

PEACE AND SECURITY

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OLDER ONE-DIMENSIONAL UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Is the Future of UN Peacekeeping its Past?

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April 2022



Over the last few decades, the focus has been on the UN's large multidimensional peacekeeping missions in Africa. However, half of the UN's current peacekeeping missions are small observation-type operations that were first established during the Cold War in places like Cyprus, the Golan and Lebanon. This report asks if this type of smaller and less intrusive mission will become more prominent again as we enter a new period of great power rivalry and turbulence.



These observation-type operations have been useful for preventing escalation by monitoring ceasefire lines or buffer-zones, but they are not suited for peacemaking and need to be complimented with envoys and diplomats that work to resolve the larger political issues along with members of the Security Council and host nations.



The report recommends that peace operations (consisting of a variety of options for a diversity of needs and contexts) should be at the core of the "New Agenda for Peace", envisaged by António Guterres to be presented at the General Assembly by September 2023. If a new era of great power rivalry requires the UN to once again adapt UN peacekeeping, then its experience through observation and monitoring operations, will provide it with a rich resource of options and models to choose from.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This current report is part of a series of Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung (FES) research on the security in the Eastern Mediterranean region and aims to put the UN presence in Cyprus into perspective, to show that the type of UN settings deployed in Cyprus is not unique. It follows from a report published in October 2021 on the UN presence in Cyprus undertaken by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) belongs to a genre of observer missions first established during the Cold War. Despite that legacy, these missions are also very much contemporary and in fact currently constitute half of the 12 current peacekeeping operations: the operations in Kashmir; in Jerusalem (UNMOGIP & UNTSO, 1948-1949); in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964); in the Golan (UNDOF, 1974); in South Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978); and in Western Sahara (MINURSO, 1991). Most of these missions are deployed in the wider Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East/North Eastern Africa region (the mission in Kashmir is the only exception), and one distinguishing feature of these missions is that one or more of the permanent members of the Security Council have a direct interest.

The current report is looking at the common features of this type of limited observer or monitoring mission in the context of a return to Cold War rivalry within the Security Council, and to explore what this may mean for the future direction of UN peacekeeping. Many of these missions belong to a particular period of time, when superpower rivalry generally limited UN peacekeeping to third party ceasefire monitoring or observation missions in interstate conflicts. Now this type of mission seems to be favoured, once again, by the UN Security Council. No new large armed UN multidimensional missions have been deployed since 2014. However, a number of smaller, limited and unarmed special political missions have been deployed, including the UN verification mission to Colombia (2017) and the UN mission to support the Hudaydah agreement in Yemen (2019). An observer mission (UNSMIS) was also deployed amidst the Syrian civil war to monitor a cessation of armed violence in April 2012, but it had to withdraw in August 2012 when hostilities resumed.

Specificities of one-dimensional Cold War peace operations

The aim of this study is to shed light on this under-researched part of peacekeeping studies. For a long time, these missions

were considered to be something from the past, hence being called “legacy missions” or “traditional missions.” This report states that these “older”, or rather “earlier”, missions could be qualified as “unidimensional” or “one-dimensional” missions, to differentiate them from their sister “multidimensional” missions. The main differences are that their mandates are limited to managing a conflict, not to resolving it. Hence their mandates are less intrusive and non-transformational. In contrast to the multidimensional missions, they have very limited civilian components, and their budgets are limited in scope to their observation and related confidence-building activities.

Another important feature, that may make them more relevant again in the future is their geopolitical context, where one or more permanent members of the Security Council (the so-called P5) have a direct interest in the outcome. This often meant that the P5 preferred to maintain the status quo, rather than risking re-igniting a conflict, including amongst themselves. This limited the role of the UN missions to conflict management. Peacemaking was largely in the hands of the P5, and occasionally they blessed an initiative by the UN Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to try to address the larger underlying issues.

These specificities are also driving the way the one-dimensional missions operate and their achievements on the ground. They have been “keeping the peace” despite the odds. Over the years, there have been several crises, but overall, they have managed to prevent outbreaks of violent conflict at the tactical level. Overall, these missions were able to contain the conflict while conceiving and adapting mechanisms to defuse tensions. However, their achievements in peacekeeping did not help the peacemaking efforts. The stability they provided helped to keep the status quo peaceful, sometimes rather comfortable (Cyprus, Lebanon), sometimes less so (Palestine, Kashmir, Western Sahara). In general, that meant that the main actors of the conflict and their P5 supporters were averse to changing its parameters. On the one hand, that saved lives and meant people could carry on with their lives in relative stability, but, on the other hand, it meant that the underlying political tensions were not resolved, which left the parties and affected people in a continuous state of uncertainty and unsettlement.

Achievements of one-dimensional peace operations

All these missions evolved in a very tense security environment, and their greatest achievement has been to have contributed to stability in that context and to have prevented, or limited, further bloodshed and the overall deterioration of the situation. They have contained the conflicts at an acceptable level of violence, while providing mechanisms to defuse tensions. Those missions are not deployed to provide a permanent solution but to *inter alia* maintain the (military) *status quo* pending a comprehensive political/peace agreement, to report violations, and to reaffirm the parties' obligations towards past agreements and the provisions of the Security Council resolutions, and to consistently report the lack of progress on the peace/political talks as well as on the cooperation between the parties on a variety of issues.

Here is the very limit of their action, as to be sustainable in the long run, the stabilization effect of peace operations must have an objective: to support a political/peace process to change the political status quo. If it is delayed for decades, then the UN mission becomes the protector of the status quo only, which can have in itself a number of consequences. If the monitoring and the observation processes led by UN mission serve the political negotiations at the beginning, it undermines them when they are protracted. And over the years, facts on the ground have been imposed by the parties that eroded the status quo, and have undermined the ability of these missions to address the changes in the balance of forces, due to the constraints placed on the implementation of their mandate, the lack of capabilities and most importantly the lack of political backing.

The one-dimensional missions still active today are as old as the conflicts they are dealing with, but that doesn't say anything about their efficiency or inefficiency in implementing their mandate, as the parameters of a peace settlement are, as one UN official put it, "above their pay grade." All these missions are in fact performing a rather discreet and quiet job that is at the heart of prevention. They are the eyes and ears of the UN and its members in conflict zones that can flare up at any time. These conflicts are calm but unpredictable, and these missions help to keep them calm by continuously reassuring the parties that the conditions in the ceasefire zone are professionally and impartially monitored, and that any violations will be speedily identified and resolved.

They also, in a way, reflect the current trends of conflict with blurring boundaries between war and post-war and frequent conflict relapses, in an international context where the rise of major power friction seems set to make international diplomacy over crises ever more difficult, with the consequence of increasingly having a Security Council "muted" by geopolitical tensions. The war in Ukraine that erupted on 24 February 2022 has of course amplified that assessment. And it may be time again for researchers and policy makers to give more attention to inter-positional forces and observation missions. If a UN peacekeeping mission will be called upon to help monitor and implement an eventual ceasefire agreement in

Ukraine, it will undoubtedly be an observation and monitoring mission of this genre.

The continued relevance of the peace missions created during the Cold War shows us that we should not think in terms of old and new, as no one type of peacekeeping mission can meet the variety of needs and contexts that UN peace operations may be called on to serve in the future. The observation missions also draw in themselves another set of lessons learned: the difficulty to have the political and the military work hand in hand, with the presence of a special envoy not being necessarily connected to the work of the mission on the ground (cases of Western Sahara or of Yemen); the recognition of the limits of state building that are driving attention towards more modest missions in the future; the added value of conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms, and how they could be improved to defuse tensions; the need for a proper communication strategy, which is something that researchers have advocated for quite some time in the context of multidimensional missions but that is as key for one-dimensional ones.

What emerges at the end of this study is that the world of "peace operations" may be divided into at least three types of missions: one-dimensional observation or monitoring missions, multidimensional missions, and special political missions. The problem is that this trend seems to contradict the wish of the Secretary-General to promote "a peace continuum". The "New Agenda for Peace" that António Guterres wishes to elaborate by September 2023 will have to "reunite" the various peace operations so that the UN system is able to answer the variety of challenges of international peace and security with a coherent but diverse set of tools in the future. The good news is that if a new era of great power rivalry requires the UN to once again adapt UN peacekeeping, then the experience that the UN has already built up over many decades, including with observation and monitoring operations, will provide it with a rich resource of options and models to choose from.

1

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception, UN peacekeeping has been characterized by its longevity, its adaptability, and its diversity.¹ Its doctrine, although only officially framed until 2008, benefitted from the many crises and conflicts the UN was involved in, and the many tools and types of missions the Organization had to deploy on the ground to contribute to their management or their resolution.

As of 2022, in a context of a progressive reduction in the number of peace operations,² five of the 12 current peacekeeping operations stem from the Cold War era: in chronological order, the operations in Kashmir (UNMOGIP, April 1948), in Jerusalem (UNTSO, May 1948)³ – observations missions that were precursors to the peacekeeping concept of the mid-1950s (see section 2.1) – in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964), in the Golan (UNDOF, 1974), and in South Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978). MINURSO, created in 1991 (with the issue of Western Sahara being on the table of the Security Council since 1988⁴) could also be added to that list as the nature of its mandate, and its conflict environment is similar to those previous missions (see annex 1). Most of these missions are deployed in the wider Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East/North Eastern Africa region (except the one in Kashmir), where major powers of the Security Council are involved.

These missions belong to a particular period of time, when superpower rivalry generally limited UN peacekeeping to third

party ceasefire monitoring or observation missions in interstate conflicts. They were limited and focused in their mandate, and they have performed a stabilization role in the regions where they are deployed, even with crises and changes occurring in their immediate security environments. For a few years now in Syria, Colombia, and Yemen, the UN Security Council has been looking at such missions, as the changing global order has put pressure on the type of large state-building peacekeeping missions that were popular in the 1990s-2000s (i.e., multidimensional UN peace operations).

When studying UN peacekeeping operations, scholars and practitioners have, since the 1990s, mostly studied the large peacekeeping, state-building, and stabilization operations, indeed where the money, the troops, and the action were, often neglecting to look at the work done and the lessons that could be drawn from these earlier peacekeeping missions, although they still constitute today half of the peacekeeping operations deployed on the ground. There was also then “a sense more generally that the future of peacekeeping was in Africa, whether in partnership with the African Union and/or the Regional Economic Communities or UN alone.”⁵ The research community has also moved away from looking at those missions, because these missions are considered as a thing of the past (hence the term “legacy missions” sometimes used), hopeless, and facing an endless stalemate. In a way, the longevity of those missions has somehow discouraged the research community to study them.

This report is part of a series of Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung (FES) research on the security in the Eastern Mediterranean region and builds on the previous research undertaken by the author in assessing the effectiveness of UNFICYP and of the Good Offices Mission in Cyprus in the framework of the research network named EPON.⁶ The current report aims to put the UN presence in Cyprus into perspective, to show that the type of UN settings deployed in Cyprus is not unique, to highlight the common features of these Cold War peace op-

1 See Cedric de Coning, Mateja Peter (eds.), *Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, 2019, Palgrave Macmillan, 319 pages.

2 Since 2017, four major multidimensional peacekeeping operations closed in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Darfur (UNAMID); a fifth one has started its transitioning out (MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo); the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, and the Good Offices between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia closed.

3 As for UNMOGIP (see box 1), there is a little “debate” about the origin date of UNTSO: “UNTSO initially came into being during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to supervise the truce called for in Palestine by the Security Council. In 1949, its military observers (UNMOs) remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which were for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area.” *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 1996 (third edition), New York: Department of Public Information, p. 17.

4 With Resolution 621 of 20 September 1988, the Security Council authorized the appointment of a special representative for Western Sahara.

5 Interview, researcher, 18 February 2022.

6 Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland), *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus*, October 2021, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 214 pages.

erations (such as the way they are examined by the Security Council, their deployment in parallel to a peacemaking process, the positioning of great powers towards them, the extreme sensitivity of local political actors towards their activity, their limited political outreach, etc.), and to draw lessons from this type of missions for potential future trends in peacekeeping. In the current context of a return to cold war “minimalism” in the form of an increasingly divided Security Council (while wondering if the decision-making on peace operations will continue to be immune to this division, heightened by the Russian aggression over Ukraine) and of a diminishing interest towards large and expensive peace operations (including on the part of the Secretary-General who has put an emphasis on “the primacy of politics”⁷), lessons from missions created during previous eras of superpower rivalry are increasingly important, as is the study of inter-positional forces as a potential conflict prevention mechanism.

