and international), and, until recently, has been the only institution with sufficient financial resources to meet African countries' needs for development financing. Around the turn of the millennium, a significant transformation took place in how the World Bank operates: it moved away from the traditional structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), where the World Bank dictated lending criteria and loan utilisation, and adopted a new model wherein its loans were aligned with and supportive of the countries' individual poverty reduction strategies. These strategies were formulated as

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that required the Bank's approval. The underlying idea was twofold: to reduce what was seen as external guardianship and to establish national ownership of the programmes funded by the Bank. This process also entailed a shift in the World Bank's policy (and that of other aid actors), moving away from liberalisation, economic growth and infrastructure, to poverty reduction, good governance, public sector reform, democracy and human rights.

Although the new development architecture helped to stimulate national ownership, it also brought the World Bank and its development partners closer to the processes and policies of recipient countries. Political opposition to this, limited effectiveness of the new model resulting in fewer donor budget support mechanisms, the emergence of alternative lenders (China, the Gulf States, etc.) offering loans without the same political criteria, and African countries capitalising on both economic growth and the opportunities presented by new funding sources have made states more critical of the World Bank as a preferred source of loans. Access to alternative funding sources has thus led to the World Bank losing some of its influence in development policy. A broader perspective of actors has simultaneously provided African states with more options to choose from, enabling them to reject actors with conflicting interests. Increased choice has helped strengthen African states' agency and autonomy but may also lead to new obligations and alliances. Meanwhile, the decline in Chinese investment in Africa and the renewed willingness of international donors to finance infrastructure development rather than focus on governance reforms, have given the World Bank a renewed role as an actor and partner in the development of African countries.

7. Concluding remarks

This is the context within which Norway needs to formulate its new strategy for Africa. The strategy must be designed based on this situation. There are many considerations, priorities and trade-offs that must be addressed: which regions, sectors and issues should be prioritised? In which areas does Norway have the greatest potential to make an impact and achieve good results? Which channels are best suited for the different areas? Who are relevant collaboration partners? How should Norwegian interests be balanced with the needs, interests and priorities of African countries? Which policies have the most support among Norwegian voters?

Endnotes

¹Crisis Group 2023

²Crisis Group, 2023

³JIGOV-Sahel, n.d.; see also Bøås et al., 2021

⁴Bøås et al., 2021; see also Bøås et al., Forthcoming

⁵Olojo & Aniekwe, 2022

⁶See Bøås et al. 2020

⁷Abrahamsen, 2005; Keenan, 2008

⁸Bøås et al., 2021

⁹Osland & Erstad, 2020

¹⁰World Health Organization, 2021

¹¹Howard, 2019

¹²MINUSMA, n.d.

¹³The HIPPO report, see United Nations, 2015

¹⁴De Coning, Forthcoming

¹⁵See the journal of Contemporary Security Policy, 42/2 2021, with a special forum entitled: The Crisis in United Nations Peace Operations (Contemporary Security Policy 2021).

¹⁶Beegle et al., 2016. However, it should be noted that these figures are uncertain, partly due to the inadequate systems for data collection.

¹⁷UNCTAD n.d.

¹⁸Debt Justice 2023

¹⁹Robilliard 2022

²⁰Beegle et al. 2016

²¹World Bank n.d.

²²Macrotrends, n.d. Kamer, 2023

²³Razafimandimby and Swaroop, 2020

²⁴OECD, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and African Development Bank, 2022

²⁵IFRC, 2022

²⁶FSIN and WFP, 2022

²⁷FAO, n.d.

²⁸African Development Bank, 2020

²⁹FAO, n.d.

³⁰Our World in Data, n.d.

³¹PwC, 2021

³²World Bank, 2023

³³PwC, 2021

³⁴Logan and Han, 2022

³⁵World Resources Institute, 2023

³⁶Chancel, Bothe, and Tancredi, 2023

³⁷World Meteorological Organization, 2022

³⁸Trisos, Adelekan, and Totin, 2022

³⁹World Meteorological Organization, 2022

⁴⁰Chancel, Bothe, and Tancredi, 2023

⁴¹Trisos, Adelekan, and Totin, 2022

⁴²Dhakar, Minx, and Toth, 2022

⁴³Trisos, Adelekan, and Totin 2022

⁴⁴ibid.

⁴⁵Papada and Lindberg, 2023

⁴⁶ibid.

⁴⁷International IDEA, 2022

⁴⁸Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2023

⁴⁹ibid.

⁵⁰ibid.

⁵¹Söderbaum and Stapel, 2022

⁵²African Union, n.d.

⁵³These are Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and East African Community (EAC).