⁷ Secretary-General’s remarks to Security Council High-Level Debate on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations, 28 March 2018, available at: peacekeeping.un.org/en/secretary-generals-remarks-to-security-council-high-level-debate-collective-action-to-improve-un

2 COLD WAR UN PEACE OPERATIONS: DEFINITION OF A CONTINUING PRACTICE

2.1. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF UN OPERATIONS: FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE OPERATIONS

Box 1.

The steps towards the establishment of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

On 20 January 1948, the Security Council adopted Resolution 39 establishing a three-member UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).

On 21 April 1948, the Security Council met again and adopted Resolution 47, by which it decided to enlarge the membership of the Commission from three to five.

On 20 July 1948, the Commission asked the Secretary-General to appoint and send, if possible at once, a high-ranking officer to act as military adviser to the Commission, and further to appoint officers and necessary personnel who would be ready to travel to the Indian subcontinent at a moment's notice in order to supervise the cease-fire if and when it was reached.

On 13 August 1948, UNCIP unanimously adopted a resolution proposing to India and Pakistan that their respective high commands order a ceasefire and refrain from reinforcing the troops under their control in Kashmir. The resolution provided for the appointment by the Commission of military observers who, under the Commission's authority and with the cooperation of both commands, would supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.

On 11 December 1948, UNCIP submitted to India and Pakistan some new proposals for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir upon the signing of a truce agreement, which were accepted by the two Governments.

On 1 January 1949, both Governments announced their agreement to order a ceasefire effective one minute before midnight, local time, on that day.

On 15 January 1949, the Indian and Pakistan high commands conferred in New Delhi and formalized the ceasefire in Kashmir. The UNCIP Military Adviser, who was invited to join the conference, presented to them a plan for the organization and deployment of the military observers in the area. This plan was put into effect on the Pakistan side on 3 February, and on the Indian side on 10 February.

A first group of seven United Nations military observers arrived on 24 January. Their number was increased to 20 in early February. These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser, formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP.

Source: United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 1996 (third edition), New York: Department of Public Information, pp. 133-134.

United Nations peacekeeping started with a timid role in observing a ceasefire line, an activity “born of necessity as a largely improvised response to the times,”⁸ where “the authority of UN forces as largely moral and political, not military.”⁹ In 1948-1949, two observer missions, UNMOGIP in

Kashmir and UNTSO in Jerusalem, were created.¹⁰ These small missions were considered “ad hoc deployments of uniformed personnel” that led the way to the emergence, in the

⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali's introduction to *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁹ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets – The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, 2000, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, p. 22.

¹⁰ In these early days of the UN, various “UN Commissions” (a Commission of Investigation in Greece in 1946 with Resolution 15, a Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia in 1948 with Resolution 40, a Commission of the Security Council for India and Pakistan in 1948 with Resolutions 39 and 47) were set up that included a small number of military observers: these commissions could be considered as precursors to observer missions that contributed to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

mid-1950s, of “a distinct concept in the management of international conflict,” and “an institutionalized practice of regional conflict containment.”¹¹ In 1958, another observation group (of about 300 military observers), UNOGIL, was deployed to Lebanon for six months “to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders” (Resolution 128 of 11 June 1958). In June 1963, a Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) of 25 military observers deployed for a year “to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic” (Resolution 179). These observation missions also “formed the basis for a coherent role for the UN through the idea of ‘preventive diplomacy,’” as laid out by the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld,¹² “conducted by a group of military observers, as Alan James described it.¹³ In other words, peacekeeping began as mainly about observing and positioning blue helmets on both sides of a ceasefire line. But then it continued as “slightly more complex military tasks than just observation” constructed on factors “such as equitable geographic representation, the neutrality of contingents, the approval of the belligerents; and the passive nature of the military operations themselves.”¹⁴

This was a period of time when the UN Secretary-General “saw the UN’s primary role as intervening in order to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into regional or global wars involving the superpowers.”¹⁵ For John Hillen, “peacekeeping is a military technique for controlling armed conflict and promoting conflict resolution.”¹⁶ In 1995, the then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described the tasks of the early peacekeeping missions as follows: “Serving under the United Nations flag, military personnel from many countries have carried out tasks which range from monitoring cease-fire arrangements while peace agreements were being hammered out to assisting troop withdrawals, providing buffer zones between opposing forces and helping implement final settlements to conflicts.”¹⁷ In a context where the action of the Security Council was limited and its decision-making process often stalled,¹⁸ the UN was then intervening in a neutral way that was precluding the use of troops from the permanent members of the Council “in order to quiet fears of superpower intervention.”¹⁹ There were two

exceptions to this with the United Kingdom in UNFICYP and France in UNIFIL. As currently, the space given to the Secretary-General was also then quite limited and the UN Secretariat’s structure tiny; the General Assembly was however more present and used to counter the division of the Council, thus able to create in November 1956 “the first ‘real’ peacekeeping mission”²⁰: UNEF I – The UN Emergency Force – in the Sinai to end the Suez crisis by “securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities.”

The end of the Cold War was a milestone for peacekeeping because of the changes within the Security Council, triggered by the new cooperation that occurred among its member states (and especially its permanent members), and the expansion of threats to international peace and security it has had to deal with. Fifty-three peacekeeping operations have been created since then, compared to eighteen during the Cold War (i.e., up until 1989, see annex 2). Up until 2015, most peace operations became bigger (with often more than 15,000 troops on the ground), more complex in their mandate, multidimensional in their format, and with greater ambitions. These missions focused the attention of all UN institutions and resources, while other types of missions entered the UN’s tool box (see box 2).

After 2007 yet another UN tool, that had emerged in the 1990s, was developed in the form of “special political missions” (SPMs), funded by the regular budget rather than through the specific assessed contributions of the peacekeeping budget, and mainly composed of civilian personnel. They are “in principle distinguished from peacekeeping missions by being purely civilian, even when they have small or *unarmed* military or police components, conducting non-operational tasks.”²¹ They are therefore under the purview of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) of the UN Secretariat, as UN peace operations are managed by the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).²² These smaller missions are currently more numerous than the 12 peacekeeping operations: as of January 2022, 24 of these DPPA missions (see table 1) were deployed, and overall 50 of them have been created since the early 1990s.²³ And in fact,

11 “Introduction – Early Experiences: 1948-1963,” in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113 & 189.

12 Paul D. Williams (with Alex J. Bellamy), *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2021 (3rd edition), Cambridge: Polity, p. 57.

13 Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, 1990, International Institute for Strategic Studies, New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 1.

14 John Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

15 Paul D. Williams (with Alex J. Bellamy), *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 57.

16 John Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

17 Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s introduction to *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

18 Between 1946 and 1955, 83 vetoes (80 of them by the USSR) were cast and only 110 resolutions adopted.

19 Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, “Peacekeeping Operations”,

in Sam Daws, Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, 2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2.


20 Expression used by Mateja Peter, “Peacekeeping: Resilience of an idea”, in Cedric de Coning, Mateja Peter (eds.), *Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

21 On the history of those missions, see Sarah Cliffe, Alexandra Novoseloff, “Restructuring the UN Secretariat to strengthen preventive diplomacy and peace operations” (New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, February 2017), pp. 9-12.

22 The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had been for a number of years, because of its strength, under the purview of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. One interlocutor subsequently underlined that there has been “monitoring in Department of Political Affairs and a political mission in Department for Peacekeeping Operations.” Interview, UN official, 8 February 2022.

23 See <https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world>. SPMs cover a variety of mandates that are, for budget reasons, clustered in three groups: (1) Special/Personal Envoys and Special Advisers of the Secretary-General, (2) Sanctions Monitoring Teams, Groups and Panels (that are in fact not considered as “real” SPMs), and (3) Field-based Missions (including regional offices).

Box 2.
The UN's tool box – A variety of peace operations for a continuum of peace



Elaborated by Alexandra Novosseloff

SPMs have been the only new missions created and deployed by the Security Council since 2014: Colombia (UN Verification Mission in Colombia, 2017), Yemen (UN Mission to Sup-

port the Hudaydah Agreement, 2019), Haiti (UN Integrated Office in Haiti, 2019), and Sudan (UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, 2020).

Table 1
Current DPPA field-based missions

Date	Name	SC Resolution	Mandate	Personnel (as of January 2022)
Since 2002	UNOWAS United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	S/RES/	Responsibility for preventive diplomacy, good offices and political mediation and facilitation efforts in West Africa and the Sahel. UNOWAS also works to consolidate peace and democratic governance in countries emerging from conflict or political crises.	National staff: 22 International staff: 53
Since March 2002	UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002)	To support the people and institutions of Afghanistan in achieving peace and stability, in line with the rights and obligations enshrined in the Afghan constitution, and through <i>inter alia</i> the provision of good offices; the support for the organization of future elections; the strengthening capacity in the protection and promotion of human rights; the support for gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment; the coordination and facilitation of humanitarian assistance; and the support for Afghanistan's development and governance priorities.	National staff: 799 International staff: 296 UN Volunteers: 68
Since August 2003	UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	S/RES/1500 (14 August 2003)	To provide advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing the inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation enhanced electoral support; to facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation between Iraq and its neighbours; to promote accountability and the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform; to promote gender equality; and to promote coordination and facilitate delivery in the humanitarian and development areas.	National staff: 502 International staff: 303 UN Volunteers: 2

Date	Name	SC Resolution	Mandate	Personnel (as of January 2022)
Since December 2007	UNRCCA United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	Exchange of letters, S/2007/279, 16 May 2007	To assist and support the five countries of Central Asia–Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – in building their conflict prevention capacities through enhanced dialogue, confidence-building measures, and genuine partnership to respond to existing threats and emerging challenges in the region.	National staff: 22 International staff: 8
Since July 2010	UNOAU United Nations Office to the African Union	General Assembly Resolution 64/288 (1 July 2010)	To enhance the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of peace and security; to provide coordinated and consistent UN advice to the AU on both long-term capacity-building and short-term operational support, as well as to streamline the UN presence in Addis Ababa to make it cost-effective and efficient in delivering UN assistance to the AU in the area of peace and security.	National staff: 17 International staff: 28
Since March 2011	UNOCA United Nations Office in Central Africa	Exchange of letter, S/2009/697 (11 December 2009)	To carry out good offices and special assignments in countries of the sub-region; to cooperate with the Economic Community of Central Africa States in their promotion of peace and stability in the broader Central African sub-region; strengthening the Department of Political Affairs' capacity to advise the UN Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region.	National staff: 15 International staff: 33
Since September 2011	UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya	S/RES/2009 (16 September 2011)	To support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts; to exercise mediation and good offices in support of the Libyan political agreement's implementation; the consolidation of governance, security, and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process; to support key Libyan institutions and provide, upon request, essential services, and humanitarian assistance.	National staff: 98 International staff: 210 UN Volunteers: 6
Since June 2013	UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	S/RES/2102 (3 June 2013)	The provision of policy advice to the Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on peacebuilding and state-building in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law, development of a federal system, constitutional review, democratization, and coordination of international donor support.	National staff: 137 International staff: 187 UN Volunteers: 38
Since September 2017	UNVMC United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	S/RES/2366 (10 July 2017)	To accompany the parties and verify their commitments regarding points 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Peace Agreement on the reintegration of former FARC-EP members, and the implementation of measures of protection and security for former FARC-EP members and communities in territories most affected by the conflict.	National staff: 158 International staff: 162 UN Volunteers: 131 International observers: 120
Since January 2019	UNMHA United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement	S/RES/2452 (16 January 2019)	To support the Yemeni parties in delivering their obligations under the Stockholm Agreement, in particular the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement). To lead, and support the functioning of, the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC), assisted by a secretariat staffed by UN personnel, to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces, and mine action operations	National staff: 85 International staff: 74
Since October 2019	BINUH United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	S/RES/2476 (25 June 2019)	To advise the Government of Haiti in the promotion and strengthening of political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; to preserve and advance a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue, and protect and promote human rights.	National staff: 49 International staff: 65
Since June 2020	UNITAMS United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan	S/RES/2524 (3 June 2020)	To support the Sudanese democratic transition by assisting the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights and sustainable peace, as well as by supporting peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, peacebuilding, civilian protection and rule of law, and the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.	National staff: 117 International staff: 141 UN Volunteers: 11

Considered differently by the Secretariat, these “field-based DPPA missions” have also blurred the line between their specificity (mainly civilian in character) and those of peacekeeping operations (where the military component is dominant), especially as some of these SPMs have been similar to older peacekeeping missions in their mandate, like the mission in Colombia and the one in Yemen, as previously the UN Mission in Nepal. These three SPMs have had unarmed observers and a very focused mandate (disarmament for Colombia and Nepal, monitoring for Yemen), like those of the Cold War observation missions. In the case of Colombia, it is also worth noting that the Verification Mission is the result of the host nation having a rather negative perception of the alleged more intrusive role of peacekeeping operations and wanting a lighter footprint.²⁴ In the case of Yemen, the mission is managed by DPPA because of the existence of a special envoy on Yemen, as the Secretariat wanted to have the political and the military dimensions work hand in hand. And some of these DPPA missions deployed teams of monitors, like the UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which deployed in October 2021 a team of ceasefire monitors to establish the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component.²⁵ As for the introduction of any new practice, this was more the result of “ad hocism” than of a well-thought plan, as the Department of Political Affairs (as it was named before the 2017 reform²⁶) “was just trying to look for a purpose, pushed to have these missions, in which it had to include unarmed military observers because of the issues at stake.”²⁷ But what is very different between these SPMs and the peacekeeping missions from the Cold War era is their context: the current SPMs are dealing with civil wars, just like most peacekeeping operations since the 1990s.