⁵⁴Gnanguênon, 2020

⁵⁵APSA, 2012

Bibliography

- Abrahamsen, R. (2005). Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 30(1), 55–80.
- African Development Bank. (2020, July 13). Africa's fertilizer sector and the Bank's High 5s [Text]. African Development Bank Group - Making a Difference; African Development Bank Group. <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africas-fertilizer-sector-and-banks-high-5s-36830>
- African Union. (n.d.). Sustainable Financing | African Union. Sustainable Financing. Retrieved June 28, 2023, from <https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing>
- APSA. (2012, October 2). The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)-African Union—Peace and Security Department. African Union, Peace and Security Department. <https://www.peaceau.org:443/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa>
- Beegle, K., Christiaensen, L., Dabalen, A., & Gaddis, I. (2016). *Africa Poverty Report: Poverty in a Rising Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0723-7>
- Berlingozzi, L. (2022). O sister, where art thou? Assessing the limits of gender mainstreaming in preventing and countering violent extremism in Mali. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 15(3), 659–680. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2101536>
- Borchgrevink, A., & Lie, J. H. S. (2009). *Regional Conflicts and International Engagement on the Horn of Africa* (NUPI Report, p. 113). NUPI. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111387/Borchgrevink-Lie-Report.pdf>
- Bøås, M., Cissé, A. W., & Mahamane, L. (2020). Explaining Violence in Tillabéri: Insurgent Appropriation of Local Grievances? *The International Spectator*, 55(4), 118–132. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833567>
- Bøås, M., Osland, K. M., Ben-Nun, G., & Engel, U. (Forthcoming). *Resisting Radicalisation: Exploring the Non-occurrence of Violent Extremism*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bøås, M., Osland, K. M., Iocchi, A., Haavik, V., Cissé, A. W., Lounnas, D., Benmrahar, A., Mahamane,

- L., & Raineri, L. (2021). D6.2 Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism (D6.2; Working Paper on Enabling Environments, Drivers, and Occurrence/Nonoccurrence of Violent Extremism, p. 75). PREVEX | NUPI, ARGA, SSA. <https://www.prevex-balkan-mena.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/D6.2-2-1.pdf>
- Chancel, L., Bothe, P., & Tancredi, V. (2023). Climate Inequality Report 2023: Fair taxes for a sustainable future in the Global South (Climate Inequality Report 2023: World Inequality Lab Study 2023/1, p. 149). World Inequality Lab. <https://wid.world/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/CBV2023-ClimateInequalityReport-3.pdf>
- Contemporary Security Policy. (2021). Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 42, Issue 2 (2021). Taylor & Francis Online. <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fcsp20/42/2>
- Crisi Group. (2023). Mitigating Risks of Violence in Nigeria's 2023 Elections (Africa Report N°311). International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/311-mitigating-risks-violence-nigerias-2023-elections>
- Crisi Group. (2023). Making the Most of the EU's Integrated Approach in Mozambique (Watch List 2023) [Commentary]. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/east-and-southern-africa/mozambique/making-most-eus-integrated-approach-mozambique>
- De Coning, C. (Forthcoming). Avoiding the Stabilization Dilemma and other Perverse Effects with Principled and Adaptive Mandating and Leadership: Lessons from 75 Years of UN Peacekeeping. Global Governance.
- Debt Justice. (2023). Debt data portal. DebtJustice. <https://data.debtjustice.org.uk/>
- Dhaka, S., Minx, J. C., & Toth, F. L. (2022). Chapter 2: 2SM | Emissions Trends and Drivers Supplementary Material (Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Chapter02_SM.pdf

FAO. (n.d.). FAOSTAT. FAOSTAT. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#-data>

FSIN, & WFP. (2022). Global Report on Food Crises 2022: Joint Analysis For Better Decisions (Global Report on Food Crises - 2022). World Food Programme. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000138913/download/?_ga=2.130880527.1292225034.1687899367-948609745.1687899367

Gnanguênon, A. (2020). Mapping African regional cooperation: How to navigate Africa's institutional landscape (POLICY BRIEF:MAPPING AFRICAN REGIONAL COOPERATION: HOW TO NAVIGATE AFRICA'S INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE, p. 25). European Council on Foreign Relations. <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Mapping-African-regional-cooperation-How-to-navigate-Africas-institutional-landscape.pdf>

Howard, L. M. (2019). Power in Peacekeeping. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108557689>

IFRC. (2022). Emergency appeals: Africa: Hunger crisis | IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. <https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/africa-hunger-crisis>

International IDEA. (2022). The Global State of Democracy 2022: Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2022.56>

JIGOV-Sahel. (n.d.). Jihadist Governance in the Sahel. NUPI. Retrieved June 28, 2023, from <https://www.nupi.no/en/projects-centers/jihadist-governance-in-the-sahel>

Kamer, L. (2023). Life expectancy in Africa 2022. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/274511/life-expectancy-in-africa/>

Keenan, J. (2008). Demystifying Africa's Security. *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(118), 634–644.