This shows that, in a way, the budgetary and administrative distinction between special political missions and peacekeeping operations are meaningless in understanding their objectives, which are to keep the peace and to help solve crises and conflicts. The 2016 HIPPO report recommended to progressively include all these missions and operations under a single expression, “peace operations”, that would reflect a “broad spectrum of peace operations that it can draw upon to deliver situation-specific responses.”²⁸ The SPMs were not named peacekeeping missions/operations for bureaucratic reasons, and the use of the expression “peace operations” was aimed

at showing the diversity of UN’s tools in keeping and making peace, as shown in the graph below.²⁹ But this term, that was first used by the Brahimi report of August 2000 in a way to encompass all UN actions in this field (i.e., conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peace-building),³⁰ then used by the HIPPO, and finally used in the framework on the Peace and Security reforms of António Guterres in 2017, was never really agreed upon by the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (or C-34), which still talks in its reports about “peacekeeping operations.”³¹ DPPA talks about “field-based missions” and not about “peace operations,” while DPKO had to drop its “K” and be the only one using that term while becoming DPO in 2017. This debate over the difference between SPMs and PKOs and between DPA/DPPA and DPKO/DPO does not interest anyone outside of the UN,³² but more and more researchers on peacekeeping have integrated this into their analysis because of the number of SPMs and in the drive to encompass all activities undertaken by the UN in the field of peace and security.

2.2. HOW TO NAME OLDER UN OPERATIONS? UNIDIMENSIONAL VS. MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Several researchers and/or policy-makers often refer to older but still ongoing Cold War missions as “traditional” ones, opposing them to what they would consider as “modern” type of peace operations, the multidimensional ones that emerged at the end of the 1980s and dominated peacekeeping in the 1990s and 2000s. In fact, all periods of time in which UN peacekeeping evolved have had a wide diversity of missions. The format of these missions is the result of the type of conflict they are meant to be dealing with, and hence the resources allocated by member states. In such context, an opposition between old and modern peacekeeping has no ground. The word “traditional” may also refer to missions of the past, of a bipolar world that had a narrow conception of security and that had to mainly deal with interstate conflicts, and as such was less interfering in the internal affairs of its member states, in opposition to a post-Cold War world that has mainly been involved in intrastate conflicts or civil wars, with a transformative agenda and bigger involvements. The fact is that this sort of peacekeeping does not belong to past practices, as the present study wants to highlight, nor has it been immune to certain evolution: they constitute a specific kind of long-estab-

²⁴ Arthur Boutellis, Alexandra Novosseloff, “Road to a Better UN? Peace Operations and the Reform Agenda,” November 2017, New York: International Peace Institute, pp. 3 & 15-16.

²⁵ S/2022/31, 17 January 2022, “UN Support Mission in Libya: Report of the Secretary-General,” para.74.

²⁶ On the Guterres reforms, see Arthur Boutellis, Alexandra Novosseloff, “Road to a Better UN?”, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Interview, researcher, 18 February 2022. As another researcher pointed out, “this ‘ad hocism’ could be said to be the basis of both UNTSO and UNMOGIP as well. Although there was explicit institutional memory carrying over from League operations (such as the international force in Saar), it is unlikely that planners saw the first UN missions as either a continuation of established practice or the beginning of a distinct new ‘project.’” Interview, 15 March 2022.

²⁸ UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People—Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* (also called HIPPO), UN Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015, p. viii.

²⁹ Alexandra Novosseloff, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Towards a UN Peace Continuum,” in Bruno Charbonneau, Maxime Ricard (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of African Peacebuilding*, 2022, *forthcoming*. See also on that topic Ian Johnston, “Between Bureaucracy and Adhocism: Crafting a Spectrum of UN Peace Operations,” *Global Peace Operations Review*, 31 March 2016.

³⁰ A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, para. 10.

³¹ See its latest report A/75/19, 17 March 2021, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

³² And it has been for UN member states a taboo because of the financial implications of “transferring” SPMs from the regular budget to the peacekeeping budget. On the complexities of such reform, see Sarah Cliffe, Alexandra Novosseloff, “Restructuring the UN Secretariat to strengthen preventative diplomacy and peace operations,” *op. cit.*, pp. 27-32.

lished practice and they have adapted over time even if their mandate did not change. Therefore, if all UN field missions should be part of a peace continuum (a message that the current Secretary-General wished to promote through his report “Our Common Agenda” and his forthcoming “New Agenda for Peace”³³), the missions created during the Cold War are one tool of crisis management among many others.

In the 1990s, these missions were also referred to as “first generation peacekeeping” (see box 3), and were designed “to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward.”³⁴ The UN even referred to “classical peacekeeping” operating alongside “a new type or ‘second generation’ of peacekeeping,” of a “multifunctional nature.”³⁵ But these expressions are not more meaningful, as they tend to neglect the missions created during those periods of time that do not correspond to the dominant model. For example, during the Cold War, the missions in the Congo (ONUC), in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) and in the West New Guinea (UNSG) are very different from the dominant model of observing and monitoring: ONUC is considered as a “second generation” mission and UNSG has been considered as a forerunner of the transitional administrations set up in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999. Many observation and monitoring missions have also been created after the end of the Cold War (see their list in annex 3). The fact is that the use of the “three generational paradigms” has been progressively discarded, as they were not offering clear-cut categories to describe an activity that often mixes the features of the three generations.

Box 3

The three generational paradigms of peacekeeping

“They include not only the early activities identified in Chapter VI (or so-called Chapter VI and a half) first generation peacekeeping—which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached. They also encompass a far more ambitious group of second generation operations that rely on the consent of parties, but engage in activities once thought to be only within the scope of domestic jurisdiction, such as elections monitoring. Finally, they include an even more ambitious group of third generation operations that operate with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties’ acquiescence. In today’s circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more factions in domestic civil wars, not all of whom are clearly identifiable and few of whom are stable negotiating parties.”

Source: Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, « Peacekeeping Operations », in Sam Daws, Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, 2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2.

Some other interlocutors have called those still ongoing Cold War operations “legacy missions,” as they have been carried over from an earlier time, from a world that doesn’t exist anymore. But that expression does not take into account the fact that these long-term missions have over the years adapted their working methods or their equipment to the evolving security environment in which they are deployed. That term does not include either the fact that even if those missions were created in a specific period of time (the East-West bipolarity), that is, their mandate, structure, and modus operandi are replicated in the missions that are more recent, either in interstate conflict, like the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) deployed along the border between the two countries in 2000-2008, or in intrastate conflict like the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) that *inter alia* assisted in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements in 2007-2010.

As a result, it seems that a new nomenclature is long overdue, especially as the expressions used so far tend to have a negative or pejorative tone. More importantly, they undermine the range of tools the UN has created since 1948. The missions created during the Cold War are no less relevant than more recent ones and continue to serve various purposes (monitoring of ceasefire lines, verification mechanisms, military observation). Moreover, the tasks entrusted to these military observers can be very different depending on the situation: from the supervision or observation of a truce or a ceasefire (UNGOMIP, UNTSO, MINURSO), to the mediation between the parties to the conflict, the supervision of the application of peace, armistice or disengagement agreements (UNTSO, UNDOF), or to the monitoring of borders. They could then also be named after by the main role of observation or monitoring they fulfil. However, that could still leave aside some of them and, the fact is that most of them are not confined to these tasks in their daily activities (UNIFIL, MINURSO, UNFICYP) that have evolved over the years.³⁶

A solution could be to name these missions “older” or rather “earlier” missions. They could also be qualified as “unidimensional” or “one-dimensional” missions, simply in opposition to their sister “multidimensional” ones,³⁷ and showing their main differences: the fact that their mandates are narrower, less intrusive, and non-transformational, contrary to most of the multidimensional stabilization missions, that their civilian branch is financially limited in the scope of their activities, all elements that belong to their specificities that are detailed below.

³³ See paragraphs 88-89 of this report: https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdf

³⁴ Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis, “Peacekeeping Operations”, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁵ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁶ In the case of MINURSO, “the initial mandate anticipated a broader range of functions, but as time passed, the Mission’s mandate – in practice – gradually reduced to solely ceasefire monitoring tasks.” Interview, former UN official, 2 March 2022.

³⁷ A special case of one-dimensional missions is the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA), a military force created by Resolution 1990 (27 June 2011), whose task is to monitor the flashpoint border between north and south and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, but is also, as multidimensional operations, authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.

3.

THE SPECIFICITIES AND COMMON FEATURES OF ONGOING COLD WAR UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Because of their history and the conflict environment in which they have been deployed for years, the still ongoing UN peace operations created during the Cold War that we are now calling “one-dimensional peace operations” have common features that are worth highlighting. They help explain their longevity and their achievements.

3.1. DURATION AND NATURE OF THE CONFLICT: LONG-TERM MISSIONS IN COMPLEX CONFLICT SETTINGS

These missions have all been created during a bipolar world, except MINURSO, which was created in April 1991 at the very beginning of the post-Cold War era. As such, they are the longest ones the UN ever deployed. That length also corresponds to the type of conflict in which they have been deployed: a protracted conflict or a frozen conflict where the peace/political process or the mediation towards conflict resolution has failed or is itself protracted, where the underlying incompatibilities remain unresolved but large-scale organized violence has not occurred for a considerable period of time.³⁸ As long as the conflict is not solved, the Security Council will be very hesitant to close down the mission, and over time these “long-duration missions can become incorporated into the long-term conflict dynamics, just as for some low-level income countries, the peacekeeping presence has become an essential part of the local economy.”³⁹ The long duration is not specific to these missions, but the 23-year-old multidimensional UN mission deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has now a transition plan towards its closing in the next five years:⁴⁰ none of the older Cold War missions have any such plan so far. And one has also to underline that keeping those missions can be a way for the Security Council to claim that it still does “something” and remains engaged on the situation. As such,

these missions can also be “an excuse or a smokescreen for not engaging further politically.”⁴¹

The link is often made between the length of a deployment and an alleged lack of efficiency of the UN on the ground. But as shown in the Cyprus case, this link must be challenged and has no real ground: it is not because a mission is four-decades long that it is by essence inefficient.⁴² It is still on the ground often because of the stalemate in the political negotiations and because of several constraints (see below). However, the more these missions indeed stay the more they become part of the conflict in creating a “comfortable” status quo that renders the “no war no peace” situation livable, and that in a way prevents the parties from going back to the negotiating table to make difficult concessions. Indeed, as described in the EPON Cyprus report, if the parties are comfortable, the urgency to resolve the conflict diminishes. In other words, their mandate, which was initially conceived as trying to resolve the conflict, transforms over the years the mission into a conflict management tool.

Even though the Cold War was dominated by intrastate conflicts, all these earlier UN missions are involved in conflicts of mixed nature, i.e., internal ones with a regional and an international dimension. The focus of the Security Council was, therefore, to manage the inter-state aspects of these intrastate conflicts because of cold war political constraints. As a result, these missions have been deployed to prevent the wider internationalization of regional conflicts along a cease-fire line, in particular in the Middle East region (see section 3.4 for a discussion on the strategic environment of these missions). And for the most part, they also, as pointed out by one interlocutor, “provided a hands-off form of cooperation designed to avoid conflicts rather than to ‘win’ them.”⁴³

³⁸ See Kamil Christoph Klosek, Vojtech Bahensky, Michal Smetana, Jan Ludvík, “Frozen conflicts in world politics: A new dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 2021, 58(4), pp. 849-858. Frozen Conflicts Dataset: <https://www.prcprague.cz/fcdataset>

³⁹ Interview, researcher, 15 March 2022.

⁴⁰ Alexandra Novosseloff & al., *Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Missions in the Congo (MONUC-MONUSCO)*, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019, 129 pages.

⁴¹ Interview, former UN official, 2 March 2022.

⁴² See Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland), *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus*, op. cit.

⁴³ Interview, researcher, 15 March 2022.

3.2. SIZE AND STRENGTH OF LIGHT FOOTPRINT MISSIONS


All these one-dimensional peace operations are small in size and strength, and their composition is very diverse, i.e., in comparison to their strength, they have several troop and police contributing countries. And these missions have traditionally seen a heavier involvement of Europeans than the multidimensional missions, as from the start, “European soldiers played a major part in United Nations peacekeeping during the Cold War,” with mainly “neutral or non-aligned nations looking for a security role in the Cold War context, such as Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Yugoslavia, and later Austria.”⁴⁴ Nowadays, four European countries (Italy, Spain, France, and Ireland) are in the top 10 contributing countries to the total contributions of UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNIFIL and MINURSO, and nine of the top 20 (see box 4). Among those missions, Nepal, Indonesia, India and Ghana are mainly contributing to UNDOF and UNIFIL. France have been involved in UNIFIL since 1978, and the United Kingdom in UNFICYP since 1964: two missions of which the two permanent members of the Council constitute their backbone (France deploying the “Force Commander’s Reserve” in UNIFIL, the United Kingdom deploying the “Mobile Force Reserve”). Ireland’s first engagement in peacekeeping was in the UN Observation Group in Lebanon in 1958. The Nordic countries have been long-standing contributors to observation and monitoring missions.

Except for UNIFIL (the fifth largest peacekeeping mission with a total of 10,638 personnel as of December 2021), only two of these missions have around 1,000 personnel on the ground (UNDOF with 1,250, UNFICYP with 1,005), and the others have less than 500 men and women deployed, even if that has not always been the case in the past: UNFICYP started with 6,238 troops and UNIFIL started 5,931 troops; MINURSO was meant to deploy 1,700 military; only the size of UNDOF remained stable at 1,250 personnel, UNTSO never exceeded more than 65 observers, and UNMOGIP started with a very small number of military observers (8). Altogether, the staff of these missions currently represent about 15.8% of all peacekeeping operations, but the number of operations counts for half of the ones managed by DPO.

A reduced format means that these operations are operating with rather modest or limited capacities (except for UNIFIL, which has some of the most sophisticated capacities among all peacekeeping operations, because of the involvement of European troop-contributing countries).⁴⁵ The modus operandi with unarmed military observers (except for UNIFIL and UNDOF) leans toward a more modest approach to keeping the peace, relying first and foremost on persuasion and discretion to achieve the mandate. They could not prevent any violation of the truce, and their presence is conceived as having, in itself, a deterrent effect. That does not mean that it has always been the case: for example, UNFICYP during the initial few months of its deployment, from April to August

Box 4

Ranking of contributions by country: The top 20 troop/police contributors to UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, UNIFIL and MINURSO (as of December 2021)



Source: DPO website: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

⁴⁴ Richard Gowan, “European Involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping,” in Hugo Meijer, Marco Wyss (eds.), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*, 2018, Oxford Scholarship Online, pp. 854-870.

⁴⁵ See Alexandra Novosseloff, Chapter on Expanded UNIFIL, in *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, op. cit.

1964, had to force its way to establish itself on the island; when deploying, UNIFIL had seriously clashed with armed elements operating in its area of operation. The reason is that they were not deployed following a proper ceasefire agreement or a peace settlement.

These modest means match a limited mandate and one negotiated between the permanent members with the lowest common denominator possible, one mandate for which the consensus on the way to implement it is minimal. As a result, these missions have a light footprint, something that corresponds to the current will of members of the Security Council to consider deploying “lighter missions that are less costly and more readily deployable than heavier mission templates.”⁴⁶ That lighter footprint also sends from the start a clear message to the parties to the conflict: the UN is here to assist and to help, but the success of its mission lies primarily on the cooperation of its interlocutors on the ground.

3.3. A NARROWER AND MORE FOCUSED MANDATE IN A LIMITED AREA OF OPERATIONS

The one-dimensional missions created during the Cold War have generally a more clear-cut and narrower mandate than the multidimensional operations. They are also deployed in smaller areas of operations than missions like in DRC, Mali or South Sudan. This has, in general, kept them away from the debates of the 2010s that their sister operations went through on the issues of infringement of host states’ sovereignty, on the protection of civilians, the monitoring of human rights, and on robust peacekeeping (except for UNIFIL, because of its strength and capabilities since 2007; paragraph 12 of Resolution 1701 asks UNIFIL “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”). In a period where resolutions and mandates are at least 10 to 15-pages long, these older missions have been praised for the simplicity and the straightforwardness of their mandates written in a few sentences or paragraphs. Two of them (UNMOGIP and UNTSO) do not regularly report to the Security Council and are financed through the regular budget of the Organization,⁴⁷ and not by its peacekeeping assessments;⁴⁸ they also have an open-ended mandate;⁴⁹ for UNTSO, the work done

⁴⁶ HIPPO report, UN Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446, 17 June 2015, *op. cit.*, para. 51.

⁴⁷ The activities of UNTSO and UNMOGIP are reported by the Secretary-General through the proposed programme budget submitted to the General Assembly: A/75/6 (Sect. 5), 7 April 2020.

⁴⁸ A/C.5/74/18, 24 June 2020: 74th session, Fifth Committee, Agenda item 148, Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Note by the Secretary-General on “Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021.”

⁴⁹ In the case of UNMOGIP, “given the disagreement between the two parties about UNMOGIP’s mandate and functions, the Secretary-General’s position has been that UNMOGIP can only be terminated by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same administrative arrangements. Its task is to observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General.” United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

by its military observers assigned to UNIFIL or UNDOF is also reported through these missions.

Their mandate focuses first and foremost on stabilizing or calming down the security situation (by freezing it and deterring violence, not by controlling a territory) through the separation of the belligerents and the monitoring of a ceasefire line and/or a buffer zone: the “line of control” in the case of Kashmir; the “green line” in Cyprus; the “blue line” in South Lebanon; the “purple line” in the Golan; and, theoretically, the Moroccan sand berm, in the case of MINURSO, whose “primary function was restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities (...) by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations.”⁵⁰ They are generally confined to a very limited area of operation with very little room to manoeuvre, with patrols in prescribed areas or restrictions regarding the access to certain areas. Their other role is to maintain the liaison, the communication, with the parties to the conflict mostly at the military level, and to conduct investigations on alleged attacks (see section 4.2.). These mandates are mostly conducted in an impartial way, with a mission “entirely detached from involvement in any internal or local problems.”⁵¹ This has succeeded to some extent, but over the years, their mandates have been eroded, and these missions have become part of the local security landscape, and have mainly managed the status quo intending to prevent escalation.

Box 5

Pen-holders of the mandates of one-dimensional missions in the UN Security Council

Cyprus	The United Kingdom
Golan Heights (UNDOF)	The Russian Federation, the United States
Lebanon	France
Middle East (Israel/Palestine)	The United States is often seen as the lead, but various other Council members have drafted recent proposals on the issue.
Western Sahara	The United States

Source: “2022 Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders,” Security Council Report: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_penholders_chairs.pdf

⁵⁰ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 271. Other tasks have also been performed by these missions, such as clearing minefields (UNIFIL), assisting in prisoner of war (UNFICYP, UNDOF), and helping repair local infrastructure damaged by conflict (UNFICYP, UNIFIL). John Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁵¹ A/3943, 9 October 1958, “Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: report of the Secretary-General,” para.149.

The mandates of one-dimensional missions have been renewed every six months (UNDOF, UNFICYP) to one year (MINURSO, UNIFIL) for several decades without being modified, even if the situation on the ground has changed. They have primarily taken the form of technical roll-over: the challenge for the negotiations in the Council is to avoid any change. Only members of the P5 hold the pen on these resolutions (see box 5). Considering that “significant amount of control by the P5,” one interlocutor noted that “non-permanent Council members generally don’t focus their energy on changing these dynamics, unlike their focus on include language in multidimensional missions.”⁵²

In the case of UNDOF for example, the Syrian conflict that began in 2011 and “the breakdown of Syrian authority in the Golan area” greatly affected the UN Force that had for three years operated from the Israeli occupied side of the ceasefire line. The Security Council had therefore asked the Secretary-General to report every 90 days, but the mandate remained the same and strictly defined by the Disengagement agreement.⁵³ Ceasefire lines are not necessarily static, like in Cyprus, as these lines can move with time, as they are in general contested by one side. In Cyprus for example, UNFICYP’s work has been complicated by the absence of a formal ceasefire,⁵⁴ and the fact that the lines are for the most part, unmarked unless at times by a few UN barrels. As a result, the mission tries to maintain firm control along the ceasefire lines, “on the premise that both sides wish to prevent incidents.”⁵⁵ The situation along the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon has also evolved over time and numerous incidents are constantly occurring in its vicinity, especially urban populated areas. In 2020-2021, the major strategic shift after the United States had recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, a decision made by President Trump in December 2020 and untouched by President Biden in June 2021, left MINURSO unchanged.

Both parties to the conflict, or the host states, and the members of the Security Council fear changing the wording of a mandate that could trigger some disruption on the ground (see below). Parties have been accustomed to facing each other and nobody wants a grain of sand to get into those seemingly well-oiled cogwheels. Some others are even unwilling to discuss any possible change (case of MINURSO). If changes on the ground are notified in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and sometimes

mentioned in the preambular paragraphs of Security Council resolutions, they are not in their operational ones. Some missions don’t even use the expression “mandated tasks” anymore, as their strict implementation has become impossible over the years.

3.4. MISSIONS WITH A DOMINANT MILITARY STRUCTURE

What distinguishes the older Cold War missions from the special political missions is that their military component is usually predominant. In four out of the six missions, the head of mission is the Force Commander (except for UNFICYP and MINURSO), contrary to the “model” that emerged later for multidimensional missions, and by which a civilian figure heads a peace operation. This also means that in those missions, the Force Commander (still selected by DPO’s Office of Military Affairs) is more than just a military commander and has by the mere nature of its function, a political role, but this also varies from mission to mission. For example, UNDOF’s Force Commander, also Head of Mission, has mainly military interlocutors, so his political role has been very limited. And most of the time, s/he must exert this role without much political advice capacity. Only UNIFIL has a proper political section headed by the Director for Political and Civil Affairs that is also Deputy Head of Mission. All the other missions have a limited substantive political capacity: UNFICYP has one senior political adviser (even if the head of mission of UNFICYP, who is double-hatted deputy special envoy, has all the political advice s/he needs); UNTSO has only a senior adviser; MINURSO has a small substantive unit under the SRSG that includes political affairs officers, and has a chief of staff who is acting as an adviser to the SRSG; UNMOGIP and UNDOF do not have any political officer, just a “civil affairs officer” in the case of UNDOF with some informal political advisory role to support the engagement with some Syrian authorities.

The political sections of those missions have also been dwarfed by the parallel presence of a (special or personal) envoy of the Secretary-General: a senior diplomat or political figure whose task is to talk to the various parties to the conflict and try to set up a diplomatic process that will lead to peace negotiations. This position of envoy has sometimes been present from the start of the mandate creating the peacekeeping mission, like in Cyprus or in Palestine, sometimes later, like in Western Sahara (with a Personal Envoy). In the case of both Cyprus and Palestine, these special envoys had at the outset the title of mediators, but that did not last: after the resignation of Ecuadorian Galo Plaza Lasso in December 1965, the “UN mediator” in Cyprus was, in 1966, formally replaced by a Special Representative through whom the Secretary-General extended “his Good Offices”; in Jerusalem, the position of UN Mediator did not survive much longer after the assassination of Count Bernadotte in September 1948; in June 1994, after the Oslo Agreements, the UN established the position and the office of a UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, whose mandate does not overlap with UNTSO’s, as it is the case for the UN special envoy on Syria that has no relations with UNDOF. The Coordinator in Jerusalem, however, sometimes reports

⁵² Interview, researcher, 13 March 2022.