Logan, C., & Han, K. (2022, April 22). Analysis: Can Africa leapfrog to electricity? Afrobarometer. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/can-africa-leapfrog-to-electricity/>

Macrotrends. (n.d.). Africa Life Expectancy 1950-2023. Macrotrends. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/AFR/africa/life-expectancy>

MINUSMA. (n.d.). MINUSMA FACT SHEET. United Nations Peacekeeping. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>

Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2023). 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance—Index Report (January 2023)—World | ReliefWeb (p. 116). Mo Ibrahim Foundation. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2022-ibrahim-index-african-governance-index-report-january-2023>

OECD, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, & African Development Bank. (2022). Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2022: The Economic Power of Africa's Cities. OECD. <https://doi.org/10.1787/3834ed5b-en>

Olojo, A., & Aniekwe, C. C. (2022). Crime and Terror Nexus: The Intersections Between Terror and Criminal Groups in the Lake Chad Basin | United Nations Development Programme (CRIME AND TERROR NEXUS, p. 32). UNDP. <https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/crime-and-terror-nexus-intersections-between-terror-and-criminal-groups-lake-chad-basin>

Osland, K. M., & Erstad, H. U. (2020). The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel. *The International Spectator*, 55(4), 18–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833474>

Our World in Data. (n.d.). Annual CO₂ emissions by world region. Our World in Data. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co-emissions-by-region>

Papada, E., & Lindberg, S. I. (2023). DEMOCRACY REPORT 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization (DEMOCRACY REPORT, p. 56). V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf

PwC. (2021). Africa Energy Review 2021 The global race to net zero by 2050 is accelerating. Will Africa realise a just transition or become a stranded asset? (Africa Energy Review 2021). PwC network.

- Razafimandimby, L., & Swaroop, V. (2020, January 24). Africa Can End Poverty: Can Niger escape the demographic trap? World Bank Blogs. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/can-niger-escape-demographic-trap>
- Robilliard, A.-S. (2022). World Inequality Lab Issue Brief 2022-09 November 2022: What's New About Income Inequality in Africa? (World Inequality Lab Issue Brief 2022-09 November 2022). World Inequality Lab. <https://wid.world/document/ssafrica2022/>
- Söderbaum, F., & Stapel, S. (2022). Regional Organisations and Africa's Development Challenges (POLICY BRIEF #06 2022). UNU Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies. <https://cris.unu.edu/regional-organisations-and-africas-development-challenges>
- Trisos, C. H., Adelekan, I. O., & Totin, E. (2022). Chapter 9: Africa | Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; (Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, p. 172) [Report]. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009325844.011>
- UNCTAD. (n.d.). Escalating debt challenges are inhibiting achievement of the SDGs – UNCTAD SDG Pulse 2023. SDG Pulse UNCTAD. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://sdgpulse.unctad.org/debt-sustainability/>
- United Nations. (2015). Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations—World | ReliefWeb. United Nations. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-high-level-independent-panel-peace-operations>
- World Bank. (n.d.). World Bank Open Data: Population growth (annual %)—Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Open Data. Retrieved June 27, 2023, from <https://data.worldbank.org>
- World Bank. (2023, June 6). Energy: Overview [Text/HTML]. World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/overview>
- World Health Organization. (2021). Violence Against Women Prevalence Estimates, 2018 (Violence Against Women Prevalence Estimates). World Health Organization & The United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Violence Against Women Estimation and Data

(VAW-IAWGED). <https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/9789240022256>

World Meteorological Organization. (2022). State of the Climate in Africa 2021 (WMO-No. 1300, p. 52). World Meteorological Organization. https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11512

World Resources Institute. (2023, May 30). Energy Access Explorer. World Resources Institute. <https://www.wri.org/initiatives/energy-access-explorer>

About the authors

Morten b  as (PhD) is Research Professor and works predominantly on issues concerning peace and conflict in Africa, including issues such as land rights and citizenship conflicts, youths, ex-combatants and the new landscape of insurgencies and geopolitics.

Stein Sundst  l Eriksen is Research Professor and works with the Research group on Peace, Conflict and Development. He predominantly works on issues concerning state-society relations, vulnerable states and how political regimes are changed, sovereignty and democracy, which he has studied in Tanzania, DR Congo and Zimbabwe.

Jon Harald Sande Lie holds a PhD in social anthropology from the University of Bergen (2011) and is research professor in the Research Group on Global Order and Diplomacy (GOaD). His research scope pertains to international aid, global governance and state formation, focusing on development and humanitarian aid in Eastern Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Uganda where he has conducted long-term fieldworks in studying the partnership relation at the level of NGOs and those involving the World Bank.

Kari Margrethe Osland (PhD) is a Senior Research Fellow in the Research group on peace, conflict and development at NUPI. Osland's work focuses predominantly on conflict dynamics, insurgencies, peace operations and peace building. Osland wrote her PhD on the impact of international assistance to police reform in post-conflict countries, comparing Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and South Sudan. She wrote her MPhil on genocide, applying the securitization theory on the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This document has been produced on behalf of The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



Norwegian Institute
of International
Affairs

NUPI
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
C.J. Hambros plass 2D
PB 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo
www.nupi.no | post@nupi.no

This document has been produced on behalf of The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading independent research institute on international politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless operates as an independent, non-political instance in all its professional activities. Research undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-term applied research to more long-term basic research.

Photo: Thomas Julin/
Wikimedia Commons/ CC