⁵³ UNDOF personnel have been kidnapped, subject to attack (accidental and non-accidental) by multiple sides in the war, and had equipment and weapons seized ... that “violence has not been a product of the Israeli-Syrian rivalry, the ongoing focus of UNDOF.” Peter Rudloff, Paul F. Diehl, “United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,” in *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 245.


⁵⁴ S/26777, 22 November 1993 “Report of the Secretary-General in connection with the Security Council’s comprehensive reassessment of the UN Operation in Cyprus,” para. 12.

⁵⁵ S/1999/657, 8 June 1999, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operation in Cyprus,” para. 20. See Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland) on UNFICYP and OSASG, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

Table 2

Staffing of the six one-dimensional peace operations (as of 30 November 2021)

Peace Operations	Military Observers	Troops	Staff officers (MHQ)	Police	International civilians	Local Civilians
UNMOGIP	43	-	-	-	21	47
UNTSO	156 (*)	-	-	-	82	150
UNFICYP	-	745	52	57	36	115
UNDOF	-	1,070	55	-	46	79
UNIFIL	-	9,622	207	-	244	565
MINURSO	208	20	14	2	72 (**)	158



(*) Most UNTSO are deployed to UNIFIL and UNDOF / (**) with an additional 14 UN Volunteers

Source: Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping_missions_factsheet_246_nov2021_en.pdf

on the situation in the Golan area. Lebanon is another special case where UNIFIL, based in Naqura, evolves alongside a Special Coordinator for Lebanon (SCL), based in Beirut, who coordinates all aspects of the work of the UN in the country; his/her terms of reference say that s/he is providing overall political guidance to the UN system in Lebanon, including UNIFIL. UNMOGIP has no envoy operating alongside the blue berets. Among the special political missions, the one in Yemen has a special envoy operating alongside its non-armed military observers whose work and presence preceded the establishment of the mission, but the relationship between the two senior officials have reportedly been difficult.⁵⁶

The civilian component of those missions has grown over the years, especially when they need to deliver humanitarian aid that is essential in a context where the conflict has become unsolvable. This “civilian component” comprises a diverse range of personnel: support (finance, budget, supply chain management, service delivery), humanitarian, and some-

times political staff in disguise. And this is the reason why civilians sometimes outnumber the military in a mission (UNTSO, MINURSO). Some missions have started to implement some “Quick Impact Projects” on the model of what is done to a much larger scale in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. They have also developed JMAC-like teams⁵⁷ and the CPAS tool⁵⁸ to improve their situational awareness and analysis.


⁵⁷ JMAC – Joint Mission Analysis Cell – is a structure whose objective is to provide integrated analyses for the senior management of the missions. See Olga Abilova, Alexandra Novosseloff, “Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine” (New York: International Peace Institute, July 2016), p.14.

⁵⁸ CPAS – Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System – is an integrated performance-assessment tool for peacekeeping missions. See the factsheet developed by IPI: <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CPAS-Factsheet.pdf>; and Malcolm Cavanagh, “The Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) – a 21st century approach to peacekeeping”, *LSE Blog*, 3 June 2021: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationalrelations/2021/06/03/cpas/>

⁵⁶ Interview, researcher, 18 February 2022.

Box 6

Example of the structure of a one-dimensional peace operation: The organizational chart of UNTSO



Abbreviations: ALO-Amman, Administrative and Logistics Office Amman; LOATA, Liaison Office Amman/Tel Aviv; LOB/C/D, Liaison Office Beirut/ Cairo/Damascus; OGL, Observer Group

Lebanon; OGG, Observer Group Golan.

Includes Protocol Cell.

D-I Chief of Mission Support for United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

Includes Training Cell.

Includes Procurement, Central Warehouse, Property Management and Movement Control Units.

Redeployment.

Source: A/75/6 (Sect. 5), 7 April 2020, Proposed programme budget for 2021, p. 64.

3.5. AN APATHETIC INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Another common feature of those Cold War missions is that they all evolve in an allegedly apathetic international environment. Analysts on peacekeeping had often pointed out that these operations are victims of the lack of strategic interest of the P5 in the regions and countries where they are deployed. However, the older one-dimensional missions created during the Cold War are a counter example to this analysis. They all stand in regions that either receive intense strategic attention worldwide (Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Middle East, North Eastern Africa) or can be caught up in nuclear deterrence if the status quo is broken (India/Pakistan).⁵⁹ This is precisely the reason why the P5 has been cautious in taking bold initiatives on each of those missions that would change the status quo, making it very difficult for representatives of the UN Secretariat (heads of mission, special envoys, force commanders, etc.) to operate on the ground and to have leverage over the actors of the conflicts.

These missions also evolve in the context of an intractable conflict and a frozen peace process. Conflicts in Cyprus, the Middle East, the territory of Western Sahara, and Kashmir all remain to this day unresolved, and the UN has been given a containment role in this context. Cold War missions tended to involve observation and interposition alone, peacemaking being just not part of the deal, as it “could have threatened fragile bipolar consensus.”⁶⁰ Logically, one of the main impediments to those missions is that they are not supported by any effective political process, and the Security Council has, therefore, been very reluctant to change their mandate or even have a discussion on possible changes in the wording of the resolution creating the mission. The parties to the conflict have been also very reluctant and have refrained from any changes in the format, means and activities of those missions. This is the reason why the strategic (UNIFIL) or independent (UNFICYP, UNDOF, MINURSO) reviews conducted by the Secretariat for those missions were mainly kept confidential (except for UNFICYP) and have had limited effects.⁶¹ The scope of the strategic review conducted in March 2017 on UNIFIL excluded a discussion on its mandate, as members of the Council did not want to open such a highly sensitive debate, especially in the context of its division.⁶² The Security Council has also refused to proceed to any change in the name of missions, even when their mandate had proven impossible to implement, like in the case of MINURSO with the *de facto* abandonment of the organization of the referendum, or like in the case of UNFICYP, which is in reality more

an “observation mission” than a “force.”⁶³ Here, the reason of that attitude comes also from the parties that sometimes simply refuse to discuss that issue.

In this context, the parties have also been able to maintain the UN mission (and its leadership) on the ground under severe scrutiny, as they have been unchallenged by the members of the Council which cannot threaten to withdraw these missions. They even sometimes question the updating of some operational documents (mission concept or concept of operations) by the Secretariat as required by internal regulations. The recurrent discussions on the reduction of the ceiling of troops of UNIFIL have also faced the great reluctance of the parties. In many instances, the host country has been the driver of the changes or the lack of change of these UN missions, including whether they have the ability to perform their mandate or discuss it in a meaningful way, and in determining the space given to the UN leadership (on the ground or in NY) to take initiatives or not. The limited leverage of these missions on the parties is an issue, and they have instrumentalized the divisions of the Security Council towards that goal.

⁵⁹ That is a difference with the recent special political missions that were deployed in non-strategic parts of the world (Nepal, Colombia, Yemen).

⁶⁰ Interview, researcher, 15 March 2022.

⁶¹ And they in fact did not concern the oldest observer missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP.

⁶² S/2017/202, 9 March 2017, “Letter dated 8 March 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

⁶³ In its report, EPON considered that the idea of transforming UNFICYP would be first and foremost to change its name to reflect the current type of mission and the fact that the head of the mission is a civilian. It would need to merge the Mission of Good Offices with UNFICYP and to have a new name that reflects better its observation role. See, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

4

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF ONGOING COLD WAR UN PEACE OPERATIONS

In the late 1980s, Professor Alan James described the three main functions of peacekeeping until then as being “crisis defusion, stabilization and settlement (assistance in resolving disputes).”⁶⁴ This has been indeed a common feature of the still ongoing missions created during the Cold War. They have been “keeping the peace” despite the odds or the crises erupting here and there, never changing their strategic environment nor their strategic environment fully changing them. Overall, these missions were able to contain the conflict while conceiving mechanisms to defuse tensions. But their achievements in peacekeeping did not really help the peacemaking efforts. The stability provided by these missions turned the situation into a status quo, sometimes rather comfortable (Cyprus, Lebanon), sometimes less so (Palestine, Kashmir, Western Sahara), a situation that made the main actors of the conflict and their supporters averse to changing its parameters.⁶⁵ In such context, these missions ask the following question: “How to keep peace in a static environment?”.

Box 7

UNMOGIP's achievements and limitations

“The lack of agreement on the mandate and India's limitations on UNMOGIP's presence led the Secretary-General to determine that until the Security Council agreed to the withdrawal of UNMOGIP it should remain in its mission area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire line and report them to the Secretary-General. Ultimately, however, this situation means that there remains no agreement on the status of UNMOGIP in Jammu and Kashmir. (...)”

Nevertheless, by helping to maintain a ceasefire for long periods, UNMOGIP has undoubtedly contributed to securing a minimal level of peace and security in the region. Without its presence, there would have been a much greater number of ceasefire violations.”

Source: Christy Shucksmith, Nigel D. White, “United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,” in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 133-143.

⁶⁴ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

⁶⁵ It is worth pointing out that the word “stabilization” has had different meanings at the UN, sometimes dominated by a military perspective, some other times by a development perspective. Here we are using this term in relation to the stability of the situation on the ground that a UN peace operation can provide through its presence. See Alexander Gilder, « The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates

4.1. MAINTAINING THE CONFLICT AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE




All these missions evolve in a very tense security environment, and their greatest achievement is to have contributed to stability in that context and to have prevented further deterioration of the situation. They have achieved a standstill, a status quo that allows very limited room for manoeuvre and political initiatives but by which the UN presence is in essence preventive. These missions are at the core of what Article 40 of the UN Charter means, and according to which the Security Council, “to prevent an aggravation of the situation,” may “call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures (...) without prejudice to the[ir] rights, claims, or position.” In other words, those missions are not deployed to provide a permanent solution but to *inter alia* maintain the (military) *status quo* pending a comprehensive political/peace agreement, to report violations, and to reaffirm the parties’ obligations towards past agreements and the provisions of the Security Council resolutions, and to consistently report the lack of progress on the peace/political talks as well as on the cooperation between the parties on a variety of issues. Overall, these missions have had a very low level of fatalities in their ranks over the years (see box 8).

As such, these missions have maintained, through their presence, their monitoring activities, their humanitarian assistance, their confidence-building measures, the conflict at an acceptable level. As Alan James underlined in the case of Cyprus, “UNFICYP’s task, therefore, was to try to keep things quiet, both as a desirable end in itself and in the hope of preparing the way for an agreement. Its contribution in this respect illustrated the chief ways in which a peacekeeping body can assist in maintaining calm. (...) When incidents did occur, UNFICYP endeavored to interpose itself so as to prevent more serious developments. (...) In conjunction with its incident-prevention work, UNFICYP thus helped to reduce much surface tension, and even made some contribution to the third aspect of stabilization: the reduction of anxiety.”⁶⁶ Except in times of a short resurgence of conflict (in Lebanon

and Practice of UN Peace Operations,” *Netherlands International Law Review*, 2019.

⁶⁶ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-228.

Box 8

Fatalities in older Cold War peacekeeping missions since 1948 (as of 31 December 2021)

Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>

in 1982 with the Israeli operation “Peace in Galilee”, and in 2006 with the Israeli operation “Change of Direction”; in Cyprus with the Turkish intervention in the summer of 1974; in the Golan during the Syrian conflict), the presence of UN missions maintained stability. In Cyprus, the last casualty due to the conflict occurred in 1996. But the Cyprus case and others “illustrate that limiting or eliminating armed conflict does not always lead to peace.”⁶⁷ On the role of MINURSO, the independent review conducted in 2018 determined that

MINURSO were performing three decisive conflict prevention functions: “First, it prevents ceasefire-related incidents from escalating, in an environment where there are no direct contacts between the two sides, both of which rely on MINURSO to adjudicate their various allegations. Second, MINURSO ensures that the situation on the ground supports the efforts of my Personal Envoy to revive the political process. Third, the Mission’s presence contributes to the maintenance of regional stability in the Maghreb.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Susan S. Allee, “UN Blue: An Examination of The Interdependence Between UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” *loc. cit.*, p. 104.

⁶⁸ S/2018/889, 3 October 2018, “Situation concerning Western Sahara, Report of the Secretary-General,” para.73.

Box 9.

UNDOF's achievements and limitations

“UNDOF was successful in its mission of disengaging the military forces of each side. Within a period of two weeks in June 1967, Israeli forces handed over large swathes of territory and Syria established civilian administration in designated areas. UNDOF was able to establish a buffer zone, separating the two sides, and inspected the area for improper troop or armament deployment. More broadly, over forty years, UNDOF built up a fine record of conflict abatement especially if one compares the incidence of violent conflict in the Golan area of operation deployment with other areas of Israeli-Syrian engagement. There has been no renewal of war in the Golan Heights area, even as Syria and Israel clashed in Lebanon in 1982 and Israeli fighter jets bombed Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. (...) However, both parties have prevented UNDOF inspectors from going into certain areas, especially those used for intelligence gathering by the parties. [And] Israeli and Syrian forces have committed (...) “permanent violations” by moving some troops and posts to prohibited areas in order to facilitate early warning in the event of attack. (...) With respect to conflict resolution, the presence of UNDOF has reduced tensions and stimulated some diplomatic efforts, but it has not led to a permanent settlement of differences.”

Source: Peter Rudloff, Paul F. Diehl, “United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,” in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-244.

In maintaining the conflict at an acceptable level, the observation and monitoring functions of these missions are key. As recalled in its latest report, “UNFICYP records all observed violations and engages with the two sides to resolve issues that arise in and around the buffer zone, with a view to maintaining calm and preventing escalation.”⁶⁹ For its part, MINURSO continuously “observes and records reports of any changes in the military presence and installations by the parties despite the suspension of the violations working group.”⁷⁰ As the security environment remains unpredictable on the territory of Western Sahara with “daily incursions into this zone and hostilities between the parties”, as underlined by the latest Secretary-General report, the UN Mission is “the only entity on the ground that reports on allegations of attacks: monitoring and observation is its bread and butter.”⁷¹ And the low-key aspect of that task is also part of the equation of that containment capacity while the search for peace can happen elsewhere or be done by other actors, from the UN or not, because in essence, “the inescapable fact is that the UN military observers themselves had little direct influence” on the environment in which they have been deployed and on the attitude of the parties.⁷²

⁶⁹ S/2021/1110, 31 December 2021, “Report of the Secretary-General on UN operation in Cyprus,” para. 59.

⁷⁰ S/2021/843, 1 October 2021, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” para.35.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, para. 84. Interview, former UN official, 28 February 2022.

⁷² John Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p.37.

Box 10

UNIFIL's achievements and limitations

“As the first Secretary-General's report indicated, “three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit” (S/12611, 19 March 1978, para.3). None of these conditions had ever been met between 1978 and 2006 for UNIFIL. Therefore, “all UNIFIL could do was to make a secondary contribution to the maintenance of peace”⁷³, in the form of a stabilizing role and a humanitarian assistance. In a way, UNIFIL reduced the impact of the Israeli occupation for the local population. (...) UNIFIL's responsibility for facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid was not specifically part of its original mandate but became over the years the primary justification for maintaining it. It also provided the local population with some limited economic development. Indeed, over the years, UNIFIL became a significant economic force injecting millions of dollars into the local economy each year, and thus raising living standards. (...) As all Secretaries-Generals pointed out once, “UNIFIL provides a vital mechanism for conflict control in an extremely volatile situation which, without it, would almost certainly escalate very quickly into a far wider conflagration” (S/13994, 12 June 1980, para.71; S/19445, 22 January 1988, para.26-27). (...) The Force was useful in maintaining local and regional stability. As Thakur put it, it was “not a peacekeeping force, but a war-dampening force. Its mandated task is impossible to attain, yet its presence remains indispensable.”⁷⁴

The main achievement of the expanded UNIFIL since the cessation of hostilities brought about by Resolution 1701 (11 August 2006) the unprecedented calm that has continued to prevail across the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel since 2006. This has been made possible through a three-dimensional presence of UNIFIL: as a security buffer, as a mechanism for de-escalation, and as an important actor in the local economy. This has been achieved by the impressive size of the force (more than 10,000 soldiers in a relatively small territory) and its new modus operandi, moving from a static posture (1978-2006), occupying a series of observation posts along the Blue Line, to the continuous conduct vehicle, foot and air patrols over any-24-hour period, 10 percent of them being done jointly with the LAF. (...) This constituted the major change from the former UNIFIL: the enhanced UNIFIL is working in support of a local actor, the LAF.”

Source: Alexandra Novosseloff, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” & “Expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 2015, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248-258 & pp. 767-778.

⁷³ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 625.

⁷⁴ Ramesh Thakur, “The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” in *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: UN Authority and Multinational Force* (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 67.

4.2. PROVIDING MECHANISMS TO DEFUSE TENSIONS

To achieve this stability, some of these missions have either served in themselves as a go-between for the parties to the conflict (UNTSO, UNFICYP, UNDOF) or have put in place specific mechanisms through which the parties can directly or indirectly talk to one another, something they won't do in any other settings (UNIFIL). Monitoring and observation missions are ideal tools to set up such mechanisms in working impartially with all parties and keeping it low-key, and these dialogues can occur despite the lack of political recognition and diplomatic relations between the parties. In the Cold War context, "these processes of relatively 'passive' facilitation would be about as far as any UN mission could enter into 'political' terrain," a contrast with the transformational mandates of the multidimensional missions of the post-Cold War era with sometimes the implantation of 'democratic governance' being explicit in Security Council resolutions.⁷⁵ The value of these operations lies rather in the liaison, dispute- and problem-solving tools, overt or under the guise of technical mandate implementation, which serve to relieve uncertainty, foster confidence, cultivate rapport and influence the parties towards non-offensive action.

The UN has had a long history of setting up military to military commissions and dialogue, such as between Georgia and Abkhazia between 1993 and 2009 (UNOMIG). Such mechanisms were also used by some SPMs, like the one in Nepal where a Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee composed of both armies' representatives and chaired by the UN was established for building trust between the parties and giving UNMIN the ability to respond to and defuse potential crises.⁷⁶

UNIFIL has established a tripartite mechanism between itself, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to help defuse tensions, to encourage the parties to fully "respect the Blue Line," to be part of the "security arrangements" needed "to prevent the resumption of hostilities," and to remove landmines, as provided in Resolution 1701. The Secretary-General considered it as "an essential confidence-building mechanism between the parties," and is in fact the only location where the Lebanese and Israeli military have a forum for direct exchange.⁷⁷ UNIFIL is thus able to defuse tensions and prevent incidents along the Blue Line by holding regular tripartite meetings with senior representatives of the LAF and the IDF, in which all critical security issues are addressed. A "hotline" was also established between the UNIFIL Force Commander and the IDF to report

Blue Line violations and any other emergency issues that may arise, while a similar mechanism was established with the LAF, in both Tyre and the Defense Ministry headquarters.⁷⁸ As summarized by the 2017 strategic review, "a key objective of the engagement of UNIFIL with the parties continues to be to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces in finding mutually agreeable security arrangements and agreeing on confidence-building measures to reduce the potential for tension or incidents, in particular in sensitive areas along the Blue Line."⁷⁹

When such mechanisms are impossible to create, the peacekeeping mission constitutes in itself a tool that liaises between the parties that do not want to have direct contacts. For example, Israel has communicated with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and vice versa, through UNTSO channels after refusing to cooperate in the consensual Mixed Armistice Commission system.⁸⁰ In the case of UNDOF, the 2018 independent review noted "the importance of the liaison maintained by UNDOF with the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian authorities on a regular basis and during times of crisis. In the absence of a formal mechanism to interact with both parties at the same time, UNDOF played a crucial role in conveying messages between the two sides. That was seen to have contributed, on a number of occasions, to clarifying misunderstandings and de-escalating tensions between the parties. The team also found that it was important for UNDOF, in consultation with the parties, to explore opportunities to enhance liaison with them to ensure compliance with the Disengagement of Forces Agreement."⁸¹ In Kashmir, the UN, through UNMOGIP, was at the outset of its mandate and deployment "able to devise a method for settling minor infractions by lending its offices for mediation and negotiation efforts."⁸² But this is no longer the case. MINURSO considered pushing for a tripartite mechanism "à la UNIFIL", but Morocco refused to consider the Polisario armed forces as an interlocutor.

In the case of Cyprus, the Security Council has since 2014 unsuccessfully called for the establishment of a military commission that could gather around the UNFICYP Force Commander representative of all parties, including the Guarantors. But beyond that issue, the strategic review of 2017 "found that, in order to increase its effectiveness, the capacity of UNFICYP for liaison and engagement should be

⁷⁵ Interview, researcher, 15 March 2022.

⁷⁶ See Teresa Whitfield, *Focused Mission: Not So Limited Duration – Identifying lessons from the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)*, February 2010, Center on International Cooperation, 26 pages.

⁷⁷ The aims of the tripartite meetings are also "to enhance liaison and coordination and to address key security and military operational issues, including violations of Resolution 1701 (2006) and the findings of UNIFIL investigations into incidents." This mechanism is also used to agree on the marking of the Blue Line. See S/2008/425, 27 June 2008, para.13.

⁷⁸ Karim Makdasi, Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, *UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East*, EuroMesco Paper, January 2009, p. 25.

⁷⁹ S/2017/202, 9 March 2017, "Letter dated 8 March 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," p. 3.

⁸⁰ Andrew Theobald, "The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization," in Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁸¹ S/2018/1088, 6 December 2018, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Report of the Secretary-General," para.23.

⁸² Christy Shucksmith, Nigel D. White, "United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," in *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

strengthened.”⁸³ UNFICYP currently serves as the main mechanism through which the sides pass messages or communicate at the military, police and civilian administration levels, a go-between role that has strengthened its legitimacy. The 2017 Strategic Review underlines that fact: “The ability of UNFICYP to resolve any such incidents quickly and prevent them from escalating was especially valued, as the two sides have no direct contact with each other and rely on the Force to clear up misunderstandings and pass on messages.”⁸⁴ The Secretary-General later added that “in the continued absence of direct contact between the relevant military, police and civilian authorities, UNFICYP plays a crucial role in liaising effectively between the sides and helping to resolve issues that could increase tension.”⁸⁵ The latest Secretary-General report to the Security Council stated that “the establishment of a direct military contact mechanism continued to face fundamental obstacles from both sides”; nevertheless UNFICYP put forward a proposal in 2020 that “the commanders of those opposing forces that maintain military positions along the ceasefire lines should enter into dialogue, with the facilitation of the mission’s Force Commander.”⁸⁶

4.3. FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

As explained by a former Secretary-General of the United Nations, earlier peace operations were initially conceived as a way “to facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreement; it offers combatants an opportunity to stop fighting and to explore fresh avenues towards peace.”⁸⁷ Indeed, to be sustainable in the long run, the stabilization effect of peace operations must have an objective: to support a political/peace process to change the political status quo. If it is delayed for decades, then the UN mission becomes the protector of the only status quo, which can have in itself a number of consequences. If the monitoring and the observation processes led by UN missions serve the political negotiations at the beginning, it undermines them when they are protracted. As pointed out by one interlocutor, “the problem is that we have seen over the years the gradual erosion of the status quo” in a number of missions (MINURSO, UNDOF, UNFICYP), “with a creeping change in the balance of forces on the ground”, which these missions have had difficulties to address “due to the constraints placed on the implementation of their mandate, the lack of capabilities and most importantly the lack of political backing.”⁸⁸ Facts on the ground have been imposed by the parties that eroded the status quo and that are slowly but surely removing the prospects for conflict resolution. This is the reason why, in the long run,

peacekeeping did not help peacemaking, as shown in the case of Cyprus, where an efficient peacekeeping tool has co-existed with an unsuccessful peacemaking one, despite constant and tireless attempts to find “a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus.”⁸⁹ International, regional and local politics on the island have kept UN mediators and actors in the following dilemma: “Is keeping the peace in such a context not better than an assertive settlement negotiation initiative that can re-ignite the conflict?”⁹⁰

In the case of UNTSO, Andrew Theobald considered that “the Security Council’s creation and maintenance of UNTSO institutionalized the stalemate, but the Arab-Israeli conflict threatened international peace. (...) Since UNTSO operations made it obvious by the mid-1950s that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not immediately be resolved, it needed to be contained in order to prevent greater calamities. The intransigence of the regional parties themselves made the quest for a peace settlement secondary to simply containing the fighting.”⁹¹ In the case of Western Sahara, the “crucial event that has been largely responsible for the stalemate has been the de-linking of the ceasefire from the work of the identification commission and other parts of the Settlement Plan. Although this de-linking was viewed as necessary and realistic at the time, it eliminated any sense of urgency by both sides to compromise and proceed to the referendum.”⁹² And “although at times MINURSO’s existence has been questioned, the general consensus even among its detractors has been that its continuation is necessary to the maintenance of stability in North Africa despite the lack of political progress.”⁹³ On Cyprus, a number of interlocutors have considered that UNFICYP has served to perpetuate a comfortable status quo that has constituted over time a constraint in the talks on the future of the island, and a trap for the two communities of the island.⁹⁴

If these missions have been successful in limiting violent conflict, they have been less so in stimulating peacemaking/conflict resolution. And they have ended up with protracted and sometimes frozen conflict where the prospect of resolution is still very far away. And it is the responsibility of the parties to the conflict to negotiate. One could argue that “hope for a future settlement is also part of preventing escalation in the present,” and that in the meantime the role of these missions is to manage the status quo, preventing escalation through building confidence in the ability of the ceasefire/truce to be

⁸³ S/2017/1008, 28 November 2017, “Strategic review of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” para.16.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, para.50.

⁸⁵ S/2019/37, 11 January 2019, “Report of the Secretary-General on UN operation in Cyprus,” para.51.

⁸⁶ S/2021/1110, 31 December 2021, “Report of the Secretary-General on UN operation in Cyprus,” para. 20.

⁸⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s introduction to *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁸⁸ Interview, former UN official, 16 February 2022.

⁸⁹ Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland) on UNFICYP and OSASG, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁹⁰ Interview, researcher, 16 February 2022.

⁹¹ Andrew Theobald, “The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization,” *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁹² Anna Theofilopoulou, “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,” in *Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁹⁴ See developments on this issue in Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland) on UNFICYP and OSASG, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-184.

managed in such a way that neither side is advantaged.⁹⁵ The fact is that any peacekeeping operation is dependent on the good cooperation of the host government and of the main parties to the conflict to achieve its mandate with efficiency. Nevertheless, these old missions are operating under the constant scrutiny of the host state, even for the slightest patrol, as already underlined. In a way, as one interlocutor considered in the case of UNFICYP, “the Force is tolerated in the island in the absence of a solution,”⁹⁶ something that is common to all the other missions. In such context, one could wonder if and how these missions could be internally restructured towards a more active role in peacebuilding. This is precisely what we have suggested in our EPON report on Cyprus recommending “the UN presence in Cyprus to carry out the groundwork necessary to build trust and peace in a new way, give more visibility to peace dividends, and better support civil society and the emerging social mobility at grassroots level from both communities.”⁹⁷ But of course, such proposal is likely to be opposed fiercely by both sides of the Green Line. In the meantime, one interlocutor suggested that these one-dimensional missions “could review in depth their communication strategy: In a world where wars are won less and less by the best weapons and more by the best story, perhaps these old missions, which know the local context well, could do more.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Interview, researcher, 18 February 2022.

⁹⁶ Interview, UN staff, Nicosia, 15 June 2021.

⁹⁷ Alexandra Novosseloff (with Lisa Sharland) on UNFICYP and OSASG, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

⁹⁸ Interview, former UN staff, 8 February 2022.

5 CONCLUSION: MISSIONS THAT ARE HERE TO STAY

The old one-dimensional missions still active today are as old as the conflicts they are dealing with that aren't resolved, but that doesn't say anything about their efficiency or inefficiency in implementing their mandates, as the parameters of a peace settlement is, as one UN official put it: "above their pay grade."⁹⁹ All these missions are in fact performing a rather discreet and quiet job that is at the heart of prevention, in line with reforms initiated by António Guterres since 2017, and his call for a "surge in diplomacy." They are the eyes and ears of the UN and its members in conflict zones that can flare up at any time, that are calm but unpredictable, as the Secretary-General often says in his reports. In such circumstances, what is considered as conflict prevention could also be seen as early warning mechanisms.

In a way, they reflect the current trends of conflict. The IISS Conflict Survey 2021 identified "the increasing protractedness of conflicts and the blurring of the line between their active and post-conflict phases" as one of the major trends of the current security environment. It has also pointed out that "the duration of conflict has extended, reaching an average of 30 years in 2020, amid blurring boundaries between war and post-war and frequent conflict relapses."¹⁰⁰ And this is occurring in a context where, as Richard Gowan put it, "the rise of major power friction seems set to make international diplomacy over crises ever more difficult," with the consequence of increasingly having a Security Council "mutated" by geopolitical tensions,¹⁰¹ and a world organization increasingly confined to being able to reach a consensus only "on humanitarian arrangements and other tools (such as the deployment of observers) to get aid to the suffering, support local ceasefires, and take other steps to lessen the harm of war."¹⁰² The war in Ukraine that erupted on 24 February 2022 has of course amplified that assessment. And it may be time again for researchers and policy makers to give more attention to inter-positional forces and observation missions.

The peace missions created during the Cold War show that no size necessarily fits all in UN peacekeeping, and that they should be considered as important as their sister multidimensional ones. These missions also draw in themselves another set of lessons learned: the difficulty to have the political and the military work hand in hand, with the presence of a special envoy not being necessarily connected to the work of the mission on the ground (cases of MINURSO, of Yemen); the recognition of the limits of state building that are driving attention towards more modest missions in the future; the added value of conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms, and how they could be improved to defuse tensions; the need for a proper communication strategy, something that researchers have advocated for quite some time in the context of multidimensional missions, but that is as key for one-dimensional ones. Overall, they have few common features with their sister multidimensional missions, and they have imported some of their practices, such as the expansion of the work of "civil affairs" sections, the development of "Quick Impact Projects," the creation of JMAC-like teams to improve their situational awareness and strategic analysis and the use of CPAS to assess their performance.

What emerges at the end of this study is that the world of "peace operations" may be divided into three: the one-dimensional missions, the multidimensional missions, and the special political missions. The problem is that this trend seems to contradict the wish of the Secretary-General to promote "a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict," as well as "a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks."¹⁰³ The "New Agenda for Peace" that António Guterres wishes to elaborate by September 2023 will have to "reunite" the various peace operations so that the UN system is able to answer the variety of challenges of international peace and security with a coherent but diverse set of tools in the future. The good news is that if a new era of great power rivalry requires the UN to once again adapt UN peacekeeping, then the experience that the UN has already build up over many decades, including with observation and monitoring operations, will provide it with a rich resource of options and models to choose from.

⁹⁹ Interview, UN staff, 8 February 2022.

¹⁰⁰ "The Worldwide Review of Political, Military And Humanitarian Trends In Current Conflicts," 21 September 2021: www.iiss.org/acs


¹⁰¹ Richard Gowan, "The U.N. Still Has a Role to Play on Crisis Management," *World Politics Review*, 13 December 2021.

¹⁰² Richard Gowan, "Major Power Rivalry and Multilateral Conflict Management," *Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder* No. 8, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, December 2021.



¹⁰³ Paragraph 88 of "Our common Agenda" report, *op. cit.*



ANNEX 1

Still active one-dimensional UN peacekeeping missions created during the Cold War



Date	Name	SC Resolution	Mandate	Personnel (as of January 2022)	Budget (USD as of 2022)																		
Deployed since January 1949	UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	S/RES/47 (21 April 1948)	To observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General. Military observers conduct field tasks (area recce, field trip, field visit and observation post) along the Line of Control. As part of the 1949 Karachi Agreement, UNMOGIP also conducts investigations into alleged ceasefire violation complaints, which the two parties can submit to the Mission.	109 personnel: 68 civilians, 41 observers	10.5 million																		
		<p>Top ten military contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Croatia</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Republic of Korea</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Philippines</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Thailand</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>Sweden</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Switzerland</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Uruguay</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Argentina</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Italy</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Romania</td><td>2</td></tr> </table>		Croatia	8	Republic of Korea	7	Philippines	6	Thailand	5	Sweden	4	Switzerland	3	Uruguay	3	Argentina	2	Italy	2	Romania	2
Croatia	8																						
Republic of Korea	7																						
Philippines	6																						
Thailand	5																						
Sweden	4																						
Switzerland	3																						
Uruguay	3																						
Argentina	2																						
Italy	2																						
Romania	2																						
<p>Head of Mission (HoM) = Force Commander</p>																							

<p>Deployed since June 1948</p>	<p>UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</p>	<p>S/RES/50 (29 May 1948)</p>	<p>To monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region.</p>	<p>377 personnel: 232 civilians; 145 observers</p> <p>Contributing countries The top ten troop and police contributing countries to the mission are listed below. You can view a full list of countries contributing to all missions on the troop and police contributors page</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Finland</td><td>15</td></tr> <tr><td>Australia</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr><td>Norway</td><td>14</td></tr> <tr><td>Switzerland</td><td>13</td></tr> <tr><td>Ireland</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>Denmark</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>New Zealand</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Sweden</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Canada</td><td>5</td></tr> </table>	Finland	15	Australia	14	Norway	14	Switzerland	13	Ireland	12	Denmark	11	Netherlands	11	New Zealand	8	Sweden	6	Canada	5	<p>36.5 million</p>																				
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<p><i>HoM = Force Commander / Parallel Special political mission (UN Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, UNSCO, based in Jerusalem)</i></p>																																													
<p>Deployed since March 1964</p>	<p>UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</p>	<p>S/RES/186 (4 March 1964)</p>	<p>To use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting; to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and to contribute to a return to normal conditions.</p>	<p>1,010 personnel: 749 troops, 53 staff officers, 57 police, 151 civilians</p> <p>Top ten military contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>United Kingdom</td><td>252</td></tr> <tr><td>Argentina</td><td>249</td></tr> <tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>241</td></tr> <tr><td>Paraguay</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>Hungary</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>Serbia</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Chile</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Russian Federation</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Austria</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Pakistan</td><td>3</td></tr> </table> <p>Top ten police contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Ireland</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Russian Federation</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Slovakia</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>China</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Ukraine</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Finland</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Jordan</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Bulgaria</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Italy</td><td>2</td></tr> </table>	United Kingdom	252	Argentina	249	Slovakia	241	Paraguay	12	Hungary	11	Serbia	8	Chile	6	Russian Federation	4	Austria	3	Pakistan	3	Ireland	12	Bosnia and Herzegovina	7	Russian Federation	6	Slovakia	6	China	4	Ukraine	4	Finland	3	Jordan	3	Bulgaria	2	Italy	2	<p>57.5 million</p>
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<p><i>HoM = SRSO / Special Adviser of the Secretary-General (currently vacant) with a Mission of the Good Offices</i></p>																																													
<p>Deployed since June 1974</p>	<p>UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan)</p>	<p>S/RES/350 (31 May 1974)</p>	<p>To maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces; to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.</p>	<p>1291 personnel: 1110 military, 56 staff officers, 125 civilians.</p> <p>Top nine police contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Nepal</td><td>414</td></tr> <tr><td>Uruguay</td><td>212</td></tr> <tr><td>India</td><td>199</td></tr> <tr><td>Fiji</td><td>150</td></tr> <tr><td>Ireland</td><td>137</td></tr> <tr><td>Ghana</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Bhutan</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Czech Republic</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>1</td></tr> </table>	Nepal	414	Uruguay	212	India	199	Fiji	150	Ireland	137	Ghana	6	Bhutan	3	Czech Republic	3	Netherlands	1	<p>65.5 million</p>																						
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<p><i>HoM = Force Commander</i></p>																																													

<p>Deployed since March 1978</p>	<p>UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</p>	<p>S/RES/425 (19 mars 1978) S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006)</p>	<p>To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; to restore international peace and security; to assist the Gov. of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.</p>	<p>10,655 personnel: 9,632 troops, 214 staff officers, 809 civilians.</p>	<p>510.2 million</p>																								
			<p>To monitor the cessation of hostilities; to accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South; to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; to assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Gov. of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area.</p>	<p>Top ten military contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Indonesia</td><td>1000</td></tr> <tr><td>Italy</td><td>904</td></tr> <tr><td>India</td><td>894</td></tr> <tr><td>Ghana</td><td>878</td></tr> <tr><td>Nepal</td><td>870</td></tr> <tr><td>Malaysia</td><td>833</td></tr> <tr><td>Spain</td><td>825</td></tr> <tr><td>France</td><td>568</td></tr> <tr><td>China</td><td>419</td></tr> <tr><td>Ireland</td><td>369</td></tr> </table>		Indonesia	1000	Italy	904	India	894	Ghana	878	Nepal	870	Malaysia	833	Spain	825	France	568	China	419	Ireland	369				
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Ireland	369																												
<p><i>HoM = Force Commander / Special Coordinator for Lebanon (based in Beirut)</i></p>																													
<p>Deployed since April 1991</p>	<p>MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</p>	<p>S/RES/690(29 April 1991)</p>	<p>To monitor the ceasefire; to reduce the threat of mines and UXOs; to provide logistic support to the UNHCR-led Confidence Building Measures.</p>	<p>485 personnel: 230 civilians, 245 military personnel</p>	<p>60.9 million</p>																								
				<p>Top ten military contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Bangladesh</td><td>25</td></tr> <tr><td>Ghana</td><td>23</td></tr> <tr><td>Egypt</td><td>19</td></tr> <tr><td>China</td><td>17</td></tr> <tr><td>Honduras</td><td>15</td></tr> <tr><td>Malaysia</td><td>13</td></tr> <tr><td>Pakistan</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>Brazil</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>Hungary</td><td>11</td></tr> <tr><td>Russian Federation</td><td>10</td></tr> </table> <p>Top ten police contributors (as of November 2021)</p> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Ghana</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>Kenya</td><td>1</td></tr> </table>		Bangladesh	25	Ghana	23	Egypt	19	China	17	Honduras	15	Malaysia	13	Pakistan	12	Brazil	11	Hungary	11	Russian Federation	10	Ghana	1	Kenya	1
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Ghana	1																												
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<p><i>HoM = SRSF / Personal envoy of the Secretary-General (based in New York)</i></p>																													

ANNEX 2

UN Peace Operations created during the Cold War (1948-1989)

Date	Name	SC Resolution	Mandate	Maximum deployment (when applicable, as of January 2022)
Deployed since January 1949	UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	S/RES/47 (21 April 1948)	To observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General. Military observers conduct field tasks (area recce, field trip, field visit and observation post) along the Line of Control. As part of the 1949 Karachi Agreement, UNMOGIP also conducts investigations into alleged ceasefire violation complaints, which the two parties can submit to the Mission.	109 personnel: 68 civilians, 41 observers
Deployed since June 1948	UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	S/RES/50 (29 May 1948)	To monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region.	377 personnel: 232 civilians; 145 observers
November 1956 – June 1967	UNEF I United Nations Emergency Force	GA Resolution 998 (ES-I) (4 November 1956)	To secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire.	6,073 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff
June 1958– December 1958	UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	S/RES/128 (11 June 1958)	To proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.	591 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff (1957)
July 1960 – June 1964	ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo	S/RES/143 (14 July 1960)	To ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. To maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries.	19,828 troops (July 1961)
October 1962– April 1963	UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	GA Resolution 1752 (XVII) (21 September 1962)	To maintain peace and security in the territory under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. UNSF monitored the ceasefire and helped ensure law and order during the transition period, pending transfer to Indonesia.	1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff
June 1963– September 1964	UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	S/RES/179 (11 June 1963)	To observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The tasks of UNYOM were limited strictly to observing, certifying and reporting in connection with the intention of Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country.	189 military personnel, including 25 military observers, 114 officers and other ranks of reconnaissance unit, 50 officers and other ranks of air unit; supported by international and local civilian staff
Deployed since March 1964	UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	S/RES/186 (4 March 1964)	To use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting; to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and to contribute to a return to normal conditions.	1,010 personnel: 749 troops, 53 staff officers, 57 police, 151 civilians
May 1965– October 1966	DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary- General in the Dominican Republic	S/RES/203 (14 May 1965)	To observe the situation in the Dominican Republic and to report to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, on breaches of the ceasefire called by the Council or any events which might affect the maintenance of peace and order in the country.	2 military observers

September 1965 – March 1966	UNIPOM United Nations India – Pakistan Observation Mission	S/RES/209 (4 September 1965)	To supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where UNMOGIP operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965.	96 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff
October 1973– July 1979	UNEF II United Nations Emergency Force II	S/RES/338 (22 October 1973)	To supervise the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and, following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements.	6,973 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff (February 1974)
Deployed since June 1974	UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan)	S/RES/350 (31 May 1974)	To maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and Syrian forces; to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement.	1291 personnel: 1110 military, 56 staff officers, 125 civilians
Deployed since March 1978	UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	S/RES/425 (19 mars 1978) S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006)	To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; to restore international peace and security; to assist the Gov. of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. To monitor the cessation of hostilities; to accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South; to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; to assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Gov. of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area.	10,655 personnel: 9,632 troops, 214 staff officers, 809 civilians
August 1988– February 1991	UNIIMOG United Nations Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group	S/RES/479 (28 September 1980)	To verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement.	400 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff
May 1988– March 1990	UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	S/RES/622 (31 October 1988)	To assist in ensuring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (the monitoring of non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and the voluntary return of refugees) and in this context to investigate and report possible violations of any of the provisions of the Agreements.	50 military observers, supported by a number of international and local civilian staff
November 1989 – January 1992	ONUSCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America	S/RES/644 (7 November 1989)	To verify compliance by the Central American Governments with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other States. In addition, ONUCA played a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilization process.	1,098 military observers and troops, supported by international and local civilian staff (May/June 1990)
April 1989– March 1990	UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group	S/RES/435 (29 September 1978) & S/RES/632 (16 February 1989)	To assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and to ensure that: all hostile acts were ended; troops were confined to base, and, in the case of the South Africans, ultimately withdrawn from Namibia; all discriminatory laws were repealed, political prisoners were released, Namibian refugees were permitted to return, intimidation of any kind was prevented, law and order were impartially maintained.	4,493 all ranks, 1,500 civilian police and just under 2,000 international and local staff; the mission was strengthened by some 1,000 additional international personnel who came specifically for the elections
December 1989 – June 1991	UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	S/RES/626 (20 December 1988)	To verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba.	70 military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff

ANNEX 3

UN Observation and Monitoring Missions (1988-2022)

Date	Name	SC Resolution	Mandate	Maximum deployment (when applicable, as of January 2022)
August 1988– February 1991	UNIIMOG United Nations Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group	S/RES/479 (28 September 1980)	To verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement.	400 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff
May 1988– March 1990	UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	S/RES/622 (31 October 1988)	To assist in ensuring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (the monitoring of non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and the voluntary return of refugees) and in this context to investigate and report possible violations of any of the provisions of the Agreements.	50 military observers, supported by a number of international and local civilian staff
November 1989– January 1992	ONUSCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America	S/RES/644 (7 November 1989)	To verify compliance by the Central American Governments with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other States. In addition, ONUCA played a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilization process.	1,098 military observers and troops, supported by international and local civilian staff
January 1989– May 1991	UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	S/RES/626 (20 December 1988)	To verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northwards and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between Angola and Cuba.	70 military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff
November 1989– January 1992	ONUSCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America	S/RES/644 (7 November 1989)	To verify compliance by the Central American Governments with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other States. In addition, ONUCA played a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilization process.	1,098 military observers and troops, supported by international and local civilian staff
April 1991– October 2003	UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	S/RES/689 (3 April 1991)	To monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border, deter border violations and report on any hostile action.	1,187 all ranks, including 254 military observers supported by international and local civilian staff
May 1991– April 1995	ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	S/RES/693 (20 May 1991)	To verify the implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional aimed at ending a decade-long civil war. The agreements involved a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues. After the armed conflict had been formally ended in December 1992, ONUSAL verified elections which were carried out successfully in March and April 1994.	368 military observers and 315 civilian police, supported by international and local civilian staff [The Mission was augmented by some 900 electoral observers during the election]
August 1993– June 2009	UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	S/RES/858 (24 August 1993)	To verify compliance with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia with special attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved.	459 total personnel including 129 military observers, 16 police officers, 105 international staff, 208 local staff and 1 UN Volunteer

June 1993–September 1994	UNOMOR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	S/RES/846 (22 June 1993)	To monitor that border between Uganda and Rwanda to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.	81 military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff
May 1994–June 1994	UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	S/RES/915 (4 May 1994)	To verify the withdrawal of the Libyan administration and forces from the Aouzou Strip in accordance with the decision of the International Court of Justice.	9 military observers, supported by 6 international civilian staff
December 1994 – May 2000	UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	S/RES/968 (16 December 1994)	To monitor the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition. Following the signing by the parties of the 1997 general peace agreement.	81 military observers
February 1996–December 2002	UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	S/RES/1038 (15 January 1996)	To monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighboring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and held regular meetings with the local authorities in order to strengthen liaison, reduce tensions, improve safety and security and promote confidence between the parties.	28 military observers; 3 international civilian personnel and 6 local civilian staff
January 1997–May 1997	MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	S/RES/1094 (January 1997)	To verify the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, incl. the observation of a formal cessation of hostilities, the separation and concentration of the respective forces of forces, and the disarmament and demobilization of URNG combatants in assembly points specifically prepared for this purpose.	132 military observers and 13 medical personnel
September 1993 – September 1997	UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	S/RES/866 (22 September 1993)	To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreement and to report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General; to observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement.	303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel, 45 military engineers; 90 international, 136 local civilian staff, and 58 UN Volunteers
June 1997–February 1999	MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	S/RES/1118 (30 June 1997)	To monitor the normalization of State administration throughout the country; to provide good offices and mediation at the provincial and local levels and participate in the official organs established for that purpose; to verify compliance with various aspects of the ceasefire regime; to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police.	661 troops, 92 military observers and 403 civilian police observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff
July 1998–October 1999	UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	S/RES/1181 (13 July 1998)	To monitor the military and security situation in the country as a whole, as security conditions permit; To monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country.	41 military observers, a 15-person medical unit and 3 civilian police advisers; 30 international and 25 local civilian staff
July 2000–July 2008	UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	S/RES/47 (21 April 1948)	To maintain liaison with the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the ceasefire. In September 2000, the Council authorized UNMEE to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments.	4,154 personnel incl. 3,940 troops, 214 police, 229 international civilians and 244 local staff
April 2012–August 2012	UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	S/RES/2143 (21 April 2012)	To monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan to end the conflict in Syria.	278 military observers, 81 international civilian staff, 40 local civilian staff

ACRONYMS

CPAS	Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Center
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
OSASG	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus
P5	Five Permanent Security Council Members (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US)
SASG	Special Adviser of the Secretary-General
SRSB	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNTSO	<i>UN Truce Supervision Organization</i>

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank colleagues and friends provided comments on drafts of the report: Arthur Boutellis, Cedric de Coning, Hubert Faustmann, Richard Gowan, Raphaëlle Guillon, John Karlsrud, Norrie MacQueen, Aracelly Santana, Lisa Sharland, Paul D. Williams.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OLDER ONE-DIMENSIONAL UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Is the Future of UN Peacekeeping its Past?

What can we learn about the future of UN peace operations from the study of its past experiences with observation and monitoring operations

This current report is part of a series of Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung (FES) research on the security in the Eastern Mediterranean region and aims to put the UN presence in Cyprus into perspective, to show that the type of UN settings deployed in Cyprus is not unique. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) belongs to older Cold War peace operations that currently constitute half of the 12 current peacekeeping operations: the operations in Kashmir (UNMOGIP, April 1948), in Jerusalem (UNTSO, May 1948) – observations missions that were precursors to the peacekeep-

ing concept of the mid-1950s (see section 2.1) – in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964), in the Golan (UNDOF, 1974), and in South Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978). The mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) created in 1991 was added to that list as the nature of its mandate and of its conflict environment is similar to those previous missions. Most of these missions are deployed in the wider Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East/North Eastern Africa region (except the one in Kashmir), where major powers of the Security Council are involved.

The current report is looking at the common features of these older missions in the context of a return to cold war “minimalism” within the Security Council, and to explain what this means for future trends in peacekeeping.

These missions belong to a particular period of time, when superpower rivalry generally limited UN peacekeeping to third party ceasefire monitoring or observation missions in interstate conflicts. They were limited and focused in their mandate, and this is something that the UN Security Council have been looking at again for a few years (Syria, Colombia, Yemen) since the changing global order has put pressure on the type of large state-building peacekeeping missions that were popular in the 1990s-2000s (i.e., multidimensional UN peace operations). The aims of this study is also to shed light on this under-research part of peacekeeping studies, as the longevity of those missions has somehow discouraged the research community to study them.